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IN T~E SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN CALL AND CLARK JENKINS, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
vs. 
CITY OF WEST JORDAN, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 19186 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellants (hereafter Call) are subdividers. Call 
sought permission to sell subdivision lots in the City of 
West Jordan. West Jordan charged a fee of $16,576.00 as a 
condition for approval. 
The authority for imposing the fee is found in 
West Jordan City Ordinance 33 §9-C-8 (Appendix A). 
Plaintiffs claim that the ordinance is unconstitutional. 
Plaintiffs seek a refund of the $16,576.00 fee. The 
complaint was brought as a class action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The trial court entered Judgment for West Jordan. 
Ca~l seeks to Ciave t'1at Judgment reversed, and judgment 
entered :...n :lis :a'1cr. 
certified as a class action. 
PFGCEDUiV.;., i1:STOE'i 
this case. In the first case, tne Utan Supreme Court 
affirmed a judgment of dismissal by the trial court. 
Call v. City of West Jordan, (Call :::1, 606 ?. 2d 2: - ICtah 
1979). That case is attached as A!Jpendix B. Thereafter, 
the Court granted rehearing. Call ''· Citv of West Jordar. 
(Call II), 614 P.2d 1257 !Utah 1980) That case is attached 
as Appendix C. 
After remand, the case was tried to the cour':. 
During pre-trial proceedings, the Court appointed a special 
master. The initial report of the special master is ver~· 
crucial to this case. The report is attached as Appendix D. 
Judge Dee entered judgment for West Jordan. Call appeals. 
After Call II was decided, this Court decided 
three similar cases. Banber:cy Dev. Corp. v. South Jordan 
~' 631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981) (Appendix E) Laffertv v. 
Payson Citv, 642 P.2d 376 (Ctah 1982), (Appendix Fl; and 
Patterson v. Alpine Citv, 663 P.2d 95 (Utah 1983), (Appendix 
G). These cases are each attached as exhibits because they 
are closely intertwined with this case. 
FACTS 
A. Composition of the City of West Jordan 
West Jordan is not a '1omogenous :crrr.urc1::·.·. cs 
made up from se•1eral dif:'erent sub-ccr.murc1c::1es. 
t:'.;e ·=r1sinal, or ol.d-tirners' ::omrnunity i.vhich has existed .for 
:nan~' ears. There are the newcomers' subd::.visions. There 
is a rural farming community. There is also a business and 
light manufacturing community Ir. 6i3 at p.5 and p.40, see 
also r. 673, Tables 1 , 2, 3, compare defendant's 
Exhibit 1). 
B. Recreation for Old-timers 
West Jordan has one central park of fifty acres. 
For the most part, that park serves the old-timers. Ir. 673 
at p. 20). 
C. Flood Control for Old-timers 
The old-timers utilize an existing flood control 
system of canals, ditches and storm sewers. It appears that 
':he old existing flood control system has long since been 
paid off (plaintiff's Exhibit 10). 
D. Growth of West Jordan 
West Jordan has been experiencing moderate growth. 
The population in 1970 was 6946. It is estimated that the 
population will be 18,000.00 in 1995 (r. 673 at p.4, Table 
:) . This projected growth requires additional facilities 
for parks and flood control (r. 597-598, 611-626) 
E. Traditional Funding for New Facilities 
West Jordan has a variety of resources for funding 
the new facilities: 
1. General Bondins Power: The City has $35 
million in unused bonding power, 
!plaintiff's Exhibit 7, transmittal letter 
::rom ril lan E. Tolman); 
2. J:a~ 
$2 million in '-Jnused ~1-.:cC. :cn<:.r'.J .... ::,::r.i.:.:1·~ 
power (r. 599 see also 
Exhibit 7); 
3. Flood Control Assistance: The City receives 
$110,000.00 per year from Salt Lake Count1 
for flood control assistance lplaintif'.''s 
Exhibit 10, "Storm Sewer Funding") ; 
4. Storm Sewer Fees: West Jordan rece i 'Jes 
approximately $219,000.00 per year in storm 
sewer fees (Exhibit 10 "Storm Sewer 
Funding") . 
F. New Subdivision Fees 
In 1974, West Jordan formulated a plan to expand 
its flood control system. This was to be done by building a 
series of detention basins (r. 610-626) 
West Jordan di& not use traditional funding 
sources for the detention basins (see paragraph E above I . 
Instead, West Jordan has resorted to a special tax on 
subdividers (r. 622-623). Call 
constitutionality of that special tax. 
POINT I 
WEST JORDAN HAD THE BURDEN 
OF PRODUCING EVIDENCE 
challenges the 
In a traditional trial, the p:aintif:' ICa~~J ·,JCc, 
have the burden of forward ·,;i ':h e'.ridence. 
traditional burden was reversed in tnis case. 
:~r3a~ .3~ :~e ~ur~en c~ producing evidence. ~here were three 
rect~CG~ ~~r :~is shift in tne burden: 
A ~iscoverv Sanctions 
The primary reason :or shifting t!"le burden is that 
West Jordan :rustrated discovery. Therefore, Judge Rigtrup 
reversed the normal burden as a sanction (see R. 1171-1173; see 
also r. c442, 1444, 1446, 1448, l-lS0-51, 1455-56, 1458, 
1460-61, ~463-66, 1468-70, 1472-74) Judge Rigtrup's pre-trial 
order is attached as Appendix H. 
Specifically, Judge Rigtrup ruled that: 
1. The trial is hereby bifurcated into two phases. 
2. At the first phase, defendant shall have the 
burden of producing evidence. 
The trial court reconfirmed Judge Rigtrup's ruling: 
The order which was signed by Judge 
Rigtrup reverses the usual order of 
trial and this Court is bound by that 
order that was signed requiring that the 
defendants herein proceed as though they 
were plaintiffs and put on their 
evidence as to what they've done with 
the funds which were taken from the 
developers (September 1, 1982 Transcript 
at p. 3 I. 
B. Trust Theorv 
West Jordan does not keep the seven percent 
subdivider fee in any segregated or restricted account. 
Rather, West Jordan simply lumps the money into its general 
ftrnd. 
In the original appeal, Call challenged that practice 
of mixing :'unds. This Court held that: 
A~though the money which was 
ccl:ected from the plainti:':'s in this 
case was deposited in the City's general 
fund, it should r.ot te assumed t:!-'.at c:1e 
money thus becomes usab'.e :er Jtcer 
purposes by the Cic; and is or no 
special benefit to the area souqnt to be 
subdivided. On the contrarv . if 
money is collected from t~e ?Ublic for a 
specific purpose, it becomes a trust 
fund corrunitted to the carrying out cf 
that purpose. 606 P.2d at 220 
It is well settled that a trustee has the duty o: 
producing evidence regarding the funds held in the trust. This 
Court has held: 
It is the duty of a trustee to keep 
full, accurate and orderly records and 
when any question arises as to their 
sufficiency or accuracy, the burden is 
upon him to show the correctness of his 
accounts and doubts may be resolved 
adversely to him, Walker v. Walker, 1 ~ 
Ut.2d 53, 404 P.2d 253 (1965). 
C. Practical Considerations 
There are certain practical reasons for shifting the 
burden. The financial records are all in the possession of 
West Jordan. Call cannot attack those financial records until 
they are produced. 
principle: 
This Court appears to have ah·eady recognized that 
As the information that must be used to 
assure that subdivision fees are within 
the standard of reasonableness is most 
accessible to the municipality, that 
body should disclose the basis of its 
calculations to whoever challenges the 
reasonableness of the subdividers fees. 
Banberrv Development Corp. v. South 
Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899, 904 (Utah, 
1981) . 
POINT II 
WEST JORDAN MUST LOSE IF IT 
FAILS TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF 
PRODUCING EVIDENCE 
The Court must find against West Jordan if it is 
unable to meet the burden of producing evidence. 
This Court has held: 
[SJ ome situations require the 
party who does not have the burden of 
persuasion to produce prima facie 
evidence of the non-existence of such 
fact in order to support a finding in 
his favor on such issue. In re Swan, 4 
Ut.2d 277, 293 P.2d 682, 686 (1956). 
The Court continued: 
In other words, the Court must find the 
facts against a party who fails to 
satisfy his burden and such finding does 
not have to be supported by positive 
evidence. Id. at 686 
Recently, this Court affirmed that rule. Even though 
it involved a bailment issue, the basic procedural rules 
governing the burden of producing evidence should be the same. 
The Court held that when the burden of producing evidence is 
shifted to defendant (as in the present case) and the defendant 
offers no evidence, the issue must be resolved in favor of the 
plaintiff, Staheli Farms v. Farmers' Cooperative of Southern 
Utah, 655 P.2d 680 (Utah 1982). 
Speaking of the burden of prpducing evidence, Wigmore 
gives the following summary: 
He [the judge] may require the 
opponent [defendant in this case] to 
produce evidence, under penalty of 
losing the case by direction of the 
Judge. A duty of producing evidence, 
under this penalty for default has now 
ar-isen ~or the opponent. 9 Wigmore on 
Evidence, §2487 p. 294. 
~ t::' ~ ·....:. - :.. 3. : 
:.._; 
_: 5e _; ::: ·. - e: 
::-. E>::.~e:-'.::·?, -~ 
2. 
;__ .3 3:3 : ~ - -
- - ....... '.:l .... ~ - ~ - .. '-- - ~ 
:ie:er.Cant jces r.ot sat::. s.: 
~1:r ~espect to step A, ~e ~ever ge~ tc Ste~ 3. 
POINT ~:I 
~ORDAN fAI::,ED "'.'C 
?RODCCE EV:DENCE THAT A ?~E::c 
HEARING WAS HE::,D AND THA"'.' THE 
?:..AN~::;c ·=::::~_'-11.SS.::G~ PREP.:..RE:: 
':'EE C,RDI:JANCE 
~3~- ar.sw·e:-e:...: ----
~ues~1cn 1:-': :.~e 3::::::-7nat:··e. 
':.J.x::--.c ;-c:· ... ·e:::_-. ~.:i._: ':e~_.:; ----
_L 
s:3:~:~s 3:~ ··:e~e~ 
~ee~s ~:3:~ ~~;-~~ :~a:. 
:::-:-··e:r::~.e:-.: 
=·~~=-a 3':. .:_?. 
::-:cse st2':.'....:.tes ar:-e sa":::..s::.ed. 
:.-:.e :~a1.-:. :...s ::i:-::::.<.:er. ar.c :.!"'.e :::ielega+:.:.cn :.s ·:s:.:. ::--.e :ast 
stat~te !n ':his ·:hain 2f ~e:egation states: 
The Plar.ninq Commission shall oreoare a 
regulation ~overning t~e subdi~:.sion a~ 
land '"'ithin a munic::.pality. .:.. p•.:blic 
hearing thereon shall be held by tne 
legislative body, after which the 
legislative body may adopt said 
regulation for the muni~ipality, 
Utah Code Ann. §10-9-25 11953. 
After the decision in Cal~ I, Call amended the 
complaint to include the following allegation: 
~". Plaintiffs allege that Ordinance 
No. 33 was not prepared by the '.-iest 
Jordan City Planning Commission and 
that no pubiic hearing was held on 
Ordinance 33 prior to its adoption, 
as required bv the aforement::.oned 
statute, and that Ordinance ~o. 33 
is therefore •101d and invalid, Ir. 
3 3 9 I . 
Thus, the issue in Call I was whether the :eg::.s!at~re 
~a~ ce.eqated oower to the de:endant to impcse the fee. 
~ou~t ~eJd tnat taxing power was delegated i~ a pub:ic .-:.ear:-:~g 
3nC c!".e Commissior. ?repared the 
:a:: now cla1~s ':.-:.at tne crd~~ance :3 :~·.·al:d 
B. There is No Evidence o: .~.n·.· 
and No Evidence That the 
Prepared bv the Plannina a.r.d -·C~ . .:._;;,:; 
Commission. 
There is no evidence in the recorJ of 3ny ~ucl:: 
hearing on the issue of the seven percent suodi•Iider :'ee. 
There is no evidence in the record that the Planning and Zoni~c 
Commission prepared the ordinance. 
After West Jordan completed its evidence Jwdge 
Dee clearly agreed that there was never any public hearing; and 
that there was never any action by the Planning and Zoninc 
Commission: 
. no evidence was specifically 
given to the Court during this hearing 
concerning the preparation of the 
ordinance by or under the direction of 
the Zoning and Planning or Planning and 
Zoning Commission, and there was no 
evidence given to the Court during this 
hearing about a public hearing, (Sept. 
2, 1982 Transcript, at p. 72). 
West Jordan will likely rely on the findings 
signed by Judge Dee some months later. (R. 1500 paragraph 221 
However, those "canned" findings were prepared by West Jordan, 
and mechanically signed by Judge Dee some months after hearing 
the evidence. That practice has been criticized: Kelson •1. 
United States, 503 F.2d 1291 (10th Cir. 19741 G.M. Leas1nc 
Corp. v. United States, 514 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 19751. 
Nevertheless, it makes little difference whetr.c· 
Judge Dee signed those "canned" findings. 
evidence in the record to support a 
There is s1mpL 
finding of a ,... pu~ .. 
hearing. Neither is there any evidence tc surpcc:: a :' ind1~: 
that the Planning Commission prepared tl".e ord::oar.ce. 
'. 0 
The Failure to Follow Each 
Statutorv Step Renders the 
Ordinance Invalid. 
West Jordan can impose a fee if the Planning and 
Zoning Commission prepares the ordinance, and if a public 
hearing is held. However, West Jordan did not follow those 
statutory procedures. That failure is fatal. The ordinance is 
invalid. 
Unlike the usual legislative hearing, 
the public hearing on a proposed zoning 
ordinance or amendment is required by 
law. A notice of hearing to a property 
owner may be required by the due process 
clauses of the state and federal 
constitutions . . Failure of the 
legislative body to conduct an 
appropriate hearing, after notice which 
affords a fair opportunity to be heard, 
will render the regulation invalid, 
R. Anderson, American Law of Zoning 2d, 
(1976), Section 4.11. 
*** 
Municipal corporations have no 
inherent power of taxation. On the 
contrary, municipal corporations possess 
with respect to taxation only such po.wer 
as has been granted to them by the 
cons ti tut ion or the statutes . . It 
has been frequently stated that, as the 
power to tax is a governmental function, 
exercise thereof by a municipal 
corporation must rest upon a 
constitutional or statutory grant of 
power clearly expressed . And 
since the authority to levy taxes is an 
extraordinary one, it should never be 
left to implication unless it be a 
necessary implication. The grant relied 
on should be evident and unmistakable, 
and, if there is a doubt as to the 
existence of the power, such doubt will 
be resolved against the municipality and 
in favor of the taxpayer. McQuillin, The 
Law of Municipal Corporations, Section 
44.0':. 
*** 
The grant of an~· pcwer tc ~3:(, ~a·~~ 
by the state to a ~unicipal ccrocra:i , 
will be, according to t::.e r'_: ~c s.c::::ep~--:0 1:. 
by virtually all aut'1oritcies, ccnstr'Jec 
strictly. A citizen cannot be sub'ected 
to the burden of taxation wit'1cut-cl~ar 
warrant of law. 
The power of taxation ,_:an be 
exercised only in the manner prescribed 
by law. If the authority of the 
municipality to tax is doubtful, the 
doubt must always be resolved against 
the tax. Id. at Section 44.13. 
Utah case law is in accord. A case in po1-nt is 
Gwilliam v. Ogden City, 49 Utah 555, 164 P. 1022 119:7) .• r. 
that case, the legislature delegated power to tax for municipa: 
improvements. The statute required the city to publish 
notice twenty days prior to imposing the tax. The city 
published a notice to levy taxes for a curb and gutter. 
However, the city did more than simply install a curb and 
gutter. The city lowered the grade of the street. 
allege that the tax was illegal. The Utah Supreme Court 
concluded that: 
changed. 
The things required of the city 
by [the statute] are jurisdictional, and 
unless they are complied with with 
reasonable strictness the city 
authorities are without power or 
jurisdiction to impose a special 
assessment or tax to defray the cost of 
the proposed improvement, 16 4 P. at 
1024. 
Gwilliam is a vintage case. However, the law has r.c: 
More recently, our Supreme Court deciced c~e case 
Lewis v. Kanab Citv, 523 P.2d 4:· ICtah c9.41. ::--. :.:-:at case 
Kanab desired to raise money ~or a c~rb and ;ut~er ;r~-ec~. 
~~e legislature had delegated power to ~unicipalities to levy a 
tax for such improvements. However, that statute required the 
city to follow certain specific steps before assessing the tax. 
One step required a board of equalization and review. Another 
step required that notice be mailed to each property owner. 
Kanab City failed to follow those procedural steps. The Court 
held that Kanab City had no power to tax unless each of the 
procedural steps was followed. The tax was therefore 
invalidated. 
The final chapter on this issue was written just 
months ago in the case of Patterson v. Alpine City, 663 P.2d 95 
(Utah 19 8 3) . Patterson is almost identical to this case. In 
Patterson, the municipality had assessed certain sewer fees. 
Power to impose those fees was delegated from the State for use 
only where an ordinance was passed by roll call vote. Alpine 
City did not follow that statutory procedure and the sewer tax 
was therefore invalidated. 
D. This Case Does Not Fall Under the 
Broad Powers Granted in State v. 
Hutchinson. 
In a landmark decision, this Court has 
dramatically expanded municipal powers. State v. Hutchinson, 
624 P.2d 1116 (Ut. 1980). However, Hutchinson was not a blank 
check for municipalities. The Hutchinson Court specifically 
held that: 
Specific grants of 
to limit the means 
authority 
available 
may serve 
under the 
for some 
on the 
the use 
general welfare clause, 
~imitation may be imposed 
exercise of power by directing 
power in 
r~4 i'.:d at 1126 
a particular manner. 
impose subdivider fees. That power i,;; ;ranted ·,..;1+:.h ~t--e,_·1::. 
restrictions. We learn from Call ~ what those ::estr1ct18r.o 
are. One restriction is a public nearing. A secor:c 
restriction is action by the Planning and Zoning Commission. 
Since West Jordan enacted the ordinance without following the 
rules, the delegation of authority fails and the ordinance is 
invalid. 
POINT IV 
WEST JORDAN HAS FAILED TO 
MEET ITS BURDEN OF SHOWING 
THAT THE SEVEN PERCENT FEE 
IS A RESTRICTED FUND 
A. Statement of the Issue. 
Defendant has no power to impose a fee on 
subdividers as a general revenue measure . 
. A reasonable charge for a 
specific purpose is permissible, whereas 
a general fee that amounts to a revenue 
measure is not. Lafferty v. Payson 
City, 642 P.2d 376, 378 (Utah 1982) 
West Jordan's City Ordinance specifies that the seven 
percent fee will be used for flood control and parks. Thus, a 
key issue is whether the fee is really used only for flood 
control and parks, or whether it is used for general revenue 
measures. 
This same issue was preserved in Cal 1 I, where tne 
Court stated: 
If money is collected :rom the 
public for a specific purpose, lt 
becomes a trust fund for carrying out 
that purpose. 606 P.2d at 220. 
The issue ~as also ~ramed in the pre-trial order: 
of 
. defendant shall 
producing e•1idence 
issues . 
have the burden 
on the following 
D. Whether the seven percent 
subdivision fee was in practice used as 
a reasonable charge for a specific 
purpose, or whether it was in practice 
used as a general fee that amounts to a 
revenue measure. (R. 1030-1031) 
B. Judge Dee's Findings 
Judge Dee made the following finding: 
Even though the individual dollars paid 
by the plaintiffs cannot be individually 
traced through the accounting records, 
the Court finds from a preponderance of 
the evidence that the monies were spent 
on flood control projects and parks and 
recreation areas for which the impact 
fee was assessed (R. 1498) 
C. Survey of the Evidence 
This is not a matter where the evidence is in 
conflict or where the judge had to weigh evidence. There is 
not one iota of evidence to support Judge Dee's finding on this 
crucial issue. 
Plaintiff's expert has testified that defendant did 
not segregate the funds or treat them as a trust fund. 
Plaintiff's expert has testified that West Jordan's records do 
not show how the money was used, (Nov. 18 Transcript, at 11-13 
and 16-17). 
The special master agrees with plaintiff's expert. 
The special master has concluded that the defendant's records 
do not account for these trust funds properly: 
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accou:-i.<:.:.ng ':.:-e3.+::_,...e!~':.. : :...r-st, :::-:::.:: . ..:... 
the Cit:.: st-'.ccJ: ::! :-:a'»= ~.:>=pa:-e,..;. 3 -:eC 
asset ledaer :.~at recorjed 3 iescr1ot:.2~ 
of al~ :{xed assets ;:ur::r.ased, jate _,~ 
purchase, cost and 3r.y other app ~icab~e 
information .3ecor.C:~·, I <:.::-iin:~ that 
the Flood Control and ParKs Fee receipts 
should have been recorded directl~ into 
a restricted equity account with~n the 
general fund, which wculd represent 
earmarked funds for :~ood contro.i. and 
parks. As the City deterrnined alccwable 
uses for these funds, t:'1ey should ha\·e 
made a transfer from the restricted 
equity account to the revenue account, 
!plaintiff's Exhibit 9 at p. 91 ./ 
West Jordan did introduce its accounting records. 
However, those accounting records simply do not answer the 
question of where or how the seven percent subdivision fee was 
spent. The~ testimony on that issue is as :ollows: 
Q. (By Mr. DeBry I Okay, based upon 
all the exhibits you've seen at trial, 
based upon generally accepted accounting 
principles, based upon all the testimony 
you've heard at tr ia 1, do you have an 
opinion whether the plaintiffs'~>; fee 
was spent on any flood control or any 
park project? 
A. I can't form an opinion. 
Q. Why not? 
A. Because as I stated before, there's 
no issue that they built these pro:ects, 
the issue is I don't /.(now 'Nr.cse ~.oney 
was spent. The :t:und :.s self-oalar.c1ng, 
yes, but I don•t ~new ~hether ~e s~ent a 
particular sum on t:--,e :-1a\'Or 1 s .:ar, -. _.._ 
whether ' . .;e spent .J..1.-. on this ~rc:e·:':, 
(Nov. 13 :':::-anscr:.-;::t, at i_:. ~6-_-l 
.:J.m Q n a c_"L..i:m :1fJ ~ lu .1.tu..1 d ~c-0 a_ 
CVt1 ~ ~"-'d a.cup:t L{h c 1n1..tle1 _,_ 
~r i 1ct . .u,,.J_w~ ~lui1._f" ,L '>'l..P'-V~ 
) . 
,f.U «.~ 1 
;...1._ •1·~· \1·-(J 
~Li 53(e)fz_' L'."fi: C.P. ~J,1.,,.. i _ .,, 
,-, 
/. 
::... s c:npossib~e 
':'o accompl.:.sh Step 3, I would have 
t:o :::!eter;Tune , .: any general defendant 
obligation for benefit to subdiv.:.ders 
existed for each flood control and park 
transaction and proiect. Since this 
information is not orovided in the 
existing accounting records, it will 
have to come from other records and, 
again, from the help of a trained 
engineer. It is also oossible that such 
information mav not be available at al~ 
for some transactions, therefore, the 
analysis would not be possible 
[Emphasis added. I !plaintiff's 
Exhibit 9 at p. 7). 
D. Sumrnarv 
ar.·: ar.a ~ys l.S 
West Jordan had the burden of producing evidence to 
show that the seven percent fee was used for Flood Control and 
Parks. West Jordan did not meet that burden. Two qualified 
C.P.A.s ICall's expert and the special master) testified that 
they cannot determine where or how the money was spent. If the 
expenditures were not restricted, they amount to more general 
revenue measures. 
POINT V 
WEST JORDAN HAS FAILED TO MEET 
ITS BURDEN OF SHOWING THAT A 
FLAT SEVEN PERCENT FEE IS 
APPROPRIATE FOR ALL SUBDIVISIONS 
A. Statement of the Issue 
This Court has stated that: 
The dedication [or fee] should have some 
reasonable relationship to the need 
created by the subdivision. 
~·) {r)fz) L;.R er.:>, Wlcl o.t 
. if not, it is :urb1dde:-: :i.~c 
amounts to confiscation c: pri«·ate 
property in contravention af =he 
constitutional prohibitions r-ather than 
a reasonable regulation under police 
power, Banberry Development Corp. v. 
South Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899, 905. 
The Supreme Court has also noted that some types c~ 
improvements are city wide: 
The central facilities that support 
water and sewer service would generally 
confer the same benefits in every part 
of the community . Id. at 905. 
However, other types of improvements are spread cut 
and vary from neighborhood to neighborhood: 
. The benefits conferred by 
recreational, flood control, or other 
dispersed resources may be measurably 
different in different parts of the 
community. Id. at 905. 
Of course, this case involves neighborhood-type 
projects (flood control and parks) These proJects "may be 
measurably different in different parts of the community." 
Id. at 905. 
order: 
This issue was clearly preserved in the pre-trial 
At the first phase, defendant shall have 
the burden of producing 
evidence . . The accounting should, 
inter alia, specify how defendant has 
spent the 7% subdivision fees paid by 
plaintiffs. The accounting shall also 
compare how defendant has spent the ~% 
fee received from [all other! 
subdivisions . (R. 1030) 
It appears that this issue is especiall1 =rucial in 
'"'!'1t '.lf ttns C'.lurt' s recent ruling in Patterson v. Alpine 
~· ~6:i P.2d 95 ll~tah 19831. In Patterson, this Court held 
oo+ ( Q~) 
t:-iat a municipality can A arbitrarily assess some residents 
$700.00 and other residents $1,000.00 and other residents 
S l, 5 0 0. 0 0 for the same city-wide water system. This case is 
Just the opposite side of that coin. It is unreasonable to 
charge all residents of the City a seven percent fee for 
neighborhood projects when some neighborhoods require flood 
control projects and some do not. 
B. Judge Dee's Ruling 
Judge Dee made no finding at all on this crucial 
issue, Ir. 1496, et seq.). Call made a timely motion to make 
additional findings (R 1256 at paragraph 3). JuQ.~e Dee denied 
the motion (r. 1494). 
C. Survey of the Evidence 
Defendant's evidence is skimpy. Nevertheless, the 
evidence suggests substantial differences in flood control 
needs in various parts of the city. Defendant's Exhibit 7 
shows a variety of different flood control projects spread 
across the city. Costs vary substantially from project to 
proJect. For example, subdivisions which drain into Barney's 
Creek are saddled with capital costs of $275,703.04. On the 
other hand, subdivisions which use the 3200 West Storm Drain 
are obligated to pay only $38,313.86. (See defendant's 
Exhibit 4. I 
Thus, it would appear that the Barney's Creek 
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subdivisions would have a much n1cher assesHrent ~nan •c·· 
3200 West subdivisions. However, t:',at is c.ct ':'1e :3s-=. 
city has charged a flat seven percent co all new suod1~is1ons 
Obviously, some subdivisions are overpay1ng--others 3.r~ 
underpaying. 
For example: the 1981 budget (see plaintiff's 
Exhibit 7) notes that $177, 000. 00 would be recei•1ed from t~.e 
seven percent fee. The budget shows that the major expenditure 
for that year would be the Barney's Creek Detention Basin. 
(See plaintiff's Exhibit 10 section titled Storm Sewer 
Funding.) Therefore, in 1981, all new subdividers must 
contribute to the Barney's Creek project, even though their 
subdivision might be in a wholly different part of town. 
D. Summary. 
In summary, the city is only authorized to irr.pose the 
fee for specific needs caused by specific subdivisions. 
However, the city has set a flat tax of seven percent on all 
subdivisions in all parts of town. There is no relationsh1? 
between that flat seven percent tax and any specific proJeC~ 
for any specific subdivision. That squarely violates 
Patterson, supra and Banberry, supra. It appears that the 
seven percent is really used as a general revenue measure, 
(compare Point III above) 
?OINT 'JI 
DEFEt!Di'.NT HAS F .0..ILED TO MEET I'I'S 
5CRDE:l ".:C SHOW THAT '::HE SEVEN 
PERCENT FEE FALLS EQUALLY ON 
OLD-".:1:1.ERS, cJEW-COMERS, AND 
FUTURE-COMERS 
A. Statement of the Issue 
This Court has stated that it is unconstitutional to 
put the entire burden of improvements on newcomers. Rather, 
the purpose of the seven percent fee is to equalize the 
financial burdens among old-timers, newcomers, 
future-comers. 
Stated otherwise, to comply with the 
standard of reasonableness, a 
municipality fee related to services 
like water and sewer must not require 
newly developed properties to bear more 
than their equitable share of the 
capital costs in relation to benefits 
conferred. To determine the equitable 
share of the capital costs to be borne 
by newly developed properties, a 
municipality should determine the 
relative burdens previously borne by 
those properties in comparison with 
other properties in the municipality as 
a whole: The fee in question should not 
exceed the amount sufficient to equalize 
the relative burdens of newly developed 
and other properties. Banberry, 631 
P.2d at 903. 
and 
The Banberry court went on to suggest seven criteria 
which would equalize the burden among old-timers, newcomers and 
future-comers. 631 P.2d at p. 904. 
::' 1 
B. Judge Dee's Findings 
Judge Qee rrade spec:;,.:::: :1r,di;)cs ::~a!: :.--:e ,-._, ~+-, 
burden on old-timers, newcomers and futu~e-co~ers ~3d ~e~-
equalized. However, Judge Dee qave :-ic a.0al'/s1s o: :.:-ie issue. 
He simply parroted the language from Banberry. IR. 1502 a• 
paragraph 29). Call made a timely motion to amend. ( R. : 2 54 
paragraph 14). The motion was denied by Judge Dee. (R. l4941. 
C. Survey of the Evidence 
This is not a case where the trial Judge had to we1g~ 
evidence. There was absolutely no evidence to suppor~ 
Judge Dee's finding. 
Indeed, defendant's skimpy evidence shows clearl,. 
that the old-timers are getting a "free ride." The sever. 
percent subdividers fee was apparently based on a i9-4 Study 
(defendant's Exhibit 7). That study bases the entire ccst o: 
the improvements on ~ subdivisions (Exhibit 7 at p. ll-i21. 
According to that study, the old portions of the City pa: 
absolutely nothing toward the flood control proJects. That is 
a direct violation of the Banberry rule. 
The only evidence on this issue came from plaintiffs' 
expert. Plaintiffs' expert testified that it is impossible tc 
relate the contributions of old-timers, newcomers, ar.c 
future-comers based upon the evidence and records produced be 
West Jordan, (Nov. 18, 1982 Transcript at ?· 13-16) 
POINT VII 
THIS CASE HAS ~JOTHING ".'C er 
WITH THE NEED FOR FLOCD 
CONTROL AND PARKS 
Most of defendant 1 s e':1de~ce ~e:3~e~ 
~:ccd :cnt=cl anc parks. Cal: concedes that West Jordan needs 
Ca.i.l concedes t'1at West Jordar. needs flood control. 
However, tnat nas absolutely nothing to do with this case. 
This case deals with how to finance the flood control 
and park proJects. One way to finance such prOJects is by 
bonding. Of course, the financial burden of bonding would fall 
equally on all 26,000 residents (see plaintiff's Exhibit 7 at 
p. 9 4) • However, West Jordan has chosen another scheme. West 
Jordan has chosen to finance the proJects on the shoulders of 
approximately 100 subdividers. 
Thus, the issue in this case is whether West Jordan 
has constitutional and statutory authority to shift that 
financial burden from a base of 26,000 people to a base of only 
100 people. 
Finally, there is a "red herring" in this case. West 
Jordan pleads poverty. West Jordan really wants this Court to 
"bend" the rules because of the alleged populatiqn explosion 
and financial need. 
In point of fact, West Jordan's revenue from all 
sources has grown over one thousand percent (1000%) in the past 
decade, (plaintiff's Exhibit 7 at p. 85.). Indeed, the 
defendant could raise an additional $35 million in bonds 
tomorrow (see transmittal letter from Allan G. Tolman, City 
Manager, attached with plaintiff's Exhibit 7). In addition, 
the defendant can probably bond up to $2 million extra for 
flood control. ~oreover, the defendant gets about $110,000.00 
per 1ear in ~lood control funds from the Salt Lake County 
23 
government. Final~y 1 
5219,000.00 per year in :ncnt:~l 0 · sc0cc- se·Nec 0 cc.o. ''°~·· 
plaintiff's Exhibit 10, section titled Storm Sewer ?und1~c.1 
In summary, there is no cb~ecti\le e•,~1dence tha"t ':.~e 
City is poor. All the evidence points in the opposite 
direction. The increased population means an increased tax 
base for municipalities. 
POINT VIII 
THIS CASE SHOULD BE CERTIFIED 
AS A CLASS ACTION 
A. Procedural History in the Trial Court 
This case was brought as a class action. A motion tc 
certify the class was made to Judge Winder. The l'lotion was 
denied, (r. 127). Some three years later the motion to certify 
the class was renewed to Judge Banks. That motion was also 
denied. (r. 463). 
The motion was renewed before Judge Dee, 
(r. 908-914). Judge Dee's final ruling denied class 
certification, (r. 1507-1508 at paragraph 17). 
B. Procedural History in the Supreme Court 
The class issue was presented to the utan 
Supreme Court during the briefing on Call I. The Supreme Cour~ 
was silent on class issues. After remand, Judge Banks deniec 
class certification. Ca 11 pet1 tioned the Supreme Court fer 
intermediate appeal. The petition was denied. Thereaf~e1, 
Call petitioned to the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus ~-
compel Judge Banks to enter findings. 
~hus, tne c~ass issue has been to the Supreme Court on 
-:.r::reo::::> occasions. i-lowe•;e r, tt'.e Supreme Court has net ruled on 
the class issues. 
It is settled that silence on such an issue 
leaves the matter open for further consideration by the trial 
court. Walsh v. City of Detroit, 412 F.2d 226 (6th Cir. l969); 
Blinzler v. Andrews, 519 P.2d 438 (Ida. 1973); Hulihee v. 
Heins of Haeu, 556 P.2d 920 (Hawaii 1976). 
c. Rule 23(a) (1)--The Class is so 
Numerous that Joinder of all 
Members is Impractical. 
The class in this case consists of all 
subdividers who have been required to pay cash and/or property 
pursuant to Ordinance No. 33 of the City of West Jordan and the 
Amendment thereto adding Section 9-C-8. Plaintiffs believe 
that the class consists of approximately one hundred ( 100) 
members. Joinder of all 100 would be impractical because of 
size alone. 
Even if the class contained less than 100 
members, Rule 23(a)(l), Utah R. Civ. P., is still satisfied as 
recent cases have upheld classes consisting of fewer members, 
Cypres v. Newport New Gen. & Nonsectarian Hosoital Ass'n., 375 
F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967), (class numbering 13 certified); 
Arkansas Education Ass'n. v. Board of Education of Portland, 
446 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1971), !plaintiff class of 17 members 
certified); Horn v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 555 
F.:'d ro (10th Cir. 1977), (reversal of a denial of a class of 
4 6) . Furthermore, the difficulty of joining even a smaller 
:1urnber of plaint~ffs i;-, ~;.e a.c:.1-.::--. ;" . .i.= 
:or exa:np.:..e, ::_;.;:---::er:_:_·-~ 
JOlnci.er •..;i.:..:. be '..mpract1~able; :::u.~ _ .. 
:nost cases, :.:-:e :-:....:..rr,be.r :.:-.at ·,..·.:___ -· 
itself satisfy t:-ie la) I: I crerec;u~s~>:e 
should be :nuch lcwer. "'.''."le =i::1::u:t::· 
inherent in joini:-ig as few as '~ er 30 
class members should raise a presumption 
that joinder is impracticable, 'lr.d <::~e 
plaintiff whose class is that large or 
larger should :neet the test of' 2 3 1 a) I:) 
on that fact alone. -::oinder of lar:;er 
classes might sometimes be practicable, 
or the action might '.'ail to meet the 
superiority test of 23ib)(3), and 
JOinder of a smaller c:ass wi:: o:ten be 
impracticable because of the 
circumstances of the particular cases; 
but the plaintiff whose class numbers in 
the 25 or 30 range should have a 
reasonable chance of success on the 
basis of numbers alone, Newberg, Newberg 
on Class Actions, §llOSb at 174 1197~). 
D. Rule 23 (a) (2)--There are Questions of 
Law or Fact Common to the Class. 
Rule 23 (a) 12) Utah R. Civ. P., provides :r.a: 
class treatment is appropriate where there are "quest1cns c: 
law or fact common to the class." 
Rule 23 la I I 2 l does not require that comrr.cr. 
questions of fact or law predominate. It only requires tha: 
they exist, Sommers v. Abraham Lincol.n Federal Sav1r.gs Loar. 
Association, 66 F.R.D. 581 IE.D. Pa. Crockett 
Virginia Folding Box Co., 6l F.R.D. 312 IE.D. 
Indeed, it has been held that there need be en:::· cne =uest1~c. 
of law or fact in common to sat1s:y the prer:-equ1s1i:e 
Rule 23 (al (2): Leisner ~- New York !eleoho~e ~·= 
359 (S.D. N.Y. C.9~31. 
: ~3ss ~embers ?aid :nor.e;· \Jr propert:' ':.o de::enci.ant 9ursuant to 
tr.e sa1,1e cl t~; ordinance. .:...:.1 would benefit if the ordinance 
was declared inva:id. Each must rely on tne same law in 
seeKing to have it declared invalid. 
E. Rule 23(a) (3)--The Claims of the 
Representative Parties are Typical 
of the Claims or Defenses of the 
C ass. 
Rule 23(a) 13) Utah R. Civ. P., provides that 
class treatment is appropriate if "the claims or defenses of 
the representative parties are typical of the claims or 
defenses of the class." 
Rule 2 3 (a) ( 3) requires that claims of 
representative parties be "typical"--not "co-extensive with" or 
"identical to" those of other class members. The requirement 
of typicality may be satisfied even though there are varying 
fact patterns, support claims, or defenses of individual class 
members, or though there is disparity in damages claimed by 
representative parties and other members of the class: Four 
Seasons Securities Laws Litigation, 59 F.R.D. 667 (W.D. Okla. 
1973) . The typicality requirement of Rule 23 requires only 
that the named plaintiffs show that other members of the class 
have suffered the same grievances of which he complains. White 
v. Gates Rubber Co., 53 F.R.D. 412 (D. Colo. 1971) All 
members of the class are in the same position since all were 
required to give up property pursuant to the same ordinance: 
Typicality refers to the nature of 
the claim or defense of the class 
representative, and not the specific 
facts :rom which it arose or tc the 
relief sought. Factual differences ~1 : 
not render a claim atypi=al L" ~~e -.a1rr 
arises from the same e'·ent ,::ir ?racti=e 
or course of conduct t~at g1·:es rise ts 
the claims of the class members, and is 
based on the same legal theory. 
Newberg on Class Actions, §1115 c. 
See also Gerstel v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 50 
F.R.D. 213, 219 (D. Colo. 1970) 
To say that plaintiff is not an 
adequate representative simply because 
her claim is not identical with that of 
all other class members is to require, 
in any class action, that the claims of 
each member of the class be absolutelv 
identical. The rule does not requir~ 
this much. 
F. Rule 23 (a) (4)--The Regresentative 
Parties will Fairly an Adeauately 
Represent the Class. 
Rule 23 (a) (4), Utah R. Civ. P., provides that 
class treatment is appropriate if "the representative parties 
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." 
The requirement of adequate representation 
comprises only two elements: ( l) that the interests of the 
representative party must coincide with the members of the 
class; and (2) that the representative party and his attorne'' 
can be expected to prosecute the action vigorously: Mersay 'i. 
First Republic Corp., 43 F.R.D. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Bot~ 
elments are present in this case. 
POINT IX 
THIS ACTION SHOULD BE 
MAINTAINED AS A CLASS ACT:ot1 
SINCE THE PREREQU~SITES OF 
RULE 23(b) ARE PRESENT 
In order to bring a class action, the pla1nti:•s rru 0 t 
.cs 
a~~ :our :i:: tne requirements of Rule 23 la). However, 
need :neet only one of the requirements of 
Rule 23 lbJ. Albertsons Inc. v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 502 F.2d 
.J59 llOth Cir. 19~'41 
A. Rule 23 lb) ( l) (A) --Inconsistent or 
'larv ing Ad] udica tions with Respect 
to Individual Members of the Class 
would Create a Risk of Establishing 
Incompatible Standards of Conduct 
for Defendants. 
The focus of Rule 2 3 (b) I 1) (A) is to protect the 
interest of the party opposing the class, George v. United 
Federal Savings and Loan, 63 F.R.D. 631 (N.D. Ga. 1974). The 
purpose of the rule is to protect a defendant from the legal 
quagmire which might result if one court were to order 
defendant to take certain action which another court orders the 
same defendant not to take, Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 62 
F.R.D. 124 (E.D. Pa. 1973). 
The advisory committee notes to the 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state: 
Claus.e (A) One person may have 
rights against, or be under duties 
toward, numerous persons constituting a 
class, and be so positioned that 
conflicting or varying adjudications in 
lawsuits with individual members of the 
class might establish incompatible 
standards to govern his conduct. The 
class action device can be used 
effectively to obviate the actual or 
virtual dilemma which would thus 
confront the party opposing the class. 
The matter has been stated thus: 'The 
felt necessity for a class action is 
greatest when the courts are called upon 
to order or sanction the alteration of 
the status quo in circumstances such 
that a large number of persons are in a 
29 
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position to call en a si~.o 'e persc·n 
alter the status quo, er •o cc~p~~1n 
it is altered, and t'1e pcss101~1t 
exists that I the] actor mignt be cci.. 
upon to act in inconsistent '.va; s.' 
Louisell & Hazard, Pleading and 
Procedure: State and Federal ~19 
(1962); see Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur 
Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 366-67 11921). To 
ITIUStrate: Separate actions 5V 
individuals against a municipality to 
declare a bond issue invalid or 
condition or limit it, to prevent or 
limit the making of a particular 
appropriation or to compel or invalidate 
an assessment, might create a risk of 
inconsistent or varying determinations. 
In the same way, individual litigations 
of the rights and duties of riparian 
owners, or of landowner's rights and 
duties respecting a claimed nuisance, 
could create a possibility of 
incompatible adjudications. Actions by 
or against a class provide a ready and 
fair means of achieving unitary 
adjudication. [Emphasis added.] Notes 
of Advisory Committee on Rules;----3'9 
F.R.D. 100 (1966). 
It appears that the present case falls squarel; 
within the rule, (see also, Horst v. Guy, 2 11 N. W. 2d 
(N.D. 1973)). 
In a similar vein, class actions have been upheld 
under Rule 23 (b) (1) (A) on claims that a utility has overchargec 
its customers, Cass Clay Inc. v. Northwestern Public Service 
££..:_, 18 F.R.Serv. 2d 1187 (D.S.D. 1974). 
Finally, identical cases to the present one wherein 
subdividers have brought suit against a municipa!1ty seeking to 
have an ordinance requiring dedication of land er payment 
money declared invalid, have been maintained as a class action 
City of Montgomerv v. Crossroads Land Cc., 3'i': Sc. :a 3o3 !Ac~. 
1978); Cimarron Corp. v. Bd. of Count·; 1:ornrniss1.=nt-?::-::o, :t)J ?.:·-~ 
946 (Colo. 1977). 
:::'1;;al::,.1 , this case seems similar to taxpayer class 
3cti=ns. Here, the taxpayer (subdivider) challenges the tax as 
i~legal. Such taxpayer actions are routinely certi:ied as 
class actions, see e.g. United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate 
Tax Comm., 18 F.R.Serv.2d 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Mathews v. 
Massell, 356 F.Supp. 291 (N.D.Ga. 19731; Booth v. General 
Dynamics Corp., 264 F.Supp 465 (N.D.Ill. 1967); Bootery Inc. v. 
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 326 F.Supp. 794 
(D.D.C. 1971) 
DATED this 
I 
"" / J:: ~day of ! (!J lz , 1983 
ROBERT J. D;BRY &~SSOCIATES 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF H.:l.ND JEL: .. DR'i 
I hereby certify that a true ar.c :crrec~ :c;:;·;' 
foregoing A Brief on A oeal was ~anj ·ieli';ered this 
_/_q_-:JJ_hday of i-1-.:..:...:i...:o.-<...+ __ , 1983, to tne to~lowir.g: 
Stephen Homer 
West Jordan City Attorney 
1850 West 7800 South 
West Jordan, Utah 84084 
The Clty O:wi-.:11 of the City or ·~est Jordan o~ns as 
{ 0 11 a.r.!I : 
Section 1. That Ord1nar1ce ~ 33 or the 'lest Jordan City 
ordinance relati.n,; to subdivi.sion.s be airended by add1.cg the 
!allowing section. 
Section 9-C-3 (a). Io ~tiC<J to all the other requirSll:!ots 
prescribed under this ord1N1..1ce the subdivider shall be required 
to dedicate seven per cent (7.0%) of the land a.rea c! tlle proposed 
s:..ibd1v1sion to the public use for the benefit and use or tbe citizens 
of tbe City or West Jurdan and shall rucvey title at tbe same to 
tbe City by a proper conveyance instl'Ulalt, or ill the alteoative 
at the optioo o! the t;0vern!.ng b:dy or the City, the City may accept 
the equivalent value o! the land in cash it it deallS advi.5able. 
Section S-C-8 (b). The ITDl'lics received by the City as a result 
of the requirement,,; of Section 9-C-8 (a.) herei.nabove shall be used by t~ 
City for its flood control and/or parks and recreat1ooal !a.cilities. 
Sect ion 2. This orainlflce shall becaae e!fect1ve tweoty (20) 
day9 after its ;xis ting in three ( 3) public places or 30 cia.ys a!ter 
publ1catlon in a n<.>NSpaper of i;eneral circulaticc. 
Section 9-C-8 (c). In the event the City governing body electa 
to receive the =nies perst.!.JJlt to Section s-c-8 (a.) said m:Xlies aball 
be pa.id by the sutxlividcr m or bdor? fin.al approval o! tbe plat 1a 
given by the City Q.Junc11. 
PA.SSm ,-:ill ALGPTIIl this 21st d.•y o! January, 1975 by the City 
:::CUllc11 Qf tr.e City of West Joni:ln . 
. \PPE;;orx ",'\" 
----------"'~...: ... 'M"' t ..... hF"'C--MM-t ~ 
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John 'ALL J.nd Clark Jen~1n-.. 
Plaintiffs and Appell 1;ib, 
t'ITY UF WEST JORDA'.. L:tah, 
Defendant and Respondent 
No. 15908. 
Supreme Court of Gtah 
Dec. 26. 1979. 
Subd1v1ders brought action to challenge 
\';\~ d1ty 0f ordinance adopted by city which 
req·J:r~d sub<liv1ders to dedicate 7% of pro-
po::it_·•I subdivision land to city or to pay 
er~·J11. tlent of that value in cash to be used 
for ilrind control and/or park and recre;ttion 
i.1u11t1e::. The Third District Court, Salt 
L.ike l'uunty, David K. Winder, J .. upheld 
\ai1dit) nf ordinance and denied subdivid-
er's requests for injunctive relief and dam-
ages. and subdividers appealed. The Su-
µrem1• Court, Crockett, C. J, upheld validity 
0i ordinance. 
Affirmed and remanded 
Stewart, J., concurred and filed opin· 
ion 
Wilkins, J., dissented and filed opinion 
1n which '.\1.aughan, J, concnrred 
I. Zoning and Planning G:=>86 
City had authont) to enact ordinance 
wh1cr requ1rf'd ::.11hrliv11le;o::; t0 derlicate 7~ 
"' ; , I l~ 
~!: . .H .<..1..:..:t 1r1 c.:.1::.h, tu Uc useJ r'ur 
flcw:><J o...ontrol .ind/or pdrk Jnd recreation 
i:Jc1l1L1e::. (Per Crocht.'lt, C J, 'J.'1th one 
Jucl~l· lOncurring anJ one Jud[;I::' sµec10.lly 
cun(' 1irring) UC A l!JS3. :u~ "'l .'t-, 10 9 1, 
IO 9 :1, 10 lJ-19 d ~eq. 10-9-~0. 10-'.} 2:2, 
lU 'J ~) 
~ Zuning- J.nd PIJ..nn1ng --=.% 
~ tct th.it dtd1t'.L[,,in ,,f 7~ 1Jf pn1p0scd 
-,ul :-.,ioin l..lnd 1rCJ •r .ts ca~h . .i.lut' -t..-
with one J ust1ce con ~ r'.'"1 ~.g and one J ust1ce 
specially concurr1::2-
3. Trusts -301h( i I 
If money is coii.-1_· 1_2f:! from public for 
specific purpose. it '.'iecor:1es a trust fund 
committed to carry1.1g out that purpose. 
(Per Crockett, C. J., with one Justice con· 
curring and one J u::.uce specially concur-
ring.) 
.i. Eminent Domain ~2(1.2) 
City, which received :$16.576 from sub· 
dividers under ordinance requiring subdi· 
v1ders to dedicate 7% of proposed subdivi-
sion land ~a or to pay equivalent of that 
value in cash to be used for flood control 
and/or µark an<l recreation facilities, was 
not taking !and under power of eminent 
domain without following requirement of 
paying just compensation but was merely 
imposing reasonable regulations on subrli· 
v1ders as prerequisite for permitting ere· 
ation of subdivision. (Per Crockett, C. J., 
with one Justice concun1ng and one Justice 
specially concumng.) 
5. Zoning and Planning "=602 
Question of percentage of !and in sub-
div1s10n to be committed to public purpose 
1s within pr2rogative of city council to cie-
termine, and so long as it is within reasona· 
ble limits, so that it cannot be characterized 
as capricious or arbitrary, courts wl!I not 
interfere therewith. (Per Crockett, C. J., 
with one Justice concurnng and one Justice 
spec1a!ly concurnng) 
h. 'Zrqi:il..; -~"d PL111n.115?' ==-.:.) 
Ortlinance .vh1t'.h rc4u1red subdiv\ders 
to deJic.J.tL' 7'0 uf µroposerl subtliv1sion land 
or to pay e4u1valent of that value in ...:ash to 
be used for f!ooJ control and/or park and 
recreation factlitie!:> was within scope of 
pov.ers granted to city so that it could plan 
for gener-J.l good vf communrty as well as 
for ne\\ly cre:i.ted suh01\'1s1on (Per Crock· 
ett. C J, with one Ju<;tlCe concurring anJ 
one Justice specially concurring l 
1-., .\•JI ,1:,, 7 Zoning and Planning C=382.1 
'.1' ~'.··n(·r.tl '>\clf,1n· ,,/ .1 '1nl,· 'nmriun1t .J1d 
·1r1t Ji1d:L[,· ·1rd1nJ.n( 1· .\ r :• "1 ; rq1 1dt" (,Jr 
~lJ"'l 1:1d )\" \ '. ··•11 I p ... 1' ri" !\<:::'Lt, J . 
Pa;. mc>r:l ~u city of ca5h e4u1valenl of 
7'": of ~u1Hl1\ hl(Jn lanJ areJ., \\ h10..:h \\ J.$ 
rn.ide µur:-;uanL to ordin.'.'l.nce for general 
.:i..PPF.NDTX 11 'R" 
' I 
! 
l 
j, 
! 
I 
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µur:.__032 of parks. recreation '..ic:lities and 
f\ova cnntro!, was not necessard;. to be 11sed 
sole!:; :·or subdinders' subd:\:s10n or ,my 
other particular one; it did not prevent city 
from imposing reasonable condition of con-
struction of storm sewers and did not pre-
vent city from refusing to credit subd.iv1d-
ers with cost of storm sewers against cash 
they paid. (Per Crockett, C. J., with one 
J u.st1ce concurring and one J usttce specially 
concurring.) 
Robert J. DeBry and Vaiden P. Living-
ston, Salt Lake City, for appellant. 
)-;ick J. Coless1des, Salt Lake City, for 
respo!1dent. 
CROCKETT, Chief Justice: 
Plaintiffs John Call and Clark Jenkins, 
subdividers, brought this act10n in which 
they challenge the validity of an ordinance 
adopted by the defendant City which re-
quires that subdividers dedicate 7 percent 
of the land to the city, or pay the equiva-
lent of that value in cash, to be used for 
flood control and/or parks and recreation 
facilities. The district court upheld the va-
lidity of the ordinance d.nd denied plaintiffs' 
request for injunctive relief and damages. 
The latter appeal. 
Plaintiffs contend that the orriinance is 
invalid because: (1) it is not within the 
City's granted powers; (2) the land or the 
money required is not for the benefit of the 
subdivision, but rather the City as a whole; 
(3) that the City is attempting to exercise 
fre >Y' t•r ,,f e1':':1~-~n~ dnrn..i1n .qthn11t fnl-
k,1" .:- .., l~~ r·equi:·1·i11e~L.., ~hereuf :ind pci) 1ng 
just rnmpensation; and l4) it un!awfu!ly 
imposes a tax. 
On January 21, 1975, the City amended 
an existing ordinance (~o. 33) relating to 
subdivisions by ad<ling the following· 
Section 9-C-8(a). In addit1un to all the 
other r~quirements prescribed under this 
ordinance the suhdh-1der shall be required 
to rlt:dicate se~·en percent ('i.0%) of !he 
land area of the propose1i suhdi•·is1on to 
the public use for the hcnefit and use nf 
· r:e .uter:iatl\ e .lt '.ht' 
~10n of :.1e ., "'r'11r.1.; · Ll\..l'., 1[ ·"he 1 
r.he Cit) ·:i_c, ,,~·eo[ ~:;1.: ~una1ent •.J 
of the . ..ina _,i.-;n :r" .t deems adv1san.t:: 
Sections 9~C-~1J1 and 1,i 1 further prov ,Jt> 
that the money received "sha!l be used b:, 
the City for its ilood control and/or parks 
and recreat10r.a! :'..1.i.::1i1ties" and that ·f ~he 
City elects to rei.::e1ve money in lieu of ~and, 
payment shall be made "by the subdivtder 
on or before final approval of :he plat lS 
given by the City Councd." 
On ~lay 2, 1977, the plaintiffs pre;ented 
to the City ~\VO piats and maps for a pro-
posed "Wescall subdi1.rision" which, 1f ap-
proved, would result in the future develop-
ment of 92 lots on about 30 acres of L.rnd 
located in the City. When the City exer-
cised lts option to accept money in lieu of 
land, plaintiff Cbrk Jenkins paid, under 
protest, $16,576.00, representing aOOut 7 
percent of the value of his land. The City 
Council then approved the subdivis10n and 
the plats were recorded. The City refused 
p!ainttffs' demand to refund the money and 
this action resulted 
In rejecting plaintiffs' attack upon the 
ordinance, the trial court stated in its mem-
orandum decision: 
As it affects the plaintiffa. 1t is the 
opinion of this Court that the City ol 
West Jordan, Utah's r)rd1nance 33, <lS 
amended January 21. 197.S, is v~lid and 
constitutional. It is further the Cnurt's 
0pinion that there has be~n no taking uf 
• ~. --: , ~ , r , , - , j , ~ n t_ 
·.1;cnuut. J'_,:)l ,_.,r~µo;::~,,L,[.,,.,1 -:r1r n..i. ... :>:e 
defendant :ev1ed an 1n\'a)i,j ~a\ uµor. thL' 
plaintiffs. See Secs. 10-9-1 through 10-
9-30, L' C.A 1953. [Citing case-> J 
The Authonty of the City 
[1] It is not questioned that l'1t1i.·~ 11,ne 
no inherent sovereign po\H:r, but .inl:. 1 
grantt::d hy the !eg-islaturt' 1 But it rr1w·.t 11L· 
realized that 1t 1s 1mpract,•',il '.-,Jr :ol.1lL.l1:.~ :,1 
sp~li uut to the b:)l dt-'l..i., ,di ,1f t!:t> ~h1n1-: 
•'ll:, government.:, mu-.;t do •_n pt'rfur·'11 · h" 
I. Johnson ~- S:mdy Cay Corp 2& L::ah 2d 22 . .\91 p ..:d •J44 , 
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C11t u. Llah. &cM:i ?:!cl ::1-
, l n '1'Jmer<Ju" ~.-··­
'" 'h!id '~at ,_'ltl+_·:o r J' t' 
;i <1rc ~'>.pressly h"T:ln'•'•i .r: "'I) •_no,,e 
,;.1r.>. ,mµl1ed ~u ' . .J.rr:. ·~r. "uch re· 
~r ,•"-,dl!ill 1es 2 
~ht->rP J.re a sene::; ,>i )~atutes through 
,1.t"",.~h ',he City .Jerives its 1uthority to enact 
11rt\1:1ances qf the character here 1n ques-
r.on Sec 10- 8->$4, L c . .\ '.953. grant; IQ 
r1t1es the authority and the duty 
to preserve the heaith, safety 
:rnd good 0rder 0f t.he en:.- and 1~ 1nhab1t-
J.nts. 
Pus idea 1s carrie<l forward and echoed in 
.3ect1on 10--9-1, lJ C.A. 1953, which provides 
that 
For the purpose of promoting health, 
safety, morals and the general welfare of 
the community the leg7siat1ve body of 
cities and towns is empowered to regulate 
and restnct the location and 
use uf bu1lding'3, structures and land for 
trnde, industry, residence or other pur-
poses 
Further dealing with that subject and more 
specific as to the establishment of parks, 
SecL10n 10-'.3-3 '.)tates that such regulations 
shall be made in accordance 
with a comprehensive plan designed to 
facilitate adequate provision for 
transportation, water, sewage, schools, 
parks .ind other public requirements. 
The ~tun11.:qJal Planning Enabling Act 1 
empowers a city to have a planning com-
mL>s10n which may "adopt and certify to 
thl.' IL:hrislat1ve ho<ly. a master plan for the 
\1 ,,, • : •lllf It ,ir T [lt:' .-,l..ld1'IP..l .. :/." 4 
:::, .. ('.Jun lU··'.::J l..!. ,c..i.te;:, Lh..i.. the p!..i.nnin~ 
1·ornm1s:.10n "sh:.dl have such powers as may 
la:: net.:l''.'.>Sarv to enable 1t •o perform its 
funct1uns .J.r;d pr0mote municipal planning" 
S1gn1f1cantly, St.:dion lU-'..-1-25 then pro-
'. 1dt>s 
Jn 1·xpn·1sing tfw po\\<;r::> gi-:::inted to it 
11:, 1 h .. del, the µf,u1n1r.g c·1>mm1::.~;on :,ha.fl 
prl:'fl 1,~,, 'L''~·'...1l1on> go~·erning the :,uhd1-
, •. ~n ,,,·,':h1n the municipa/1t_i. A 
pu!J1w '1l ,r1n'd; ~ht:reon shall be held 'u; 
'.he Ii·>(' 1c •• e ·,•Jd'., .:i.fter which the ,'t_·g'.)-
i:J.ln e ,TJ.J.~ J.dopt said regufaur,ns 
for the munic1pJ./1ly 
[all ':'.mpn~1:> herein added.) 
If lhe ,lf)<l\'f:" statutes are viewed together, 
and 1n <i.ccordance with their intent a.nd 
purpose. is tht:!y should be, it seems plain 
enough that the ordinance in quest10n is 
within the scope of authonty and respong1-
!:nlity of the city government in the promo-
tion of the "health, safety, morals and gen-
eral welfar~" of the commun1ty.s 
Just how essential and desirable it is that 
cities have such authority in planmng their 
growth is brought into sharp focus hy re-
flecting, on the one hand, upon the condi-
tions in the slum and ghetto areas of vari-
ous cities, where there are none. or inade-
quate, parks and playgrounds and, on the 
other, upon the enrichment of life which 
has been conferred on other cities where 
there are parks, plazas, recreational and 
cultural areas (some of which are very fa-
mous) for the use of the public. 
In modern times of ever-increasing popu-
lation and congestion. real estate developers 
buy land at high prices. From the com-
bined pressures of competition and desire 
for gain, they often squeeze every lot they 
can into :some labynnth1an plan, with only 
the barest minimum for tortious an<l circui-
tous streets, without any a.rterial ways 
through such subdivision::;, an<l with little or 
no provision fqr parks, recreat10n areas, or 
t.:\-"!1 f,)r r,· '.::>V'l:ll11,., "t.:lb').\ f'lL"C" Tht> 
r.t.:~d !1.':-: ·rn~ .,:~::<-rJ.1 p•, ~!t!ng Lill.I LUlt 1.!.•JI 
is apparent. and mah.es mamfest the wis-
dom 1.mderly ing Lhe deleg:J.tion of powers to 
the c1t1es. as is done in the statutes above 
referred to 
A.s unUeveloped land is improved, it is 
.ilso important that some provision for Oood 
control be mo.de. To the extent tht1.t the 
~. ':iee '>.1/r LJkr' c:.1\ Re1t!M~ :01 l'Dh 514. .i. l0-9-20. UC . ..\ 1953 
I ..'·l P .'J ci 17, 1 '.'42, ind nuu v S.i/C L.Jkl:' C1c~ 
·~'P l~t.111 'iC,11 P ~J ..'V..', ':f-f:>1 5. L.Jngu.:i.ge from Sec !0-9 \.UC A 1953 
( . ..\ l'JS"'. 
; 
1 
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establishment of suhcii,·:sions increases the d:OP•'"·:~·l n the City's ;· '"'L ;'und. 
need for flood cor.trc•i measures or recrea- shr,u,.J 11,ir 'ie a.ssumed ~h,1: ': e ,r,ey :hu:. 
tiona! facilities, it 1::. huth fair and essential 
that subdivider.; be required to contribute 
to the costs of providing those facilities. 
Lack of Benefit to the Subdivision 
[2] In their point :-lo. (2), the plaintiffs 
attack the ordinance on the ground that the 
lan<l dedicated (or the money in lieu there-
of) is not to be used solely and exclusively 
for the benefit of the created subdivision. 
They point to the provision that the land is 
received "for the be:nefit and use of the 
citizens of the City of West Jordan" and the 
money is used for "its [West Jordan's) flood 
control and/or parks and recreation facili-
ties." 
Wie agree that the dedication should have 
some reasonable relationship to the needs 
created by the subdivision.' But in the 
planning for the expansion of a city, it is 
obvious that no particular percent.:i..ge of 
each subdivision, or of each lot, could be 
used as a park or playground in that partic-
ular subdivision; and likewise, that it could 
not be so used for flood control. But it is so 
p!ain as to hardly require expression that if 
the purpose of the ordinance is properly 
carried out, it will ~dound to the benefit of 
the subdivision as well as to the general 
welfare of the whole community. The fact 
that it does so, rather than solely benefiting 
the individual sub<livision, does not impair 
the valiqity of the or<linance.7 
[3] These ob::;crvations are also perti-
nent: Although the money which was col-
lected from the plaintiffs in this c:ise was 
f'i S···· ~Cd.kTTk"l> .. 1 .411111 Y~'-'' 01c_j,=:e Esrate--
fnt ~ r·/J;in1u~ ~ O•nr111:;s1cir1 J{ u J11bur· .. 
Conn.Sup. 74, 230 A.2d 45 l 1967); f\.rughoff v 
City of Naperville. 68 !ll.2d 352. 12 Ill Dec. 185. 
369 N.Lid 892 (1977), Home Bwlders Ass'n v 
City of Kansas City, 1\.10 • 555 S. W 2d 832 
(1977) 
7. Ayres v City Council, 34 Cal.2d 3 I. 207 P 2d 
I (1949); Associated Home Builders. Inc. v 
City of Walnuc Creek, 4 Cal 3d 633, 94 Cal. 
Rptr. 630, 484 P 2d 606 (1971) 
8. 15 McQutllin, Municipal Corporations, Sec 
39 45 states that: "Special funds .J.re often cre-
ated for a particular purpose, and in 
such case lhe general nde is that they cannot 
hh,,'1'>-'.-. _ieiab!e fur other ;:i,.r, ''~e::. ~): Lhe 
C. r.:; :. ·:d ::i qf no special hen•;:· ~u the J.rea 
sougnt ) be subdivided. Ori ~~1e .~ontrary. 
thJ.t 1t ...-,]] be used for its ::.tJ.~e<J iJUrpose is 
assured, iirst, by the integrity and good 
faith of the public offic1a1s ch.lrge<l with 
th:i.t responsibility. and seconO, by the fact 
that the recogmzed principle 1s ~hat if mon-
ey is collected from the public fur a specific 
purpose, 1t becomes a trust fund committed 
to the carrying out of that purpose.8 
The Emment Domain Issue 
(4] There is an obvious fallacy in the 
plaintiffs' argument that the City has not 
followed the proper procedure for taking 
plaintiffs' property under eminent domain. 
This is not a proceeding initiated by the 
City to acquire property.• It has indicated 
no desire to compel the plaintiff to subdi-
vide their property, nor to dedicate any part 
of iL The plaintiffs are the moving parties, 
and as a prerequisite for permitting the 
creation of the subdivis10n, the City, under 
the powers conferred upon it as herein-
above discussed, can and does impose rea-
sonable regulations. 10 
Invalidity as a Tax 
Plaintiffs urge that the requirements of 
the ordinance in question are but a revenue-
raising scheme for the purpose of meeting 
the financial needs of the City, and thus 
constitute an improper levy of a tax upon 
their property. This labeling is but an ex-
br- ..1 , ... •! ior .i.1 ,n,or ,.i·J~~,,,_.· 
..1 "..1nd r~.~e'~ tn , .: L.;11..:ip:...:,l\ f.·r c1 
special purpose is a trust fund. :md eqwly will. 
tn a proper case. interfere lo prevent its d1ver-
s1on." (Citing ca~es J 
9. See Ayres v CH.~ Council. supra. note -:. 
Perrerson ~· City of 'la.pernile. 9 lll2d 233. l JI 
N.E.2d 371 tl956J 
10. Billings Properr1es Inc Ye!/01~'~tone 
Councy. 144 Mont 25. 394 P 2.J 182 187 ( 1964 ), 
City of Albuquerqui:> ~ 77 'J \.1 "IJ. 
4!9 P 2d 460 \1966\ BuJ/dcr~ 
Inc v \.11dweq Cil\', Old 539 P 2d 13-7 
(1975) 
: .,I 
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'...Jl;.,. 1q10n It ! t '1J.::. w.-.n ..1djud1ca.ted 
1,0l JUl h ..J.n ordin:.ir.:e, 1f :e.bonably de-
,1gnd .. tnJ carried r):..it fnr lhe µurpose 1n· 
>·ndcd. 1~ a. proµer form of planning for the 
;ood 1Jf the community, :.ind is not such a 
~roh1 bt ted tax .11 
[5] The question as to the percentage of 
:he lanrl tn the suh•ltv1s1on {in this instance, 
i rerrent) to be committed to the public 
purpose 1s within the prerogative of the 
City Council to determine, and so long a.s 1t 
1s w1th1n rea.son:ible limits, so that it cannot 
be characterized as capnc10us or arbitrary, 
the courts will not interfere therewith. 12 
[6] In harmony with what has been said 
above, it is our opimon that the ordinance 
under attack is within the scope of the 
power.:; granted to the City so that it can 
plan for the general good of the community 
as well as for the newly-created subdivi-
s10ns 
We have deci<led the principal issue which 
was addressed by the parties in the district 
court, and 011 this appeal, as to the validity 
of the ordinance. However, we observe 
tt.at in the averments of the affidavits, 
there are other matters which may need to 
be resolved on reman<l; and accordingly, it 
1s deemed appropriate that we make some 
addit10nal comments. 13 
There. is no question, but that the ordi-
nance should be applie<l fairly, and without 
favoritism or discrimination insofar as that 
nn ~w -i.ccomplished In view of the aver-
n11 ~t ~ :,1aint1fi, J.f~1da1. it. ~h,\t. that ;irrn-
ciple has been VJOl.J.te<.1. the trial cu..:.rt 
:;hould he concerned with examination into 
and resolution of any legitimate issue raised 
thereon. 
[7] In his affidavit. plaintiff Clark Jen-
kins .lverrcJ that he not 0nly paid the $16,-
.)'76 ! <L"surned to be 7 µercent '.)f the value of 
11. Pe/Ccnon v City of :vapt>rv1!/e, supra, note 
9, Jen.id ;· 1/1!/age at !:)carsd<J/e. 18 :-.J Y 2d 78, 
2-:' 1 N Y '.:> 2d 'JSS. 218 N E :!d 673 ( 1966) 
12. For .in f'XLellen( d1:.cuss1nn 0f the vanous 
lOn':.t1tut1onJ! chall':"ngec, th..1t haw• been made 
re1;.Hdm~ ~ubd1 .. 1su1n leg1<:.IJtlon. ~ee AssoCldf 
CjUIC''d 
:51,.)ulJ 
:,i de.J1c::ne 028 acres vJ.lued .Jt 
1nd t1i e\penti .J.bout $19,000 1n cun-
stru..:t1tu1 •Ji a :.U1rm sewer (which p!a1ntiff 
urg~::. , :'loud 1.:(1ntrol) before the City wou!d 
appro\ ~ :he suhd1v1s1on. He asserts that 
thc.se a:nounts arc 1n excess of the 7 percent 
required by t.he orJinance. The City's affi-
da1. it st.at.es that .t received the $16.576, but 
says nothing about receiving the other 
amounts JUSt r~ferred to. It is, of course, 
essential that the amount the Cily exacts 
pursuant to the ordinance is not more than 
the 7 percent of value of plaintiffs proper-
ty 1t prescribes 
Our final observation is on plaintiffs' ur-
gence that the $19,000 they expended in 
constructing a st.orm sewer should be cred-
ited uµon their obligation under the ordi-
nance. From what has been said in this 
decision, it should be sufficiently plain that 
the 7 percent exacted pursuant to. the ordi-
nance is for the general purpose of parks, 
recreation facilities and flood control, and is 
to be so administered and expended hy the 
city government for that purpose; and that 
it is not neces.sarily to be used solely for th~ 
plamtiffs' subdivision or any other particu-
lar one. This does not in any way prevent 
the City from imposing other reasonable 
conditions upon the approval of a subdivi-
sion and proposed construction therein, in-
cluding requiring a storm sewer if the con-
ditions are such that it is needed in that 
subdivision for the protection of future resi-
dJ:>nts thereof or other residents of the City. 
\Ve t!i~~for ... (h not ·lis.1.:{ree "~irh ~he 
City'.::; requ1n::mt:nl of the stvrm >t'\\ll::r, ""!' ·r 
with 1ts refusal to credit the plaintiff with 
the cost thereof on its 7 percent required l>y 
the ordinance. 
The decision of the trial court is affirmed 
anJ the case 1.s rernan<led for further pro-
ed Home Builders. Inc ~, City of Walnut Creek. 
supra. note 7. Jnd authont1es therein cited 
13. See Rule i6(a). UR C P. LeGr:md Johnson 
Corp ~· Peterson. JS UtJh 2d 2GO, -1;!0 P 2d 6!5 
(!966) 
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ceedings consistent with this opinion "" Lake City.~ L1ri.. '~ ·;eJd.9 A.mn.',"ctn 
cost:;; awarded. FoJrk City 1: R,i: .,,_iJ I_,Jyt.._rn City 
HALL, J., concurs. 
STEW ART, Justice (concurri"g) 
I concur in the conclusion that ? 9-C-8(a) 
of the ordinance of the City oi West Jordan 
is authorized by§ 10-8~ U.C.A (1953), as 
amended. This statute deleg:i.te:;; to cities 
general police power to be used for the 
benefit of the city and its 1n:iabitants. 
However, the ordinance in question clearly 
approaches constitutionally protected 
rights, i.e., the prohibition against the tak-
ing of private property without just com-
pensation. The power of a city, or for that 
matter of the state, to require subdividers 
to dedicate a portion of their land for public 
improvements is not without limitation. In 
my judgment, the Court should address the 
problem of what standards delineate a con-
stitutional and an uncon~titutional forced 
dedication by a subdivider. The question is 
certainly one that will recur and ought to 
be resolved by the Court. 
WILKINS, Justice (dissenting). 
I respectfully dissent. 
The majority opinion forms a perilous 
new rule today by impermissibly expanding 
municipal powers, for the first time in this 
State, beyond those granted cities and 
towns by our Legislature and beyond those 
recognized by subdivision, zoning, and mu-
nicipal government authorities, and it en-
dangers the sound precedent of narrowly 
ccnstruing- mun\C'ipal pow~rs whlch h:l::i heen 
Jp·,,_:!0p2J ln .~Jit L.JJ..c..' (.~y v. R~11~ne. 1 
Ritholz v. City of Salt Lake,' Salt Lake City 
v. Suttcr,3 Tooele City v. Elkington," Nance 
v. Mayflower Tavern, 5 Parker v. Pro.,·o 
City,• Nasfell v. Ogden City,7 Bohn v. Salt 
I. IOI Utah 504, 124 P.2d 537 (1942) 
2. 3 Utah 2d 385, 284 P.2d 702 (1955) 
3. 61 Utah 533, 216 P 234 (1923) 
4. 100 Utah 485, 116 P.2d 406 (1941). 
5. 106 Utah 517, 150 P 2d 773 (1944) 
6. Utah, 513 P 2d 169 ( 1975) 
3peth, 11 a.n<l utlier 
I sha!l relate ;n:, ., >l° :~1s ~:i.se, as '>veil 
as review what I pt>:-~e1.;: ~o be the correct 
legal principles J.pµl:,~::i.ole to 1t. All statu-
tory references ue · J r~·~ah Code Annotat-
ed, 1953, as amende'.l, 1rniess otherwise indi-
cated. 
Subdividers have ·1nc!er~aken to develop a 
subdivision within the City's boundanes and 
have dedicated land area and installed 
storm sewer facilities '.V1th1n the subdivision 
and have additionally paid $16,576 to the 
City, all in response to Cty demands made 
under authonty of the Ordinance as a pre-
requisite to subdivision approval. The rec-
ord and bnefs indicate a dispute as to 
whether the land was dedicated and the 
money paid under protest. No formal writ-
ten protest appears in the record, but plain-
tiffs claim they attended a city council 
meeting in which they orally objected to the 
land dedication and fee payment. 
Subdividers framed their complaint as a 
class action seeking a declaration of the 
invalidity of the Ordinance on their own 
behalf and on behalf of others similarly 
situated. Other than a general denial in its 
answer and the allegation that the class 
consisted of 28 subdividers rather than the 
100 alleged by plaintiffs buried within an 
affidavit on another subject, the City has 
totally failed to address, either here or be-
low, the Sub<livi<lers' class action allega-
tions. The record does not indicate whether 
the Di:;tnrt Court m'.1.de 1.:-:v "if the r\i->-tf'rm1-
Utah Rules of Civrl Procedure, but the 
Court disposed of the matter 1n an Or<ler 
dated Apnl 21, 1978, denying the Suhdiv1d-
ers' "Motion for Dec!araLon of a Class Ac-
7. 122 Utah 344, 249 P2d 507 \1952) 
8. 79 Utah 12!, 8 P 2d 591 Rl AL R 215 ( l912J 
9. 28 Utah 2d 343. 502 P 2d 5:Ji 1.\9721 
10. 77 Utah IG8 ".:!'J2 P 249 (]')JU) 
11. Utah, 578 P 2d 328 1 197bl 
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11,,n Th\-' 1'1t.'', mot1011 LO ,J1sm1ss ·>a.:i 
,ff'~-ttl'd a::i .,ne ~-qr ..,ummdrJ judgment Un 
\lay 17, 1~7~. ~he Distnct C.JUrt ruled ~n 
fa'>1Ji uf the City::. motion, 3.nd against the 
:)ubd1v1ders' mut1~in, that the Ordin<ince 
was >a.lid .ind lhe City's demands were 1n 
confurmit:,. ,1, 1th 1t 
Except for cities wf11ch operate under 
chort~r 12 :.i.nd denve their authonty from 
Articlt.: XI, Section 5 of the Utah Constitu-
tion, the c1t1e:-1 of this State are "creatures 
o( statute and limited in powers to those 
d~leg-ated by the legislature, "13 
All power and authority of our nonchar-
tered municipalities is derived through leg-
islative grant, and for the Ordinance under 
review here to be upheld, it must have been 
enacted pursuant to an enabling statute. 
Prior to the majority decision here, this 
Court recognized that legislative authority 
may \J.e exercised by municipalities in only 
one of three ways. Justice Wolfe wrote in 
Sa.It Lake City v. Revene · 
It has been repeatedly stated by this 
court _"that a municipal corporation pos-
sessc:s and can exercise the following 
power;, and no others: First, those grant-
ed in express words; second, those neces-
sarily or fairly implied in or incident to 
the powers expressly granted; third, 
those essential to the accomplishment of 
the declared oh1ects and purposes of the 
corporat1on,-not simply convenient, but 
indispensable." 1 Dillon Municipal Corpo-
r•l<on, 5th Eu. p. 448, § 237, " 
[Emµhas1s added ] 
'>jJn1!1L ,eF;l.::iLJ.t1o1:: jjrant oI puwer the i.!ity 
had nn authority to limit barbershop bu.::;i-
nes.s nours for health µurposes under three 
statutory grants of power to cities and 
towns One statute provided cities power 
t(, "lict•nse, tax, ;rnd regulate" barbershops. 
\ ·'t'C'ond statute emµo\\ered cities to 
µromulgate regulations "'to secure the gen-
12. The Cit) in this case does not represent 
lls~lf to be chartered 
13 H.rtholL '· Cay of S_i/1 L.:1ke si.pra. note 2 at 
3 l L'.lh .2d .187. 284 P .2d 703 
er:.i.J health of the city, and -1-.e third broad-
!;. de!egated to cities :i.uthor1ty to enact 
,-ird1nances for the pub11c he:::i.lth. safety, 
i)rospenty, morals, peace cin<l good order, 
and comfort and con,·emence of the city 
and its inhabLtants. That third statute now 
appears in our Code as § 10-8-84 and is 
relied upon by the City an<l the majonty 
opinion as authority for the City to enact 
the Ordinance under attack here. 
In Salt Lake City v" Sutter." defendant's 
conviction for violating Salt Lake City's 
prohibition ordinance was reversed, this 
C-Ourt holding that the statute enabling 
cities to pass ordinances necessary to pnr 
vide for the safety, health, mor..ds, comfort 
and convenience, again the statute relied 
upon by the City and the majority opinion, 
did not authorize the City's legislation pro-
hibiting possession of intoxicating liquors. 
Whatever power or authority munici-
palities in this state ha 1:e is derived from 
the Legislature. 
It will hardly be contended that the 
ordinance in question is "essential to the 
accomplishment of the declared objects 
and purposes of the corporation." As we 
have seen, it is not included within any 
express grant; nor is it necessarily or 
fairly implied as an incident to the pow-
ers expressly granted measured by the 
rule laid down by the authorities. 
IL may be, anrl is, contended that the 
ordinance rn question 1s only carrying out 
the general policy of the slate as re-
flected by the legislative enactment mak-
ing- it ln nff··nse ag-Cli"'::'t ~h2 <st'.lte hw for 
.ut_. ~·Pr_,_,.,, t1i ·-.nn,,-1·.5:. ,,,1, ~: 11: :'l1s ; •·,,-
se~!:ilOn without authority 1ntox1caling- l1-
quors within the state. But the policy of 
the state cannot control in determining 
the powers of a municipality. Those 
power; must be measured and deter-
mined by the grants found in the charter 
or in the general !aws purporting to enu-
merate such power.::. 
14. Supra, note l Although cited by the maJor 
1ty as authonty for its po::.ition here, Revene 
he!d. 1n direct conn1ct ,,.,.1th the majonly, that 
the Ordinance enacted by the Cit) exceeded the 
CJtv·:. authont~ under the enabling statutes 
15. Supra note 3 
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\\.. c.:::i.n ::.ee no escape from the ,~onc:c<­
s10~ t:1at the bodrJ of city comm1:-::.1oners 
of S.itt Lake City was without ,:rn~;-,orlt_. 
to ··.1act :he ordinance 1n question ·Jn ~r.:s 
a.pr eai.1s 
The requirement that cities must have 
express authority to enact ordinances 1s not 
unique to Utah. ;\lcQuillin tn .\funicipai 
C1Jrporations, and Yokley, 1n The Law ol 
Subn1~·1s1ons, state as a general propos1t1on 
that dedication ordinances require enabling 
legislation. 
In some jurisdictions, zoning-enabling 
statutes authorize local zoning bodies to 
require, as a condition precedent to devel-
opment. that subd1viders dedicate por-
tions of their property for pub! ic pur-
poses, or pay J.n assessment in lieu of 
dedication. There must be express statu-
tory authority granting the power to mu-
nicipalities to impose such conditions, or 
at least language from which the inten-
tion to grant the power may be inferred. 
11 
Further:, judicial scrutiny of a municipal 
ordinance differs from that imposed in the 
test of a State statute in that the usual 
presumption of validity of the sovereign's 
action does not apply. In the case of an 
ordinance, any reasonable doubt must be 
resohed against the municipality's power to 
enact it, and any questioned power must be 
deni~d. 18 
~either party nor the majority opinion 
cites any Utah '-'latute directly authorizing 
\f;. t~ ,1- is1 1_·<.1h ;.;n 11 ?lG P '.?". ... Al;o 
... ~-~Ort .. ""'·~ rh1> c.,,. '~ fc•cf'I ... l.. -~~ 21',::ns<trrr 
suprJ. note 4. 
17. 8 McQu11ltn, Mun.Corp § 25 146a 1 Rev 
l9i6). I Yokle}- \tun Corp § 97 tSupp 1973. 
p. 179), Accord. Yokley. The W.w of Subd1'-·1-
s1ons § 15 (1963) 
18. ,l\.'ance v .\fayflower Tavern. supra note 5. 
Parker v Pro\'O C1cv. :;,upra. note 6 \/J:;,fe, 1 v 
Ogden Cicy. supr:i. note i. Salt L.;ke Cir.> v 
Re\·ene, supra. note ! 
19. \f,1ps and plcJts co be acknnwledg':'J. cert1 
fied. approved. Jnd recorded Such map 'Jr 
plat sh;iJI be acknowled~eJ by ~uch owner be· 
~he City ·s enar~·: ,..,1· 
~his case. The ,~" 
-f 57- .)-3 19 anu :u ~.: 
L't..ah Corie A.nn l.'l ... 
, ·~= 'J , >I · .1e 
~, )p1n1on 
iinds :iuthortl) for 'he ~ -.irtlOn :n 
§ 10-8-84 :i.nd ,,·arious w, n Title 10, 
Chapt.er 9, under :he :hPo~ · :1at :he Ct:; 
was acting under those ;J1H'. --:r" neces,J.rily 
implied to 1t to carry out · .".ose /:MJwers 
expressly grant.ed. Section )7 -::.- :1 governs 
the nature of maµs and ;:ihLo, a sutxJivider 
must file and have approved Title 10. 
Chapter 9, is a Legislative grant of p<;wer 
to cities and towns for the purpose of ~nact­
ing zoning regulat10ns to promote the 
"health, safety, morals and general welfare 
of the community." Chapter 10 also in-
cludes the :\1unic1pal Planning Enabling 
Act, §§ 10-9-19 through 10-9 3u, which 
empowers any city to adoµt a master plan 
for the physical development of the munici-
pality and to promulgate regulations to as-
sure that subdivisions conform t~ the mas-
ter plan. The City has adoµted a ma....o.;ter 
plan as contemplated by the Act. 
Section 10-8-84 is a broad !:,'Tant of tho::: 
State's police po\vers to cities anJ town$ 
and is frequently referred to 1~ the "g-ener-
al welfare clause" zo It 1s derived from 
Uta.h's earliest laws anJ state5· 
They [the cities and townsJ may pass 
all ordinances and rules, and make ... di 
regulations, not repugnant to law. neces-
sary far carrying into efft:ct ur r/i;:,charg-
ing all poarer!' and dutic:5 conferrcrJ /Jy 
this chapter. and ::1uch as :1re necessdry 
ed town ~ucri µi..11 ,)r ri1-1µ ~n.J.' :"' Jppro·<-·d by 
its governing body. or bv some r1ty or town 
officer for that purpose des1gnat~J bv resolu 
t1on or ordmance '1f '>UCh go\ erning bod>. 
See also~ 5"7~5-1 which states 
Such maps J.nd pl.its, when m.lde 1cknowl 
e-dged. iilt'd :ind recorded. >hall operate ~,- J. 
dedication 0f .ill such stn•ets. ~l\evs ..i.nd other 
pub!ic places. and shall .est !he !"" •)f such 
parcels of land ;is 3re tht>re1:1 t''-PP""'<;,,(•<J n<tm.:d 
or intended tor public uses :n ot.d1 -..n11nt·. 
or town for the publLL tor th"" 'I~<'~ 1h1-r1•1n 
n..imed or 1ntenJe,J 
fore ~ome officer luthonzed i-.,y la\\ to rake 1 ~1e 20. Bohn> Sair L:ikt' C1C\ ::.upr:i. -, I'-""' 
acknowledgmen1 of con\eyancf's vf :-e-=il .. st.::ite '.VhJ1»hP..1d .;uprJ '"IO!P 1 
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1- qwr 'r1 l1r(,1. idt:: for 'fl.., -, :·; J.nd 
>-ie ht>.l1t~ ,ind :'r'JLT:·1"8 :r,e 
· .... nt::. 1mpro\f:' the mon.L. ~ed(e 1nd 
Jrder. comfort and cow. ~r.:~:'ce oi 
;ty anrl the 1nhab1tants ~hl:rP.if. and 
rie protection ·)i propert·. :nerein, 
f.· ena.s1s ;dded.] 
Thi:- ~Petton is not, however, authority for 
tlH: 1)r(linance under attack here. Cases 
dec 1 i1-:d under thls statute are emphatic and 
exµ:.c:•" 1n limiting its scope. In .Vasfe/J v. 
Ogden Cily,21 the city's power to enact an 
ordinance declaring that the presence of a 
•eh1cli::: parked in violation upon any public 
street Wa!S prima fac1e evidence that the 
registered owner committed the violation, 
was successfully challenged. Although 
Chief Justice Crockett reasoned there as 
here. that what is now Section 10-8-84 
implitd to the city the power to enact the 
ordinance, the Court held that the city had 
been gTanted no express authority to pass 
the ordinance, and that the city had no 
implied power to pass the ordinance based 
upon this general welfare statute or stat-
utes granting cities the right to regulate 
the use of streets, traffic and sidewalks. 
The Court has also characterized this 
staLute as "merely in aid of the express 
powers elsewhere granted" 21 in invalidat-
ing a city ordinance prohibiting keeping a 
pool table or pla)1ng pool. Anrl in Lark v. 
Whitehead; 23 Chief Justice Crockett again 
dissenting, the Court held that while the 
cities had been expressly granted Legisla-
t1 ve :1u thonty to enact an ordinance punish-
1q,.:: :_,, r·,nnJ '.. nd'::',.,_..r.t r,r ,J•..:;r)rd~rl: ,_11n-
duct ,n ~ ~U-;:$- JD, ::)...1.lt. L..J.;.....: l'.1t:, s >nll-
nance excee<led that statutory gr.int, and 
thJ.t .. ven under § 10-8-84, the statute re-
lied upon in the ma3ority optnion here, the 
city had no implied power to enact its orct1-
rlciOC'C 
The genera! provisions uf Sec. 10-8-84 
<lo not confer :.i.uthonty upon J. municipal 
21 ~upr.1 note '.' 
22 '.\me-nc.1.n Fork \-;n Robinson ct al ~u-
pra. note lO .H 77 lltah I i'l. :::02 P 250 Ac-
c·urd, Bulin ., SJU ! Jht' Ci!> supra nott: 9 
23. <::upu, note !J 
body to abroga.le •_!,. 
1n the expres.:, ;JrrJ " 
~t.1,1ns specified 
>- c. 10-8-.50, 
UC.A 1953 In :i,1/~ L,,,.,. 1~.ly v. Sutter 
this court cited t~1f_' ·x ,'' ll''.e ~hat where 
an express author1i 1 s ,P'·"!n to pass ordi-
nances tn a par~.c:J1ar da;:i.; uf cases, fol-
lowed hy a general authonty to pass all 
necessary laws. th~ express authority 1s a 
lim1tat10n upon :he general power so far 
as it relates to matters which belong to 
the class of those enumerated, but which 
are not, in terms, ;ncluded. A general 
power granted to the corporation to pass 
all ordinances necessary for the welfare 
of the corporation, is qualified and re-
stricted by those other clauses and provi-
sions of the charter or the general law 
whicb specify particular purposes for 
which ordinances may be passed. Other-
wise, the general clause would confer au-
thority to abrogate the limitations im-
plied from the express provisi!Jns.14 
In Layton City v. Speth,"' this Court set 
aside a conv1ct10n under a city ordinance 
which exceeded the statutory grant or au-
thority from the Legislature. In Layton 
City, the city had enacted an ordinance 
making it illegal for a vehicle owner to 
knowingly and intentionally permit person~ 
who possess, use, or distribute controlled 
substances to occupy his vehicle. The State 
statute in effed at the time the ordinance 
was enacted granted to cities the power to 
prohibit distribution of intoxicating liquors. 
narcotics or controlled substances to persons 
under the age of twenty~ne. This Court 
held ovPr the Jigs.en ts of Chief .Justice 
<:roch:o:>tt :i.nrl J11-.tki::> :1.J.11. ~hat the 1.r1~;­
nance was not neces:sary fur carrying into 
effect the purposes of the statute, w;i,s ~­
yond the scope of L€gislative authority 
granted to the city, and was therefore in-
valid. 
The remarning statutes cited by the City 
and the majority opinion as implied authori-
24. Id at 28 Utah 2d .346. 502 P.2d 559. Accord, 
Allgood v Llrson, Utah. 545 P 2d 530 ( 1976) 
25. Supra. note 11 
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r; for the City to ~;'._L~. ·J·.e 1)rdinance .1re 
.::~ning statutes found i'1 Title ~n. Chapter (J 
2.nd §§ 57-5-:3 anJ 57-.i--i.. the pertinent 
parts of which are c1teJ 1n footnott: 19 ui 
this opinion. Clearly. ~he::it: ::-~:.i.tutes do not 
grant the City exp!"e .... s authority to enact 
the Ordinance nor rto I [ind 1n these stat-
•Jtes implied authority to enact the Ordi-
nance to carry out puv.ers expressly grant-
ed under the zoning- statutes. A general-
ized difference between zoning statutes and 
subdivision controls i:; ~hat zoning normally 
prohibits certain uses 0f property, while the 
title remains in the private owner, and sub-
division controls normally make positive ex-
actions, such as conveyance of the title to 
the city, from the pr1vate owner. 
[I]t must be kept in mind 
that zoning regulations, generally, only 
limit the use of the property, whereas 
subdivision legislation often exacts a pen-
alty for approval of a desired use.26 
Traditionally, zoning and subdivision 
ha1;e been founded on separate legislation 
a!'ld administt!red separately. Subdivision 
regulation and zoning are frequently in-
terrelated in purpose and technique; 
[N)onetheless, fundamental differences 
do exist between the two areas. \Vhile 
roning involves no more than negative 
prohibitions on certain uses of the own-
er's property, subdivision regulation often 
makes positive exactions of the owner. 
It may require him to construct streets or 
sewers, to convey a portion of his land to 
the municipality for public use, or to pay 
~'..!.: '1•1 · ,.,l,,n• ,,f ,,11rli """".str 1 1r~t1on 
1~t:~l1:.'.i. ·•'1 .1 ·..L. ... ~1 Lr .~ .,"~ ,111t· ·! · ... --1~ 
this difference necessitate::. a more :>pec1f-
ic test of constitutionality, i. e., the lcgis-
latJOn should not on!y be .substantially 
relat.ed to the public health, safety. mor-
als, or general welfare, but. insofar a.s 
dedications, activities J.nd expenditures 
are positively reriu1red of the subdivider, 
these requirements should be rea..sonabl: 
26. Noland v St LOUIS Counc.~. \.1o. 478 5 \\.: 2d 
363, 366 (1972) 
27. Reps & Smith. Control cf L:rban L.lnd S•:b 
d1v1s1on, 14 Svracu~e- L Pt>v 417 407 rSµrin~ 
1963) 
rc· . ...i.: 
sh.,11 
'"' h1cr. ·, J1::l ·; '""11l:c::- n,1·:e <(Cnt>r:11I 
conre1~~d ~.'le ,,·,~·t·r :u 'evy ::ipe1.:1.1, 
or ~::.e::,::irnenL 2: ~Ernohas1s Ml1Jl'~ 
Here, the 1:,t;. 1~ not ..ictempting •,, r 
the Subd1v1ders' prorert:. from res11k ":, 
use tu m•1n1c1p~ii Jse :·ur ,choo!s ..ind ,.,r . .:; 
or to otherwise l1m1t •>r proh1b1t its u~<.: i11 
this ca~e. the City is rel.Ju.ring ~he SuL•l:' '•I· 
ers to con~·ey land to 1t, or to pay :c .J.l: 
amount of money equal to the \·alue uf :!1e 
land. without remuneratlun. In no sen:;,: .s 
this a convent10nal zoning case 
Further, §§ 57-5-.3 and 57--S--l cannnt 
stand as authority for the Ordinance The 
statutes automatically ·;est fee litle 1n ~he 
municipal agency upon acknowleOgment 
and recordation of the plat. They do not 
delegate to the cities anJ towns the power 
to enact ordinances exacting property or 1n 
lieu fees, without compenSation. from pri-
vate property owners as a condition to sub-
division approval. Nor can such exaction 
be read as necessarily or even fairly implied 
from those sections 
In his review of State statutory autho-
rizations for subdivision control, Yoh.Jey re-
views§§ 57-5-1 to 5'7-5-8 of vur Ccxie and 
states: 
A review of these provisions inJicates 
an absence of any standanls l{Overrnng 
approval of plats except t1e usual cti-
rect10ns for delineation of lots and 
street:,, that is, there 5eems to be no 
authonty conferred for the µromul~at1on 
',\[lJLh 1\\)ldJ /'t_•jU.it' :;l'. f,l<-<·'·•"i-: 
tam conditions JS .1 prerequisite to pl.lt 
approval The statute itself ,~nnta1ns nv 
proviswns for meeting <:onditwns befure 
plat approval ~ 
Anrler:.on, in The .1mt>nc:l!1 LJ. w of Zun-
lllg, distrngu1sfi, . ._, bdween rcqu:rir:~ .1 ,uh· 
div1s1on developer •_o LJ],111 (,)r -,trt'Pb .ind 
28. Y.iklev, Th':" L:iw 0( '>ul,J1.1s1r,n~ ::i ';1; 
119631 L-\lthou~l1 th1~ :,.xl '~ q,d d< d >.1th 1 
f' \LL ' CITY 0F \'.'EST JU!W ~~l Utah 
Cole as., UUlh, 6()6 P.2d 217 
·,i..1 h1ch he state:-. 'dl1 )e required 
d w1thuut 5U~Jr11· •. ~:·,n controls, and 
"'r1h'h may be required 1n ~n1~ St.J.te under 
H ~,'";' )-J and 57-5-4, ::ind >:"Xac~1ng proper-
rv for other municipal purpo~es . .vh1ch he 
rereatedly states must be rJone pursuant to 
strictly construed enabling legislat10n.?9 
Finally, the ~1unicipal P!anning Enabling 
Act,30 and spec1fically § 10-9-25, quoted by 
the majority opinion, cannot stand a..s suffi-
cient authority for the City to take the 
Subdividers' property under its Ordinance. 
That Section states· "In exerc1sing the 
powers granted to 1t by the act [the ~unici­
pal Planning Enabling Act], the planning 
commission shall prepare regulations gov-
erning the subdivision of land within the 
rnuniciµality." [Emphasis added.] No-
where rioes the .act authorize the planning 
commission or any municipality of this 
State to take any portion of a subdivider's 
property. The act enables municipal bodies 
to adort a master plan (which the City has 
adopted), establish an official street map 
and to zone in conformance with those 
plans. It gwcs cities an<l towns the power 
to prohibit the issuance of a building permit 
or :i.pproval 0f a subdivision which does not 
conform to the master plan, and it makes it 
a misdemeanor to sell subdivision lots with-
out µtanning commission approval. Again, 
in this case, the City is not attempting 
either to rezone the Subdividers' property 
or to refuse to approve their subdivision 
until it conforms to the master plan; the 
City, here, is approµnating lhe Sulidivider.:>' 
,, .. , 
l'ht: Lc:gi.::.lature lta.::. h~t.l tho 0pµurtun1-
t1e:. to ~xpressly expand the powers availa-
ble to mun1c1pa!it1e.::1 in controlling- problems 
associated with rapid subdivision develop-
ment, but 1t has not. as yet, prescribed that 
necessary expended jJO\'<er In 1973, a bill 
was introduced 1n the Utah Senate which 
woulJ have delegated to the cities the pow-
er to r1:>quire fees or dedicatwn 0f lanJ or 
both cl:::. a conJition for ::i.pµroval ,)f a subd1-
n.,1on plat In 1915, a bill amending 
29. 4 Anderson The .\rr.NH .. rn LJ.w of ZL~mng. 
~ 21 3'• p 141 11977) ;t>e ;;t>rierally i~ .::J ll5 
~ l (J"i 2J ~b .rnd 23 )'4 
§ lG-9-2..) \\ ~trr>11'..J• -:d in the Utah Sen-
ate which ,... cir.,;!li 1a\ e allowed cities dnd 
counties to pr0::scribe qualifications upon 
subdivider:;, such a.s providing for stvrm 
drarnage S!stems, parks and recreational 
facilities in ordE:r to gain approval of thelr 
gutxiivision rlats. ~either Dill gained the 
approval of both Houses of the Legislature. 
I have rev1c\ved those statutes character-
ized by the City and the majority opinion as 
enabling the City's actions here, and l re-
main unµersuade<l that any or all of them 
are sufficient to expressly grant or neces-
sarily imply to the City that power which it 
seeks to exercise by Ordinance No. 33. As 
noted ante, the normal presumptions in fa-
vor of the validity of statutes do not gener-
ally apply t0 ordinances, and this especially 
when the questioned ordinance seeks to .:ip-
propriate to the government some protected 
private right. 
There is some difference cif view with 
respect to a presumption of power to 
enact an ordinance and also with respect 
to burden of proof on that issue. Gener-
ally, there is no such presumption of va-
lidity of an ordinance as against the ob· 
jection that no power existed under char-
ter or statute to enact iL In other words, 
there is no presumption in favor of the 
validity of an ordinance where it is ques-
tioned on the ground of want of power to 
enact it; on the contrary, power to µass it 
must appear to have existed when it was 
adopted, if the ordinance is to be sus· 
tained. Accordingly, one claiming under 
an rmlin:i.nce r:iust hr :::i.bl2 ·.o pr•int to 
<'.'. ':~tl•t.! ;ir) ,1, -::'" .:,""\ -::n..:.l '. • ':, 1r1.0:- ~'l·'ci' ._,) 
1n express terms or in terms by wtHch the 
power is fairly and nece::isarily implied. 
Also, proof of authority to enact an ordi-
nance has been ruled to be necessary 
where objection is made to it 
on the ground that it interferes with 
common rights. Indee<l. the \•iew has 
been taken that with respect LO the exer-
cise of every power by a munic1pal i..:orµo-
rat1on, any reasonable doubt that arises 
as to the exislence of the power is Lo be 
30. Sections 10-9-19 to 30 
lilJt> PACIFIC REPORTER cd .'ERlb 
r·_.::,Jhed against the r:or;1orat1on, and the 
t"w .. er is to be denied Con::.1stently, a 
,:_net construction J.g:i:n.:iL '.)rd1nances re-
.~cncting person.ii :1bert;., property, im-
munity or pnvilege '" iollowed in many 
ca.:-es. Cert,.11nly, where it is 
dear that an ord1n:rnce exceeds the legis-
lative powers oi a city, it will not be 
presumed to be valiJ.JI 
Only after ordinances are satisfactorily 
determined to have been enacted pursuant 
to Legislative grants of authority may they 
carry the presumption of validity In .lfar-
sh:iil v. Salt Lake City,32 Utah's zoning stat-
utes were declared constitutional and the 
City's ordinances, enacted pursuant to those 
express grants of authority, were upheld. 
At that point, the presumption of validity 
attaches to the ordinance under clttack and 
it will not be declared invalid unless it is 
arbitrary, discriminatory or unreasonable, 
or unless it clearly offends :rnme prov1s1on 
of the C<mstitution or a statute.JJ 
It is also only after a subdivision ordi-
nance has been determined valid that it 1s 
to be tested as to its reasonablenes~ in 
application to the particular fact situation. 
In Jcnad v. Village of Scar.sdale,1-4 cite<l in 
the majonty opinion, villages in the State 
of New York had been deleg-ated sufficient 
gTants of power to require exactions from 
sub<lividers, so the question became one of 
the reasonableness of the application of the 
ordinance to the facts of that case, unlike 
our problem here. App!yrng the presump-
tion test to the facts of this case, the Ordi-
nance shoulci fail for want of authority to 
en:--.rt it 
~,,.1.~rd ~t...:.'•-.:::o h<.l_. .. en~1·'-C:·.I <lrt1te-, .tu-
thorizing rnanrlatury detlicatwn of la11d or 
in lieu fees as a preref1uis1te to plat approv-
al. These enactments, how~ver. have taken 
place with a keen eye to protecting the 
rights of privatt! property owner.s. In Asso-
31. 6 McQuilltn. supra, note 17, § 22.31. 
32. 105 Utah Ill, l41 P.2d 704 (1943). 
33. Id .. see also Gibbons & Reed Co. v ."Jonh 
Salt Lake City, 19 Utah 2d 3.29. 431 P 2d 559 
I 1967). 
c1att..''i !-{ 
Cret·i.., 
~he rT' 1; 
s1m11.ir Jr!J1n,tnc1.: lic;e ~un :1. ~·d J.t 
tack Bul ~.-,OL'J:Jlt'1J Home Builders doe~ 
not stan•.: :"r :he tJtopu.'1Uon espoused hy 
the majority 1)p1n1on, becau::ie that c3.':>e con-
strueLl an ,mJ.nJ.nce .vh1ch haJ been enacted 
pursuant tu :1n express State enabling stat-
ute and J nl::'w!y .Jdopted :imenUment to the 
C:ilifornia (',mstllullon. And in 19?·t. CJ.11-
fomia pa.."~ed statutes 36 requiring public 
agencies benefiting from the suhJ1v1s1on 
dedication to remunerate the deve!oper-ded-
1cator ior his property. 
The Subd1v1Jers also challenge the Orrl1-
nance as an unreasonable exercise of the 
police power because the City has deposited 
the in lieu fees into its general .'.lCcount, 
presumably to be used for genera! City 
purposes, and because they claim, the City 
has not shown that the exaction from them 
is re<l!lonably related to the derr1an<ls µlaced 
on the City by their suhdiv1s1uns, and th3.t 
thert~fore the exaction benefits others at 
their subdivision's expense. The affidavit 
of one of the Sub<liv1ders (made a part of 
the record) states, and the City doc.., nut 
dispute, that the Subctividers' in lieu fees 
have been us~ to purchase land for a 
water-detention basin to receive run-off 
from subdivisions other than the one devel-
ope<l by the Subd1v1ders herein 
A reading of the Ordinance discloses t.h:i.t 
the land shall he dedicateJ or the in lieu 
fees paid "to ~he public use ior the benefit 
and use of the citizens nf the City uf We~t 
Lic1!Jt1es." 
A::, support for their argument, ~he Subdi-
viders cite Weber Ba..sm Home Builders 
Ass'n •,' Roy Cityl1 In that ca::ie. the Court 
34. \8 NY 2J 78. 271NYS2d 'J55. 2!'\ N E~d 
673 t 1966) 
35. 4 C:d 3d 633 94 Cal Rptr h\q 4H·\ f' 2d '"irlfi 
I :')7\) 
36 Cal Govnt Cude~ 66471->-il) 1\Ve-.,() 
STATE ' LA 'Dl 
Cite a~ Ciali, t>-06? ~d 223 
trud, 1:i lnd dtscnrn1nator:: J. 
1t', ird1n._inv· ...; hu1kiing perm1L fees 
Crom )12 :o )1 :_~ ~'-:-::money was receJ\'ed 
and paid 1ntv tl1~ ~ ', , i;enera! fund, as ci.bo 
occurred 1n :n1s ·:i::ie, n0t :1Jr the purpo::.e of 
meeting increa::.eU '"sts of regulating build-
ing construct1on. but for the purpose of 
improving the c:t/s water and sewer sys-
tems necess1tatt:J Dy the construction of 
new homes and t'or other general purposes. 
The Court obserYed that equal protection 
and due process pnr.cip!es are violated by 
an ordinance which undertakes to impose a 
greater burden of general government cost 
on one clas.s of rbirlents than upon others 
without reasonable basis for classification 
and held that an ordinance which imposed a 
greater burden on those who built within 
the city after the ordinance than before its 
enactment was constitut1onally unaccepta-
ble" Chief Justice Crockett, wtitmg for the 
Court, correctly slated: 
The critical question here in whether 
lhe ordinance in its practical operation 
results in an unjust discriminat10n by im-
posing a greater burden of the cost of 
city government on one class of persons 
as compared to another, \Vithout any 
proper b;.tsis for such differentiation and 
cla.ss1fication. It is not to be doubted 
that each new residence has its effect in 
increasing the cost of city government; 
nor that due to the steadily increasing 
costs of everything, including those in-
volved in rendering such services, the city 
wou!J have authority to raise the fees 
charged for such services from time to 
t.11r.o '\!P'.'t'rtfwlc".~ ,~ '.h:-1.~ cn:inectinri 
ed •'qually rrnd on the s<ime basis as the 
old residents""' [Emphasis added"] 
I am not un'Symp.J.thetic to the needs of 
the cities in our State faced .. ~·1th dramatic 
expansion I J.m constrained. however, to 
rt·\'lew their ordinances with sensitivity to 
both the constllul!onally protected rights of 
proµerty ownt_·rs anJ the l1m1~ing nature of 
the :-itatutory granb of pov. er to those 
1'1t1es And thdl sensit11;1ty enmpe!s :i. \1ew 
un my part that the Ord1n::i.nct· is 1n\·al1J 
rn•J ·'>trl ~t.c:i.use of the spec1(i 1~ ~r.~,;:, 
nl!'l·d ,n 'h1:> oµin1on. 
\L-\LGHA;..-, J., concurs in the .:e1\,;:, <::\-
pres..,1:0 in the dissenting opinion of \VIL-
Kl:\S. J 
0 i K'l'-,-,,-,,,,,",,,-5'°'1J"[M'-
T 
STATE of Utah. Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Albert Banard LAMM and Roy Lee 
Lamm. Defendants and Appellant. 
No. 15888" 
Supreme Court of Utah" 
Jan" 16, 1980" 
Defendants were convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, G" Hal 
Taylor, J", of theft by receiving, and they 
appealed. '!'he Supreme Court, Hall, J", 
held that evidence was sufficient to estab-
lish each element of offense charged, which 
was based upon alleged concealing or aiding 
in concealment of stolen property. 
Affirme<l" 
Maughan, J., dissented and filed opin-
I. Criminal Law <>=1159"2(7, 9). 1159.4(:!) 
It is exclusive function of jury to 1t..·e1gh 
evidence and to determine credibt!ity of 
witnesses, and it is not withm prerogative 
of Supreme Court to substitute its judg-
ment for that of fact finder; Supreme 
Court should only interfere when evidence 
is so lacking and insubstantial th:it reasona-
ble men could not possibly have reached 
verdict beyond reasonable <loubt. 
38. fd ..1t 2b Ut3h 2d 2\8 4-87 P ::'.d 868 
< 'ILL v CITY <JF WE~T J<Jl'.fHc; l:tah 12'> 7 
~n ·_h1" · ·~e 
,. rn r·' ' ;"" ':' Le~1:-,,,J· 
•.r ')r,r.e1 ,nclud-
'i"--'r's .Jn'; -.1.i. ··r "E'., BJ cum-
1n. ·.:-l"'"f:' -; n(1 .:.l.1~ 1J'.·~ ,.,, 0'11ch even e::.-
,".1:::~. ~uch I~::.:;, ~t·r·, ncs. ·.he :iature dr 
~ 5 ,,f 'h: ['1-..1::.lUn Tl1e D1·:1s1on's ex1st-
3 ntiteU 1n 1he ::it..tl 1...:'es 7 out nowiiere 
·.~e 01\151(Jn grantt:d :ne r:gnt :o litigate 
I
·, tJ 1JWn n<1me or 1Jthen•,:1se. or. s1gn1fi-
to .iµpeai Order.- ui ~he Comm1ss1on. 
believe that, absen~ express statutory 
/ Jhonty granted by the Legisiature, the 
~ .~swn of Public Ct1lit1es has no st.anding 
·, lppeal Ortlers of the P'JDlic Service Com-
~ s.;1on. Indeed, ~he im;:i:1cat10n of Section 
-1-13 is that the Div1s10n on behalf of 
:·e executive director of ~he Department of 
13,.siness Regul.:ltion, is charged to execute 
1nv rules, regulations or orders of the pub-
/ '1~ ~rvice comm1s~1on of Utah issued pursu-
dnt to its qua.si-Judicial or rule-making pow-
~r · ThL'i Court should not allow the Divi-
',"n . .1nd particularly in the absence of a 
~e:~n1li\e grant of authur1ty by the Legisla-
·m. ~o J.ssume the ~ension-filled role to-
1
.qrd the (\1mmiss1on of both investigator-
, 1~forrer and adversary 
John CALL and Clark Jenkin., 
Plaintiffs and Appt>llants, 
(!TY <Jf II EST JU RDA,\.. Ut~h. 
Defendant and Respondent. 
:"Jo 15908 (Rt'hearing). 
Siipr<'rnt- C'uurt of l'tah 
Jum' ~- 1980 
'·jt .. 1 • ':t-r::. hrriu~ht .ict1un ti) challt''l~e 
.1·1!1r.:.rnct: Ail'1~1tPd by l'l~'l' ·.vh:1'h 
req1:::-e· · dt>r: :o 1ied1cate 7~ of ~,ro-
pusc. ,,,Jn :and to city or :o t)ay 
equ.· .. 11· · · r ·_h;.i.t •:alue in cash to l:i.: J:>1..·d 
ior '"t:-ol and/or park and recre::i.twn 
:acil1t1'-) -:·~e Third District Court, .3<.i.lt 
Lake l';Ju,-:·. David K. Winder, J., uphe!J 
ordrnanc~ . ..i.nd subdiv1ders appealed. The 
Supreme r\"Jrt. 606 P.2d 217, affirmed J.n<l 
remanJed. On reheanng, the Sut-ireme 
Court, \.\'1i'...1ns, J., held that ordinance was 
not uncon::.tltut10nal on its face, but coulrl 
not be applied without subdiv1ders being 
gwen the opportunity to present eviJcnce 
to show that dedication required of them 
had no rea....;onabie relationship to needs, 1f 
any, for flood control or parks and recrea-
tion facili~ies created by their subdivision. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Municipal Corporations =122(2) 
Once it is determined that municipal 
ordinance is within the scope of powers 
granted by the legislature, the ordinance is 
entitled to the presumption of constitution-
aJ validity accorded other legislation. 
2. Zoning and Planning <>=61. 134 
Oniinance which required subdividers 
to dedicate 7% of propvsed subdivision land, 
or pay equivalent of that value in cash, to 
be used for flood control and/or park and 
recreation facilities was not unconstitution-
al on its face, but could not be J.pplied 
without suMiv1ders being gi\'en the oppor-
t'..::t1~·. tv l~:'"'lt 'c": ·:-.';ti.'.<;' 1:0 ~~')"' '.'.1 l: 
d~d11.:J.LJOn re11uircu of (ht:m h<!U :-io n.:~onu.­
ble relat1unsh1p to needs, if any, for flood 
control or parks and recreation facilities 
created b) their subdi\ is10n. 
3. Zoning and Planning C:=>234 
If subdivJ::>ion generates need for flood 
control or parks and recreation facilities 
and municipality exacts fee in lieu of deJ1-
I nJIPJ )/,Hn >mt'lt1n,; . . '<er1n1n~ 6. Sec11on ) t--1 -6 
l'l.Jh Pn\\ n " L,gh C,1 S~ 
'"7 p gn~ 11g2!1 t1Jh L,i..:ht & 5<o'efoo!note2,supr-:J 
P11/;/1( S,·n" t'' .1mn1.,·>10111 •J; 
.O.PPENDIX "C" 
1258 - :oh 614 PACIFIC RE:'IJ!!TSR. 2d SERIE~ 
cat10r. ni ;..J.rd [,)r :5-uch purposes, :"ee:-
collecr..ed must be used m such .l way J .... -, 
benei!t demonstr:ihly the subdi\ 1s,on 
question, though t!ie benefit need not h>" 
solely to ~he particular subdivision. 
Robert J. DeBry and Vaiden P. Li"ing-
ston, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and .'-~­
pellants. 
Lynn \V. Mitton, Sandy, for defendant 
and respondent.. 
WILKINS, J ust1ce: 
This matter IS again before us following 
our granting of plaintiffs' petition for 
rehearing. The original majonty opinion 
addressed primarily the issue of whether 
there was statutory authority for the City 
of West Jordan to pass an ordinance requir-
ing a subdivider to dedicate land or pay a 
fee in lieu of dedication as a prerequisite to 
approval of the subdivision pla.t. 1 This is-
sue was decided by the majority in the 
affirmative.2 On rehearing this Court lim-
ited the scope of review to the issue of 
whether the ordinance in question 1s consti-
tutional, and therefore we address only this 
matter now 
[l] Once it is determined that a munic1-
pal ordinance is within the scope of powers 
I. The ordinance m question in pertinent part 
reads as follows: 
Section 9-C-8(a). In add1t1on to all the 
'1'.,"!r r~~·11r"!rr> .. rH~ preo;cnh"!d ·Jr.C':'r this Qr· 
Ji.-id.11ce- ·.!1e '"hd1vr'J~r ::.n:i.11 ,·Je ~e·~· :ro::!C :o 
...!edit...ite t..he scv~n IJ<:f cent 1 i'''QJ or tne land 
area of the proposed subd1\lls1on w U'1e public 
use for the benefit 3nd use of the c1t1zens of 
the City of West Jordan or in the 
alternative at the opuon at the governing 
body of the City, the City may accept the 
equivalent value of the land 1n cash 1f 1t 
deems advisable 
2. C.l.il v City of West Jordan, Utah. 606 P 2d 
217 (1979) In Call I, the author of this opinion 
ftJed d dissenting opinion. 1n which Justice 
Maughan concurred. and which conc 111ded that 
there was no statutory J.uthonty for the ordi 
nance m question 
., ..... .:::.nt,' 1 l hy ~n., eg-is1atur1'-,, 
q1.n1on of '.h1:-i ('uurt ;n111, '-ll lhe 
>rr~:nance 1n q11t':::.t1on ·,.1..:a.s-·.,,.- · n~.' ( p :s 
t>nt1t.eJ to lhe presumption .;f, 1l,1~~1Lut1on-
1I . al1dity accorJed other !e~->ut.un J In 
this case, the District Court ruled ~n.it the 
ordinance was const1tut10nal and therl!fore 
granted West Jordan's motion to J1~m1ss. 
(2, 3] While we agree that the ordinance 
lS not :.rnconstitut1onal on its face.~ plain-
tiffs raise questions as to its const1tut10na!i-
ty as applied to them which make disposi-
t10n of this issue as a matter o: law inap-
propnate. We staterl in our prior opinion m 
this case that "the dedicat10n should have 
some reasonable relationship to the need 
created by the subdivision." s This same 
requirement has been articulated m the de· 
cisions of other jurisdictions addressing this 
issue. In Jordan v. Village of Jfenomonee 
Falls,• the Court held: 
We conclude that a required dedication 
of land for park or recreation-
al sites as a condition for approval of the 
subdivision plat should be upheld as a 
valid exercise of police power if the evi-
dence reasonably establishes that the mu-
nicipality will be required to provide 
more land for parks and play-
grounds as a result of approval of the 
subdivision. 
P 2d 1150 (1976), I R Anderson. Amencan 
Law of Zoning 2d ( 1977), ~ 3 23 
4. \Vhde i..,,.,.v\t\· :ind ~ucc:1rictr."'~S :n •hi"' 1nf! 
1ng >t 1•_.11-J.~ 1.1 JL.<'1,-1• 'f n1, "~-,ni• 
be J~sir.ib!e ..:1nd c~-rt:.unly 1:::. .iµp1<'Ua«-t1 :tie 
ordinance in question when compared with 
similar pro\llsions from other iunsd1cuons evi· 
dences J. p3ucity of stated pun:ioc:.e and stan 
dards of appl1cauon l.hat borders on rendering 
the ordinance unconstitutmnally vague See. e 
g. the ordinances quoted 10 Jord:m ,. Village of 
Menomonee FdlJS. 28 Wis 2d >308. 137 >J '.V 2d 
442 (l965l: .4.ssoc13lt'd Home Builders v Cir\" 
of Wa/nur Creek. 4 C.il Jd 1'311. 484 P ::!d 006. ~4 
Cal Rptr 630 \1')711. HomP 8uJ/Jns .\srnc1d· 
t..ion Qf Gre:Her KJnsas L.t\ " L iri, ,)f l\Jns:is 
Ci£}, 555 S W :::'J ')J2 , .\1o i •_1771 
5. fi06 p '.:d 3l .:20 
3. Crestnew-Hollari.11 Homeowner~ As.;;oc1J- 6. ~S \\11s 2d t.i11R ·.ilS, !".!7 '..; ".\' 2J 44.2 .. p-.; 
lion, Inc. >' Engh Floral Compan.>. l_'tah. 545 \ J '.171) 
oiT.HE, ET< '· l"T~H ~IERIT SY~TD! l'ilC~CIL Utah 1259 
C11f' ;1:.., Utah. 614 P 2d 1259 
•1 ,lf,,,-ne Bu1i,-f~ . .-.::. -l.. 'e!•H''.;.l;ur: of 
~·., "!\,b City i. C.t_', rJf i{J.nsa.:; 
\~1-.,sour1 Suprµm~ 1~,1urt n~id. 
if the hurden ,·ast 1Jµon the 
der :s reasonably ;:it.tnbutable to 
1, Hl v1ty, then the requirement (of ded-
Jl,Jr ·)r fees in lieu thereotl 1s perm1ss1-
1P, ·f nut. ,t lS forbidden and amounts to 
i ,nf1.5cat10n of pnvate property in con-
·.r~'entwn of the constitutional prohibi-
·1rins rather than reasonable regulation 
·.Hider the police power Insofar as the 
t1'>tabl1shment of a subdiv1s1on within a 
cit\ increases the recreational needs of 
t.h~ c1t_v. then to that extent the cost of 
71eetln!f that increase indeed may reason-
1bly be required of the subdivider. (Em-
phasis 1 n original.) 
\n this case the rule adopted by this 
1 1 0Urt 1n Ca1/ I, quoted an le, cannot be 
1cpl1ed without plaintiffs being gwen the 
0:.iportunity to present evidence to show 
·hat ~he rledicat10n required of them had no 
·~asonable relationship lo the needs for 
::ood cuntrol 0r parks and recreation facili-
:1~~ created bv their subdivision, if any. 
:mp!ir1t 1n this. rule is the requirement that 
f :he ~uDdiv1s1on generates such needs and 
West .Jordan exacts the fee in lieu of dedi-
c.atton, 1t 1s only fa1r that the fee so collect-
:d be used in such a way as to benefit 
'kmonstra.Uly the subdivision in questi~n 
Th1'.> is not to say that the benefit must he 
'0iel.1' to the particular subdiv1s1on, but only 
'.hat ~here be some demonstrable benefit to 
~.n<I , , ir~ ,nd,.,tJ .-'Jr •ur:hPr 1Jro-
.. t-d1n~ 1ot 1neon81stt:nt with this vp1mon. 
• 'HJ uJ:-.l::. .twarded. 
\ROCKETT, C J. and :-!Al.!GHAN, 
Y.\1.L 111•1 STEWART, JJ, concur 
STATE of l'tah. By and Through the DE-
PART~lE:";T IJF cmtMU~ITY AF· 
FAIRS, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
UTAH ~1ERIT SYSTDI COUNCIL and 
William A. Callahan, Defendants 
and Appellant. 
No. 16501. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 3, 1980. 
State sought review of a decision of the 
Merit System Council ordering the reem-
ployment of an employee of the Depart-
ment of Community Affair.i. The Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, G. Hal 
Taylor, J., reversed, and remanded to the 
Council to hold a new hearing. Employee 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J ., 
held that the exclusion of the director of 
the Department of Community Affairs 
from a portion of the administrative hear-
ing because she was a witness in the pro-
ceeding was revers1b!e error an<l the attend-
ance by a deputy director, who directed 
another arm of the operation and lacked 
full knowledge of the case, was not suffi-
cient to provide the Department with ap-
propriate representation. 
Affirmed. 
I. Officers and Public Employees =72(1) 
Both ;;a.rt:~.~ tu µroc"-'e·iing lwf1)rt• '\1er:t 
System Cour.ul wece en;:.1:.led t.11 ha.e tc:stt-
mony taken under oath or affirmation . 
2. Officers and Public Employees =72(2) 
Failure to place witnesses before Merit 
System Council under oath was not revers-
ibly erroneous where no objection was 
raised until State sought review of C.Ouncil 
order in d1stnct court. 
3. Officers and Public Employees =72(2) 
Omissions from record of proceeding 
before \.1ent System Council were not re-
• • PETERSEN. SORENSEN & GROUGH 
Thirj Ju,~i,: ,,\\ ~ · 
Of Salt L3'c (,,u11t, 
For The State Of UtJh 
::(Allfl(O ?\JB~IC ACC'JUNIAN1S 
Sep lcmbcr 1 1, I 'Ji; 1 
RE: ORDER AP?Ol~TING ;•ASTERS, Civil No. C-?U-1129 
Sir: 
JOHN CALL A~O JOHN CLARK JE~K!NS - PlJnt1ffs' 
vs. 
CITY OF WEST JOROAll, UTAH - Defendant 
M(MBUfS OF 
AM(~ICAH tNSTITUT( OF 
C(IHlfl(D P\JSUt ACCOUNTA.NT'S 
UTAH ASSOCIATION OF 
CCRT!Fl(O PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS 
As the appointed master of the court in the above referenced proceeding, 
have completed a sur•1ey of the available accuunting records at the City of 
West Jordan. In accordance with this order, the purpose of this survey was 
to determine if the City's records could provide informotion as to: (1) the 
amount of consideration paid by various '"'"livHl<·r' rrl.1irrl tn thr cily'•, 
Flood Control ancl "Mk Fee OrdinJnCP, (2) wh.it lhc city d1u with each fee 
this information from the City's records. This preliminary report presents 
the resul :s of .my survey 
~(COUNTING RECORDS AVAIL\RLE 
For each of the f 1sea1 ycJrs ending June Jll, !97S through 1978, the 
following records were available: (l) general ledgers, (2) cash receipt 
journals. iJ) cash d1sburserrcnt Journals. These lecgers and journals are the 
coinple:e recorJs ke~t by the City and it appears that no records are missing. 
APPENDIX "D" 
/ During fiscal year eccicg ~cce 10, :g-> - n "•", 
account~~g s;stern. ih1s 5>/S~L·~ ;:JrJ·,~~r.:s 
as the prior hand ~cs ted 
The C :ty has 'JSed a series cf accc;un:s f, 1 tl-iin the ~cner"d I fL1nc ~o cc:::~;: 
for flcod CJntrJ1 and pan fee transactions ine fol low1n<; accoun::. were u:e~ 
RECE!?TS 
Flood Control Revenue 
EXPEND !TURES 
Flood Control 
Parks - Equipment and Operating Supplies 
Darks - 3uildings and Grounds 
?arks - Sundry Charges 
?arks - Land PurChdSCS 
?an: s lrnprovcments ()th er ThJ n 8u1ld·n~s 
P J rk s ~quireient 
?a rx 5 - Profcss1ona1 Serv 1 ces 
For fiscal ;ears 1s-:i and 132J "1e follpwing accounts were usea. 
RECE:PTS 
Flood ~nt c 
rlcod ::in:,...~~ - Sa'a.,es 
Flood Control - 3enefi ts 
;load 1:cn t r'J I Pub I 1 c .'Jot ices 
Flood Contr:ii Travel 
:-, ood ::nt:~ 1 E~'J iprner"1t and Su L' ;· : es Ma 1ntenance 
•1 oc:J :ont:~ Pnfess iona I )erv 1(~': 
Flood Cunt ... ~~. '11scellaneous Su;;o 11 es 
Fl ooc ·:ontrol - '·~ isce1 laneous Ser·1~ce-: 
Fl ocd ': un t ,...'J l · .... 3 nd .i:c.::{uisit1cns 
r: ood : ~r;: :· ') ~ ! -on •e"len ts Ot 'le,... - h:! n 3 J 1 I G · 
/ 
I 
I 
.. 
tne 1ac-e h:ount1 were u1cd year to year except in 1979 and 
:;c:: t·,e e'~end;ture ac:,Junts ~ere ai I under the general account title of 
SURVEY ~ORK PERFCRMEJ 
ri·'.h ao Jr.Jers'.Jnd·r; Jf the accounting records available and the accounts 
~sed 'Jr '.he ' 1 ~Jd cJntrol trin1Jct1ons, I selected a few transactions for revie· 
back to supporting docur:'cnta t ion. The transact ions reviewed and my findings 
are presented ~clow 
Rece1pt1 
7/25/77 GENERAL LEDGER POSTING 28, !41.89 
7h1s transaction Wd S traced back to two ca sh receipt documents 
as follows: 
7/20/77 Clark Jenkins 16,576.00 Wes Cal 1 
7/20/77 Ensign Dev. 11,565.89 Bunker Hil 1 
~ 28 !1 l 82 
Ca1h receipt doc umcn t 1 we re found and I traced this amount to a 
:ia n k :•eck'ng ac:Junt deposit. 
hoend1 t~res 
)/:: ·7 CHE:K NO. 3152 NE:LSEN, .'o1J\XWELL & WANGSGARD s 1.168.21 
~c is ~ 3 yrrent was traced back to supporting invoices from Neil sen• 
"axwe" ~ rlon;sgard. The ~1.168.21 is part of a total payment of 
s:: .. ., ::; J"~ '\ supported Jy the following individual invoices: 
'1 
2. 
• 
4 Ill, 73 
1. 
2. 
3. 
'...Jes: JordJn - S~ur"' :>J "l~1: 
CJntract - Project ·~J~ber ~26C-6J 
-lill1amsburg Subd1·11s1on - uea dra~r.a~e 
Browns Meadow - area dra ·nage stud; • 
Area # 's 5 and 6 - area dra inaqe s tuoy 
Cost Summar;. 
Engineer 18.J ~rs. 
3/10/7tl \.lest Jordan - Stonn Ora inage 
Contract 5860-63 
s :u dy 
1. '-lill iamsburg Suodi·1is:on - area •fra:nage st~cy 
4/11/78 
1. 
Cost Summary: 
Engineer l.5 hrs. 
?roJect Number 53;3.53 
?rofcssional engineering services for constrvct1or 
surveying and inspection for the 27GO ~est Storm 
Ora in Project 
Cost Summary: 
ProJect Inspection 
Sur·1eyor 
Technician 
T ravel 
28 hrs. 
20 hrs. 
2 hrs. 
s 31. 64 
5/18/78 CHECK NO. 3163 NOLAN & SON s 10.000 00 
This check is a partial payment on a total invoice of Sl9,644.61 
related to installation of the 2700 \.lest storm drain. 
'li 
7" 
162 
3. 5/31178 CHECK NO. 3260 NICK J. COLLESSIDES S 472.00 
4. 
The $472.00 1s part of a total check for Sl, 172.00. $472.00 was 
traced to a supporting invoice related to legal services on the CAL. 
ct , a l . vs . -I e s t Jordan ca s e . 
11/22/76 CHECK N0. J889 T~NNESEN SPR!NKlE~ CCMP:~i 
This trJnsJctions wJS traced to J sL1~rort1n1 invoice for 
sprirklinj systems as follows. 
~3r~est Estates ~;c 
CJ:ce 'lallc1 No 
11 ,; 
••1...:..:-
. " 
111 ~apect 11 fJr 3 iC'eS ::;f ryround dt Sl0,000 per acre. The total 
0 r:~er'.; ~·Jrcnase •:is '.S. 371 acres at 7000 South, 3200 '~est. A second 
c1ec< for the '.la lance Jf $73,710.00 ·-ias Pdld on the same date and was 
charged to tne PJrKs - Land ?urchdses account. 
Conclusions 
.1;:0 the ·1ndc:-1tand1n~ I gained from the sample tests above, [can 
dra·" '.he '~l10·,,1n'J conclJs1ons about t11c rest of the work tl1e court has 
rcqucstec· 
C11h recci~ts Jrc ;cncrall; ·ldcr,uately cnc11mcnted, and [can determine 
from the existing accounl1n~ records the individual contributions made 
by each subJiv1Jcr. 
2. In or~cr to dcterc1111~ tile •,iay the City l1Js spent eacli individual subdivider' 
fees, I ·-ii 11 need to ~erform the fol low1nn steps: 
I ,,,11 1 need to ce'.er-;oinc Hhat each of the individual flood control and 
parks disburcsrnents ·,1cre for. Fror. the sample tests above, I beleive 
tnJt t11e trrnsJct 1cns arc 1·1el I Jocu"1ented .ind that I can determine the 
purpose of eac'1 j:scwrsement. 
S'.eo_l 
~fter I find a general description of the transaction provided in Step 1, 
I w!ll oonj tJ jeter"line ~no benefited fro01 each individual trap52ctjqo -
rron the sanplc '.ns'.s above, I know thJt often the accounting records do 
nc'. --:·11:e an e':'JnJtion of the indivirlual benefits to subdividers. 
:.cc iccount 1n9 recJrds. I have no way of kno>iing who 
~l·-~· :._•J fn:c :c.c ~:c,:;co pJyment for the 2700 West storm drain. To 
:»!cr..,,nc !h•.' nc'1":ual sJb.Jivider's Lcncfit from this type of 
I 
I :ra~sact ~11, ..,· 
ind1vld:...al SJ("]d~./,.:2rs, nc,,C'-1'.::r, .Jr'_ 1 J, sc.::.,ec~ive .:t:c~':..11.n"", 'riC'~ 
J.n anJ1_1s1s ,·10_..l,j :-~G'J~re J r;: 1,·,e,.-1 ~t 
fisca: year. :JJ not Oe1e1,1e ~r,jt ~ ...,n,;i '"~1';d1v1dP,... r,..., ''O pyl""''"O" 
1 rj i .' 11i1..J 3. i l I 
\st~;-;-
{ 
From SteJS 1 ancJ 2 I ·•111 have an undcrstJnring of ·•hat al~ the f'cc: 
c:r~ro~ and J2r·ks ~ransactions ~ere ;or anrl wno benef1ted from them. 
S'.ep requires additional depth in the benefit analysis because the 
Cit; >i1s spent cic:1ey for flood control .ir1d oarks that has cor1e fror. 
sources Jther than Flood Control and Park Ordinance fees. Tnese other 
funds can come from Federal or State sources or from general tax revenue: 
FJr clarification in lJnguage, I will CJll these other funds "ger.eral 
c1'.y fJr.ds" Jnd I will call the Flood Control and Park Ordinance fees 
"f 'ooa control fees". T>ie City has not segregated funds fr:rn tr.ese t·e1·c 
sources, therefo•c, the accounting records 80 rot ref1ect ~h1ch source 
money is being •Jsed w11cn a disburse"Tient 1s being rnade. The prob 1em at 
City funds and that '.his benefit is not pro;erly considered as part of•· 
bencf1: the C1t1 's responsible to provide 1nd1vidual s~bdiv1=ers fer 
(:lote that :;tcD 2 nas given the suDd>viders C'' 
for the bene•·:s '.rom tcese general Cit1 funds.) 
port1Jn of a sut.:JJ,',d~r's tJtal benefit_ 1,t-rryn ~te:J : 1 wJs ~r:i-11Ced from 
I ; • • 
·r-,1) NI le}.;(' or;i ~i1 1_· pure flood control benefit for 
CJn'.rJl and Jar' '.ransic:,on ana ~roJect. Since this information is not 
prov1ced 'n the ex·,st1ng :iccounting records, 1t will have to come from other 
recJrds and, agiin, from the help of a trained engineer. It is also possible 
Lthat such 1nhrmation may not therefore, the analysis woula be available at all for some transactions, not be possible. 
PROP:RTY RECCIVEO AS FEES 
The City has on occasion received ~roperty as a fee from the Flood 
Control and Parks Fee Ordinance. These transactions are not recorded in 
the accounting records of the City but are recorded in the minutes of the 
City. I reviewed one of these transactions and found it to be in good 
order. I did not, nowever, attempt to follow the transactions past the 
entry in the minutes. I should be able to follow these transactions into 
recorced deeds and perform procedures similar to those provided above. 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNIFORM MUNICIPAL 
FISCAL PROCEDURES ACT FOR UTAH CITIES 
The court ·was son;ewhat confusing in it's instructions related to my 
determination of west ~ordan City's compliance with the Uniform Municipal 
Fiscal Procedures il.ct for Utah Cities (the Act). Paragraph 2 of the order 
which stated "The .rnster shall report to the court as to whether the documents 
are being kept in accJrdance with Utah Fiscal Procedures Act and general 
accounting princip~es" ·~JS striken from the work I was instructed to do. However, 
Paragraph J st3tes chat "If the documents are not being kept according to regular· 
establis'e·j accJunt1c9 principles in accordance with the Fiscal Procedures Act, 
the ~.1:'.e>· :r·ai· ''s: es~imHe che cost of the report had the records been prepare 
7: cording e Fiscal to gene r 3 l 1 y Jc : :: ~ : = ·j J:: : : t.. n t -?rocecures ~:: · r es ~,e ' n ~ 
compliance in these t1-.'0 o rea s. 
present 0nly my opinions cela:ed '.J the Ac:. 
First, Section 10-10-29 FUND: TO 2E EST~JL!SHED of the Ac: states that 
"Each City shall maintain, ac:Jr:ling to its owr. "eeds, some or al 1 of the f:1·. 
funds or ledgers in i:s system of accounts 
of the rrun1cipalit;." .<est Jordan City did no'. 'llaintain a property ledger 
until recenti;, however, within the scope of tnis scrvey ccui d not deter1nr.e 
its accuracy related to prior transactions. 
Second, Para9raph : 2) of Section 10-10-29 al so requires a City '.o ma ·:n:a · 
"Special revenue funds, as required, such as fund financed by a special-pur;c 
tax being earmarked for a specific purpose", and paragraph (4) requires 
capital improvement funds to otherwise account for funds allotted annual~/ t: 
specific ccnstr~ction or improvement projects derived from sources other that· 
proceeds of g~neral obligation bond issues or general long-term debt." 
Neither of these pacagraphs are exactly related to the acccun~'ng ~rcbie-
of flood control an: pu'<s fees. '.owever, I think that they bot~, provice ;u'.'.'. 
on the proper me:hod of recording these transactions. First, while these fee'. 
may not be taxes, '. :h'.rk :hey are ,.,1tnin the '.heme of paragra~r. '::; in tha'. 
they are for a special purpose and ecr111drkcd specifically for that pur~ose. 
Secondly, these fees "e"': :Jl'ec':ed 'or flood control and parks ccnst:'Jctic", 
improvement projects, therefore, Jaragrapn (4) '.eems to apply. ~he City has 
recorded these t:3nsJ=~ ·:ns as ;ear-tJ-fear revL'l'.J~ 3nd ex pen·~~ ~ ... ·-es ai;d ,ra~ 
not given them spec'.a· a~:ount'.rg treatwent. 
I~ ' ' ' - • 'ri':" :·e ]Ji~ir,~ d ~Jra~ra~ns (2), \·1) and (9) of Sections 10-10-29, :)nclu~e "hat t~e fees should have had special accounting treatment. First, 
th;nk :he City :hculd ha·1e prepared a fixed asset ledger that recorded a 
description of all 'cxed assets purchased, date of purchase, cost and any other 
appl icabi e informa t on This ledger should also have included the property 
received as Flood Conni and PJrks Ordinance Fees. Secondly, I think that the 
Flood Control and 0 irks r~e receipts should hJVe been recorded directly into a 
restric'.ed e~u''.f acc:unt within the general fund, which would represent earmar: 
funds f)r flood control and parks. As the City detenn1ned allowable uses for 
these funds, they should have made a transfer from the restricted equity account 
to a revenue account. It appears that the expenditures have been recorded prope 
This accounting method would have provided an equity account that reflected any 
unused portion of these funds collected. It would not however, require the City 
to document the individual subdividers benefit from the expenditures or how his 
individual funds were spent. I cannot find any provision in the Act that requir 
accounting records to be maintained so as to document an individual's benefit or 
how an individual's funds were spent. 
COSTS TIJ COt'cLCTE T:r[ crn:11:1AT!Oll 
r can objectively evaluate the time necessary to analyze the receipts from 
subdividers and '.he general nature of the total disbursements by the City. 
have '.o "se 3 1ery sub;~c'.ive analysis, however, in determining the time necessa 
to allccate the ~eriefits of al I costs to individual subdividers and to determine 
an.y gcrenl obi 1~atcon benefit that I refcred to in Step 3 above. For this reas 
r must ~rovide the following very broad range of fees to complete this work' 
Analysis of fees received 
and the general nacure of the 
disbursements (Step 11 
Step 
Step 3 
Total 
Est "'J · .. J 
5,~C'.l 
S,GCO 
12 '~1'0 ----
cJNAL REPORT 
3,700 
7,600 
7 600 
18,900 
If the court should request me lo complete this work, I will issue our 
final report in accordJncc with ~tatcme~~u_<iiting Standards No. 35 -
Special Reports Applyi~~ ~~rc~d Upon Procedures to Specified Elements, 
Accounts or Items of a Financial Statement, issued by the Auditing Standards 
Executive Corrrnittee of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. 
Because my "rocedurcs will not constitute J complete examination in accordance 
with generJlly accepted auditing standards, I ,,ill not express an opinion on 
the financial statements of the City. Also, if I was to perform additional 
procedures or if : was to ~erform an audit in accordance with generally ac:eptec 
auditing standards, other matters might come to my attention that I would report 
to the court. 
Again, it is a subJective matter of determining how much the above fee 
estimates would :ie if tr.e records had been pre pa red in accordance with the 
accounting methods ! have suggested in my corrmcnts related to comp I iance with 
the Uniform Fiscal Prccedures Act for Utah Cities. [t would obviously be easier 
to find recorded proper'.; received for fees, and any unused fees cculd easily 
be identified in total. -:-nese records would cot help in the analyses of the 
individual sub:Jividers becefit from expenditures ,)r in deterr:i;nins how his 
p 
i ind' ;~jua' <='ee:. -,.,ere s~ent it appears reasonable that these records would hav 
reduced t~e fees "bovc Jy 10 to 20 percent. ff the c1ty would have kept indivi 
records for eac~ Subdi·11der on specifically how his money was spent or how he 
benefited from Joint expenditures, then the above fees would have been reduced 
substantially, but as r stated above, I cannot find a requirement that such rec 
were necessary. 
will be happy to discuss these matters in detail at the courts request. 
1~,~~ 
Petersen, Sorensen & Brough 
I 
I 
L 
BA:;BERRY DEV. CORP. v S<l\IT!-1 JORDAN CITY Utah 899 
Cite u. Ut..ah, 63 I P 2cJ 199 
,(!erice, 1n my :\e\v 0f mctrket value in 
h1::i ,_'3..'>e. Even if rt :ie conceded that the 
plaintiff's out-of-court statement as to the 
nlue of the well is sufficient to establish 
lfP 1·aJue of the well, ~he testimony falls far 
shurt of providing a reasonable basis for 
Jeterm1lllng market value of the whole par-
cel without a working well. Surely in this 
case such evidence would not have been 
hard to come by The point cannot be 
avoided by the general principle that some 
uncertainty in evidence of damage is to be 
expected. That principle has especial appli-
cation in cases dealing with lost profits 
because of lost sales, see Winsness v. J.U. J. 
Conoco Distributors, Inc., Utah, 593 P.2d 
1303 (1979); loss of good will; losses occa-
sioned by inability to reduce unit costs; etc. 
These types of losses inevitably are bur-
dened with considerable uncertainty be-
cause of the nature of the factol"3 which 
must be considered. Market value, 33 a 
measure of damages, may give rise to con-
flicting testimony, but the basic factors to 
De considered are not 30 difficult to evalu-
ate. In- any event, there must be some 
evidence of market value, and there is none. 
HOWE, J ., concurs in the dissenting opin-
ion of STEWART, J. 
w._ ___ , 
o ~ ~ffllU,.CHSlSIE~ 
BANBERRY DEVELOPMENT CORPO-
RATION, McKean Construction Compa-
ny, Midwest Realty and Finance.. In~ a 
Ft.1.h corporation. Plaintiff~ and Re--
~ ",)7'1,; ... :1 t<i, 
v. 
SOUTH JORDAN CITY, a municipal cor-
poration, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 16872. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 3, 1981. 
Subdiv1ders brought suit against city to 
chall~nge the va!idity of water connection 
and p:irk improvement fees 1mpose<l ~ a 
condition to connection to the city water 
main and a.9 a condition to final approval of 
the .;;ubdiv1ders' plat. The Third District 
Cuurt, Salt Lake County, Dean E. Conder, 
J., 0>'JSt<..1ned validity of the park improve-
ment iee, and granted city's motion i:.o dis-
mts~ ..t.5 to 1t and held the advance collection 
of w<.~cer connection fee contrary to statuto-
ry law and granted subdividers' motion for 
summary judgment and both sides appeal-
ed. The Supreme Court, Oaks, J., held that 
advance collection of water connection fee 
from suOOivider and a park improvement 
fee des16TI.ed to raise funds to enlarge and 
improve sewer and water systems and rec-
reational opportunities would be valid pro-
vided they were reasonable. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Howe, J .• filed separate opinion concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part in which 
Maughan, C. J., Joined. 
L Water.i and Water Courses =-203(6) 
Advance collection of water. connection 
fee from subdivider and a park improve-
ment fee designed. to raise funds to enlarge 
and improve sewer and water systems and 
recreational opportunities would be valid 
provided they were reasonable. 
2. Municipal Corporations ct:=712 
Wateni and Water Counes C-203(6) 
To comply with standard of reasonable-
ness, a municipal fee related to services like 
water and sewer must not require newly 
developed properties to bear more than 
their equitable share of the capital cost.s in 
relation to benefits conferred. 
3. :"Y'l:unh~ipM.I C0r;ior:it~on!' c=.458 
To dbt>rmine ~q·J1:1bie Sl1C\re 0: t:k 
capital costs to be borne by newly deve!-
ope<.l properties, a municipality should de-
termine the relative burdens previously 
borne and yet to be borne by those proper-
ties in comparison with the other properties 
in the municipality a.s a whole and impor-
tant facton to consider include: (1) the cost 
of existing capital facilities; (2) manner of 
financing existing capital facilities; (3) rel-
ative extent to which newly developed 
properties and other properties in munici-
pality have already contributed to cost of 
existing capital facilities; (4) relative ex-
tent to which newly deve!ope<l properties 
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and other proper~.-::s in mun1c1pality will 
contribute to cost v; ~'<:'.:it.mg caµ1t.al facili-
ties in the futur.:.::. ::. :::..:tent to which mu-
nicipality is requ1nn;; new developers or 
owners to provide ,-,Jr-r::non facilities that 
have been prov1ae<l Oy municipality and fi-
nanced through general taxat;on or other 
means; (6} extraordinary costs in serv1cing 
newly developed properties; and (7) time-
price differential inherent in fair compari-
sons of amounts paid at different times. 
4. Municipal Corporations ~458 
In determining reasonableness of a fee 
for municipal services, courts must concede 
municipalities the flexibility necessary to 
dea1 realistically with questions not suscep-
tible of exact measurement and precise 
mathematical equality is neither feasible 
nor constitutionally vital. 
5. Municipal Corporations <0=> !67 
Municipal officials must have legal 
power to deal creatively with extraordinary 
or unforeseen circumstances in provision of 
municipal services. 
6. :.funicipal Corporations <>= !22(2) 
A municipality's exercise of its legisla-
tive powers is entitled to a presumption of 
constitutionality. 
7. Water and Water Courses <=203(12) 
Zoning and Planning ~685 
As the information that must be used to 
a.Ssure that sudivision fees are within the 
standard of reasonableness is most accessible 
to the municipality, tha~ body should disclose 
the basis of its calcu!at1ons to whoever 
challenges the reasonableness of its subdivi-
sion or water hookup fees. 
8. ~~·:it:C'f :\n<l W.lt,,.r Cours'?'"\ :;=.20~ll2) 
Zoning and P!,111ning -:..:= 005 
Once the municipality has di~c!o:;ed the 
basis of its calculations for its subdivis10n or 
water hookup fee:; to those who challenge 
the reasonableness of the fees, the burden of 
showing failure to comply with constitution-
al standard of reasonableness is on the 
challengers. 
9. Municipal Corporations <:3:=458 
Park improvement fees should be fixed 
so as to be equitable in light of relative 
benefits conferred on, as well 3..'l relative 
n:ur .1. .::, i.- ..l ,\ nule ,H:'; 
'""'''1·':'·l ~·r~r·unt sui'.',r1~r; 
rele\·:.i.nc :iefits .ind buri?·~'1· 
1,e1Pµed ind •)ther prop€n1t:,, 
\!ichaPl J. \lazuran, Sal•" LL e ·:t:.'. for 
deft!ndant dOd J.ppelbnt 
John H J.1cDonald, Cr:ug S 1~,~, S.J.!t 
Lake City, for plaintiffs a.nJ 1 L..:rirl".denb 
OAKS, Justice· 
This is a suit by three subd1v1deI'S clg'J.lnSt 
a city to cha!lenge the validity oi water 
connection and park improvement :·e€::1 1m· 
posed ~ a condition to connection to the 
city water main and as a cond1t1on to :·inJ.l 
approval of the subdividt:rs' plat. At issut! 
m this appeal are the legality of any such 
fees, and, tf they are legal, t:-ie criteria for 
judging their reasonableness. 
The procedure for char~;mg the park im-
provement fee does not appear in the rec-
ord. City Ordinance 13-1-5. which the sub-
dividers concede was lawfully enacted J.nd 
constitutionaJ, requires a subdivider who 
desires to connect to the city water system 
to enter into an agreement "spec1fyrng the 
tenns and conditions under which the water 
extensions and connection shall be made 
and the payment that shall be required." 
Paragraph 10 of thi:- agreement form J.dopt· 
ed by the city and required of all suhdivi<l-
ers before plat .i.pprova! obligates the ::>ubd1-
viders to pay th~ entire c0'it of ;\II watPr 
including extens1vn::i irum e:<1::.t1r.g \Vater 
mains and all connecting lines within the 
subdivis10n. It a!so prcv1des th.:it "tht- City 
shall charge the Applicant a cunnect1,1n :·ec 
m the amount uf $ __ for each individu-
al dwelling unit to he ser.·eri wtth1n the 
subdivision, which sum shall be pay:ihlt-> .n 
full to the City before the ::..ufxli·:1:.1on ~:. .,_ 
tern is connected to any e'<1sl!ng City wat1>r 
mains." The required crJnr:tod:1,n f'-'e "''a.:. 
$800 for a 3/,-tnch line and '£1,001) !or ·1 
l·1nch line 
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'.;'hat 'tw •'(.flecr:un ,( '•1..- •cl' r f,..,e._._. 1n t.he :>J.mt'. 'TIJ.nner as 10-8-38 au-
~ ree::i .n J.dvanct'. fr()m :he ~e ·~. 
<>n:ot1tuttd .in unlawful ta{ a.nd _in 
11n1 (\r1:-.t.lutlonal taking of r.>rrJµerty >nthu•1t 
liul.:' ;·ruce::.s. the subdtviders sought in1unc-
lJ\e r<:-liei They i:-hallenged the city's µark 
~·wr0vemenl fee 0f $235 per lot on the 
~a.rne basis They also attacked both fees a.s 
d1sc;im1natory. 
Un motions in advance of tnal, the dis-
tnct court (1) sustained the validity of the 
park improvement fee and granted the 
c1~y's motion to dismiss as to it, and (2) held 
the J.Jvance collect10n of the water connec-
tion fee contrary to statutory law, granted 
the subdividers' motion for summary judg-
ment, and pennanently enjoined the city 
from its enforcemenL Both the city and 
the subd1viders have appealed. 
L 
THE VALIDITY OF WATER 
CONNECTION AND PARK 
IMPROVEMENT FEES 
[l] The district court ruled that the ad-
vance collection of the water connection fee 
was rendered illegal by the combined effect 
of U C.A., 1953, § 10-8-38 and § l 7-i>--22. 
Sectwn 10--8--38 empowers the city, for the 
purpose of defraymg costs of construction 
or operat10n of a sewer system, to require 
mandatory hookup and payment of charges 
when a sewer is available and within 300 
feet of any property containing a building 
used for human occupancy. Section 17-6--
22 provtdes that a municipal corporation 
which contracts with an improvement dis-
tnct for sewage services shall !lave J.uthori-
;,) rr.J.he 5erv1•_·~ 1'har~ 0 ~ to p::i.rtit:.::i wh0 
connt:L~ to 1W sewer system. If the mumci-
pd!1ty J.lso operates J. waterv1orks system, 
the sect10n provides that these charges 
"mJ.y be combined with the charge made 
for water furnished by the water system 
and may be collected and the collection 
thereof secured 1n the same manner as that 
3pe-cified 1n Sect10n 10--8--38, Utah Code An-
n(1LateJ 1953." 
HPc.au~ § 10--8-.38 does n0t authonze the 
th..Lrging of a sewer connection fee in the 
r:t:-,e •lf vacant lots, and because § 17-&-22 
p1 OVl(le~ that the city may cn!leLt water 
~horizes for Lhe co1l"!'-t1on of sewer fees, the 
comlirnat.J.on of rhe~e two ::;~atutes is urged 
to forbid c1t1e::i f;qm co!!ect1ng water fees in 
C\rcumstances no~ authorized for sewer 
fees This does not fol\o·.v. Section 17-6-
22 is perm1ss1v2, not mandatory. It poses 
no statutory proh1b1t1on against the collec-
tion of a water connection fee from a subdi-
vider for each lot in a subdivision at the 
time the subdivision is hooked up to the city 
water system. 
The validity of a sewer connection fee to 
raise money to enlarge and improve a sewer 
system was sustarned by this Court in 
Home Builders Ass'n v. Provo City, 28 Utah 
2d 402, 503 P .2d 451 (1972), discussed here-
after. In a decision issued after the trial 
court acted in this case, we sustained a 
municipality's power to withhold the privi. 
lege o! city water service until a landowner 
had paid a valid municipal sewer c.onnection 
fee. Rupp v. Grantsville City, Utah, 610 
P .2d 338 (1980). In two other decisions 
issued after the trial court acted in this 
case, we sustained a municipality's require-
ment that subdividers dedicate a portion of 
subdivision land for recreational purposes 
(or pay cash in lieu) as a condition of final 
approval of their ~lat. Call v. City of West 
Jordan, Utah, 606 P.2d 217 (1979). On 
rehearing in this same case, we held that 
the reasonableness of the dedication or ca.sh 
requirement in a particular case was a ques--
tion of fact that must be resolved at trial. 
Call v. City of West JorWui, Utah, 614 P.2d 
1257 (19~0) 
Tht'se four Jet":31v;is ha1.e r~."01':ed the 
legality of water connection and park im-
provement fees designed to raise funds to 
enlarge and improve sewer and water sys--
terns and recreational upportunities, as well 
as the legality of conditioning water hook-
ups or plat approval on their collection. 
However, these decisions leave open the 
question of the reasonableness of any indi-
vidual fee charged or land dedication re-
quired This question of reasonableness 
must be resolved on the facts in each partic-
ular case. We therefore reverse both judg-
ments and remand the entire case for trial 
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on the reasonablene:::is ,)[ ~he i<2eS the ·~·.t~: mun 
has imposed in this c-ase. 
'"':fl[' ,[jtLJ' •'I 
n :l/~i! 1 t' ;[~II 
Because this case :s b~1r.~ remanded :·0r restri · nary --:on1r.,.; 
trial, it is appropnat<:: :·or this Court to T:-":- , ··:.,'\.le 1 ~..il '.he .:.'r 1 
e!.iborate on the constitutional standards uf 11,trl ..,t-t::d ~he ..:1ty's 
reasonableness that should gove!l1 the va- resp~·~ "'•:::c ;na~t~rs ;inu that :."e .... xce~~ 
!idity of subdivision charges such as these. 
IL 
THE REASONABLENESS OF SUBDIVI-
SION FEES IN GENERAL 
Like so many other municipalities in this 
st::i.te, the City of South Jordan confronts 
the problems of providing a fast-growing 
city with adequate services for water, sew-
er, recreation, and other common needs. In 
1978, the city had to deal with the develop-
ment of about 600 lots (including the -100 in 
sulxHviders' development), up from about 
65 in prior years. Snch growth puts a 
severe strain on the financial and personnel 
resources of a small municipality, and if not 
properly managed could well overburden 
common facilities like water and sewer to 
the point where their service would deterio-
rate severely for the existing occupants and 
be inadequate for the new ones. An appro-
priate_ way to provide adequately for such 
services is by advance planning and financ-
ing. 
The conventional means of financing mu-
nicipal facilities ~e tax revenues, special 
assessments, and bonding. In addition, in 
recent years many local governmental '.JniU 
in this country have employed subdivision 
plat controls to require fees, such a.s the 
water and park fees inYolved in this case, 
that force developers to contribute to the 
centralized capital costs of municipal serv-
1~~~ 1n ;..d.!it· n to t.:1.,. c i;-"\'1:,··l!_ .,1.;;(i 
!. 1c:,:,zu\ eL':i!:..3 .... µµLe.'.lfi!e ::iol:::_, r_o t11e::· 
velopment. The courts of this state and 
others have approved the legality of such 
fees, but are still struggling to define the 
limits of reasonableness that must be im-
posed upon their amount. 1 Without legal 
limits-imposed by statute or constitut1on-
subdivision charges could easily be used to 
avoid statutory requirements for bonding 
wnu[,1 
rng f~nll The ·~it:.- :n:11nu1ns 1n its ),,..~fin 
this C•ur•_ that the wale; :.::onnect:,•n :·i-.::::. 
woulJ '..le u::ied r.o erilarge '..vater '..ne.:. .ir:d 
Stora;;~ :incl pumping f3.c1iiues. :ir·:l ~he 
park :rr!rro1,ement fees ·.>.·ou!d be ·..1;;t:•J ·,) 
enlar-;~ .J.nU Jevelop city parks. The i-':ut:es 
diffE:r ·Jn gf"lether such an intent w;i" J~­
cured u~. enforceable restriction, :;uch .i.:. 
depo~it to ..1. separate fund These conten-
tions, 3.ll relev:i.n t to reasonableness, ar~ 
matters f .;c consideration at trial. 
The subdividers also argue that the water 
connection fee cannot be impose<! on the 
developer, but must be deferred for imposi-
tion on the tot owner or homeowner at the 
time of hookup. We find this argument 
unpersuasive. This is not a case where the 
party burdened with the exaction will de-
rive no benefit from it. 2 \\-'hen the subdivi-
sion is connected to the city's water and 
sewer systems, the city must be prepared to 
perform its services on demand, and from 
that fact the subd1viders denve immediate 
benefit. The provis10n of standby capacity 
to a subdivision requires the commitment of 
substantial capita!. The city does not have 
to wait until someone turns on a tap or 
flushes a toilet before rt requires participa-
tion in the cost of providing- its services. 
Subject to the requirement.<; of reason:i.b!e-
ness diseus~ed helow, a hookuo ff'e that 
menl vi so:r;t: l-'"rt:un u; :.1e eu1ninun C..i.iJital 
costs attributable to comm1tt1ng ser.·;,ee to 
the lots in the subri1vis1on is valid. The 
same is true of the park improvement fee. 
The proceedings on remand 1n this case 
wilt be governed by t\l.·o le:iding- dee1s1ons Jf 
this Court, one rle3.ling with a municipal 
ser-'ice that emµlnys an ~·:pensive central 
I. J Johnson. ''Const1tut1onal1ty of Subd1vts1on Through Subd1 .. 1s10n E-.,ict1ons. -;3 ·1 ile L J 
Control Exactions The Quest for a RJ.uonale, ·· ! I! 9 ( l %4) 
52 Camell LQ 8iJ ( !967). Heyman & Gdh0ol, 
'lhe Const1tutrnn<d1ty of Imposing Incre:1sed 2. c.c .. - _]nd l-.J11nr1 ,.,, 01:''!,,..r • ,;,-p~,1 
Community Costs on New Suburban Restdems 
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.c1l1l·, like '.vater or sewer, .\nr.I ~he )t.1er 
.~ 1n ,l municipal service that ~mploys dis-
i·enl:'d resources like recreational land. 
Though the standards of rea~onab!ene.ss in 
these 1" wo circumstances are essentially the 
".>J.me, their application is somewhat differ-
ent. The two different types of charges 
will therefore be discussed separately 
III. 
REASONABLENESS OF WATER 
CONNECTION FEE 
[2] Home Bui/der.J Ass'n v. Provo City, 
28 Utah 2d 402, 503 P2d 451 (1972), sus-
tained the validity of a sewer connection 
fee (in addition to the monthly sewer 
charge) for each living unit of n~wly con-
strncted buildings connected to an existing 
sewer system. The fee was imposed in 
order to improve and enlarge the sewer 
system. It was not a revenue meJl.Sure or 
an assessment, the court found, but "a rea-
sonable charge for the use thereof," as au-
thorized by U.C.A., 1953, § 1()..8-38. Sig-
nificantly, the $100-per-lot charge was de-
rived by dividing the total number of sewer 
connections in the municipality into the net 
value of the sewer system, and the funds 
obtained were to be restricted to the en-
largement, improvement, and operation of 
tbe sewer system and to the retirement of 
indebtedness incurred: in its construction. 
In approving the sewer connection fee in 
Home Builders, this Court relied on Airwick 
Industries, Inc. v. Carlstadt Sewerage Au-
: '":1,r :.:. :,7 ~; j l1i7, ''.'..7'1 .\.:2-t d t L 1 7')1 
1. _._ ~.cit appro·, c::J a wnnectiun foe at-
r.ingement by which the capital and inter-
est cost.8 of a new central sewage system, 
although met initially by the actual users, 
would ultimately be borne by all propert1es 
bendited, including lands that were unim-
proved when the central expenditures were 
ongrnally made. The municipality did this 
hy including 12 part of its conne<:tion fee 
what our Court charactenzed as "a sum of 
money which would represent a fair contri-
bution by the connecting party toward the 
exP'f.!n3e theretofore met by others." 3 
l. Homf' Builders Ass 'n v Provo CJCY. 28 Utah 
2d .:it 405, 503 P 2d at 453. 
The Home :-;;.. fer.; CJ.Se established the 
principle upon ·::h1ch the reasonableness of 
the water connection fee in this case should 
be JUdged. The "fair contribution" of the 
connecting party should not exceed "the 
expense thereof met by others." Or, as the 
:-.Tew Jersey Supreme Court held in a subse-
quent case, the rules governing the alloca-
tion of improvement costs between city and 
developer 
would ideally have been 9uch as to insure, 
to the greatest extent practicable, that 
the cost of extending a municipal water 
facility would fall equitably upon those 
who are similarly situated and in a just 
proportion to benefits confel't'ed. They 
should be sufficiently flexible to permit 
consideration to be given to the fact3 and 
circumstances of each particular case. 
Deerfield Estat .. , Inc. v. Township of E. 
Brunswick, 60 N.J. 115, 286 A2d 498, 505 
( 1972). Therefore, where the fee charged a 
new subdivision or a new property hookup 
exceeds the direct costs incident thereto (as 
a means of sharing the costs of common 
facilities), the excess must survive measure 
against the standard that the total costs 
"fall equitably upon those who are similarly 
situated. and in a just proportion to benefit.3 
conferred." Stated otherwise, to comply 
with the standard of re88onableness, a mu-
nicipal fee related to services like water and 
sewer must not require newly developed 
properties to bear more than their equitable 
share of the capital costs in relation to 
[.lj To di::termme the equitable share of 
the capital costs to be borne by newly de-
veloped properties, a municipality should 
determine the relative burdens previously 
borne and yet to be borne by those proper-
ties in comparison with the other properties 
in the municipality a.s a whole; the fee in 
question should not exceed the amount suf-
ficient to equalize the retative burdens of 
newly developed and other properties. 
Among the most important factors the 
municipality 9hould consider in determining 
the relative burden already borne and yet 
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to be borne by newly develoµed pmperties 
and other properties are the fodowing, sug· 
gested by the well-reasoned .:luthorities cit-
ed below: (1) the cost of existing capital 
facilities; (2) the manner of financing exist-
ing capital facilities (such a.s user charges, 
speciaJ assessments, bonded indebtedness, 
general taxes, or federal grants); (3) the 
relative extent to which the newly devel-
oped. properties and the other properties in 
the municipality have already contributed 
to the cost of existing capital facilities (by 
such means as user charges, 5pecial assess-
ments, or payment from the proceeds of 
general taxes); (4) the relative extent to 
which the newly developed properties and 
the other properties in the municipality will 
contribute to the cost of existing capital 
facilities in the future: (5) the extent to 
which the newly developed properties are 
entitled to a credit because the municipality 
is requiring their developers or owners (by 
contractual arrangement or otherwise) to 
provide common facilities (inside or outside 
the proposed development) that have been 
provided. by the municipality and financed 
through generaJ taxation or other means 
(apart from user charges} in other parts of 
the municipality; (G) extraordinary costs, if 
any, in servicing the newly developed prop.. 
erties; and (7) the time-price differential 
inherent in fair comparisons of amounts 
paid at different times. Home Builders v. 
Provo City, supra; Rose v. Plymouth Town, 
110 Utah 358, 173 P.2d 285 (1946); Airwick 
Industries, Inc. v. Culsta.dt Sewerage Au-
thority, supra; Deerfield Estates, Inc. v. 
Township of E. Brunswick, supra; West 
P.lrk A .,..e., Inc. v 7,rvr.sh1p of C::enn. ~3 
N . .,. 122, 22-1 .-1...~1 l llSiOO); Rut.1n £.sW.tt's, 
Inc. v. Town of Belleville, 56 N.J.Super. 330, 
152 A.2d 853 (App.Div.1959); Zehman C-On-
struction Co. v. City of Eastlake, 92 Ohio 
Law AbsL 364, 195 N.E.2d 361 (Ct.App. 
1962); Strahan v. City of Aurora, 38 Ohio 
Misc. 37, 31l N.E.2d 876 (Ct.Com.Pleas, 
1973); R. Ellickson, "Suburban Growth 
Controls: An Economic an<l Legal Analy-
sis," 86 Yale LJ. 385, 467--89 (1977); F 
Michelman & T. Sandalow, Government in 
Urban Areas, 533--36 (1970) 
[4, SJ In adjudicating the validity of any 
individual application of this standard of 
rea.sonablent::~ 
rn un ic1pai 1 ~1._·-; 
." 'l' :_,t 
: : t:, ~.~''ess;ir· 
deal rea!1st1<-.J., .t;''it1un" ~1ot oU!>'-' ,'-
tible of e-:act ~·'=' \"" .r.-·.'T'<-r'lt P:-cc:se mac.r:-
ematical equ.L11t_. .,, .1,•1thi:'r feJ.S1ble nur 
const1tut1onally \ 1lJ1 · 4.1rw1ck lndustne3, 
Inc.. \.'. C.ulst.1d: Sewer:Jge .-luthonty. su-
pra. Z70 A.2.d ...i.t ~6. S1mdariy, mun1c1pa1 
officials must .. llso have the lel;al power to 
deal creat1vel .. .,v1th extraordinary ur un-
foreseen circumstances :n the provision c)f 
municipal services Rose ~ P!_vmouch 
Town, 110 Utah 358, 173 P 2d 285 1 1946 I 
We agree with and adopt the :"Jew Jersey 
court's ruling in Deerfield Estates, Inc. ,. 
Township of E. Brunswick, supra, 286 .\.2d 
at 507-508· 
The rule we lay down must be given a 
pragmatic application. Complete equaJi. 
ty of treatment may sometimes be 1mpos. 
sible, especially where a municipality has 
followed no set pattern with respect to 
past extensions. Nor should a· municipal. 
ity be denied the right to modify an es-
tablished pattern where altered c1rcum. 
stances reasonably so dictate. Equality 
of treatment may upon occasion be forced 
to gwe way before some supervening 
public interest. But insofar a.s such 
equality can reasonably be achieved this 
must be done. 
(HJ The required flexibility will be im-
plemented by the presumption of const1tu-
tional~ty incident to a municipality's exer-
cise of its legislative powers. Call v. Cit_v uf 
West Jordan, Utah, 614 P 2d 1257, 12.'>8 
r1980): rre~tview-Hnl!J1iay Honit=-ownn-q 
Ass':, J. ... _ • r''lj(n :-~,,r!! ,_~, r·, .h ·-1.5 
P.2d 1150 \197tiJ, Duw;;;e v. ::> •. de La.r.e: C1'y 
Corp., lZl Utah 107, 255 P2J ~23 (19531. 
Since the infonnation that must be used to 
assure that sutxfr11sion fee~ are within the 
standard of reasonablene~s :s must acce~si­
b!e to the municipality, that body should 
disclose the basis of its c.alc•Jlat10n" t...o .vho-
ever challenges the re.J.Sonableness ,)f its 
subdiv1s10n nr hookup fees Once th..it t'.'l 
done, the burden of ".howing failure to com-
ply with the ronst1tutlonal stanJa.rd rif '<'3-
sonab!eness 1n this matter is \ln tht:> t-'n.il-
lengers Homf' Bu11rier.:; A-'>~ 'n uf 1 ;re:i.ter 
I 
j 
I 
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[\' 
REASONABLE::ES~ OF PARK 
IMPROVD!E~IT FEE 
[9] In Call v. City of \Vest Jordan, Utah, 
606 P 2d 217 (1979), opinion on rehearing, 
oH P 2d 1257 (1980), this Court upheld the 
validity of a city ordinance that required 
subd1viden, as a condit10n of plat approval, 
to dedicate certain proposed 3ubdivision 
land to the city (or pay cash in lieu) for 
flood control and/ or park and recreation 
facilities. In remanding the case for trial 
on the constitutionality of the ordinance as 
applied (i. e., the requirement that seven 
percent of the subdivision land be dedicat-
ed), this Court ruled that "the dedication 
should have some reasonable relationship to 
the need created by the subdivision." Id. at 
1258. The Court quoted the following from 
Home BuildeN Ass 'n of Greater Kansas 
City" City of Kansas City, Mo,, 555 S.W.2d 
B32, 835 ( 1977): 
[l]f the bun.Jen ca!:t upon the subdivider 
is reasonably attributable to his activity, 
then the requirement [of dedication or 
fees m !ieu thereof] is permissible; if not, 
it is forbidden and amounts to a conltse.a· 
tion of private property in contravention 
of the constitutional prohibitions rather 
than a reasonable regulation under the 
poliCe power.' 
Reasonableness obviously hold.~ the munici-
pality to a higher standard of rationality 
:n:~~ ·.:-, ... :'·t.:;,u1:-ement ~!lal ~t.5 actioris r..qt be 
:.ru1::-..1.rJ ur ca!JnCiou.>. 
Under the reasonableness test in Call v. 
City of We.st Jordan, supra, the benefits 
derived from the exaction need not accrue 
solely to the subdivision (614 P 2d at 1259); 
tlood control and recreation are needs that 
cannot be treated in isolation from the rest 
of the munic1pality. At the same time, the 
htnefits derived from the exaction must be 
,,f "rlemonstrab!e benefit" to the subdivi-
':JJOn (Id_ .J.t 1259). 
~ with water con~ection fees, the 
Jmount of ;;uch exactions or fees should be 
3Uch ~hat the burden of providing these 
4_ Ci//,. (-,,.,,of West Jordan. 614 P 2d at 1259 
munic1µ..1.l ,..:rvtces "falls equitably upon 
those "~ho dr~ similarly situated and in a 
just proportion to benefits conferred." 
Deerfield £:;,ta.tes, Inc. v. Township of E. 
Brunswick, 60 ~ J. 115, 286 A.2d 498, 505 
(1971). The measurement of "benefits con-
ferred" may have a more significant impact 
on the reasonableness of park fees than on 
water connection fees. The central facili-
ties that support water and sewer service 
would generally confer the same benefit.s in 
every part of the municipality, but the ben-
efits conferred by recreational, flood con-
trol, or other dispened resources may be 
measurably different in different parts of 
the municipality. Park improvement fees 
should thorefore be fixed so as to be equita-
ble in light of the relative benefits con-
ferred on, as well as the relative burdens 
previously borne and yet to be borne by the 
newly developed properties in comparison 
with the other properties in the municipali-
ty as a whole. The fees in question should 
not exceed the amount sufficient to equal· 
iz.e the relative benefits and burdens of 
newly developed and other properties. 
The factors to be considered in the deter-
mination of relative burden are similar to 
the factors discussed in Part Ill in connec-
tion with water connection fees. The flex:i· 
bility to be tolerated within the presump-
tion of regularity and the disclosure of the 
basis of calculation specified in Part III is 
also applicable to this type of subdivision 
charge. 
The ;11dl(ment.3 of tht tri.::il co1Jrt J.re re-
verstd in the aµpeal and the cross-appeal, 
and the cause is remanded for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. No costs 
awarded. 
HALL and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
HOWE, Justice (concurring and dissent-
ing): 
I concur that the defendant city may 
lawfully require water connection fees to be 
paid at the time the main line running 
through the subdivision is connected to the 
city system and water is brought to the 
edge of e.ach lot. I arrive at this conclusion 
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in view of tht .::..~!".nrity invested in cities 
and towns to "cons:ruct, :nainta.in and oper-
ate waterworl-;.~,' j 10-3-14 U.C.A.1953; to 
"fix the rates to (~~ paid for the water use," 
§ 1~22; and to ''enact ordinances, rules 
and regulations ::ir the management and 
conduct of the ·.vat....:rworks system owned or 
controlled by it," § Il}-7-14. It is not un-
reasonable to require payment of the con-
nection fee when the water is turned into 
the main line cot.:rsmg through the subdivi-
sion because at that time the defendant city 
is obligated to furnish water to each and 
every lot as requested. In order to prepare 
to do this, the defendant city had to make 
capital expenditures to enlarge its ca.pacity 
so that it could meet the new demands to be 
imposed upon it. I concur that§ 10--8--38 is 
not a prohibition against advance collection. 
I also concur with the cnteria of reasona-
bleness contained in Parts III and IV of the 
majority opinion. 
I dissent. however, from the holding in 
the majority opinion that the city may law-
fully impose park improvement fees. I con-
cur with the reasoning of Justice Wilkins in 
his dissenting opinion in Call v. City of 
West Jordan, Utah, 606 P.2d 217 (1979). 
The imposition of the park improvement 
fees is even more offensive in this case 
since the city conditioned the furnishing of 
water service to the subdivision upon their 
paymenL To me the two subjects are en-
tirely separate an<l I believe it to be an 
abuse of the city's authorlty to own and 
operate a waterworks system (a proprietary 
operation) to use the furnishing of water as 
l.::v~r.ige to cull'=" t f·.;~:3 !'or othe: •i;irebte,I 
p:.;~o:se~ s.~cl 1vn W-S-.36 1~1.~1ur.;:e.s ~1i:1c.:. 
and towns to discontinue water ser.-ice to 
premises where the sewer service charges 
have not been paid, but I find no authonza-
tion to also deny service until park improve-
ment fees have been paid. 
MAUGHAN, C. J ., concurs in the opinion 
of HOWE, J. 
8t"t", Harper Ct:I.BERTS01'i, F,1 , 
1'1 ,ne E:::.t.ate of Jo\ce K. (1,)!;.-.--~ 
:lnd ..Ls an indindual. Plaintiff 1.,,J ::.:--
.;,pnndt"nt. 
v. 
CONTINZ:"ITAL ASSL'RA.NCE COo!PA-
NI'. a Tennessee corporation, Chira:?;o 
Bridge and Iron Company Profit·Shar· 
in~ Plan Trust. an Illinois Trust, Beth 
Rowley Culbertson Conrad. an individu· 
al, Loretta Culbertson, an individual, 
Ricriard Culbertson, an individual, 
Chrystella Culbertson. an individual, and 
Elizabeth Culbertson, an individual, De· 
fendants and Appellants. 
No. 17H8. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 4, 1981. · 
Decedent's second wife brought action 
as executrix to have proceeds of a profit. 
sharing plan and certain insurance policies 
awarded to decedent's estate rather than to 
decedent's first wife as his designated bene-
ficiary. The Third D1stnct Court, Salt 
Lake County, Bryant H. Croft, J., awarded 
plamtiff proceeds of profit-sharing plan and 
defendant proceeds of insurance policies, 
and defendant appealed and pla10t1ff cross 
appealed. The Supreme Court, j1aughan, 
C. J .. he!rl that: fl) r1~fenrl3..,t 1,vas ,:..,•,t•,,,-1 
it-shanng plan, interest lo ·.i. n1ch ·.e:->teJ in 
her on decedent·s death, where di--cedent 
neither changerl designated beneficiary not 
as moving party in di\·orce action sought 
explicit relinquishment of defendant's ex-
pectancy, and there were no broJ.r:i, compre-
hensive prov1s1ons in J~cree 0i Ji\0r('e 
which could reasonabl:, be ronstrued ~ J. 
relinquishment or waiver r1f any nr ..l!I ex-
pectancies, and (~) wnere ·ieeree of div.,r('I:-' 
between defendant and <iec<:>dent 3.~ ht·r 
first husband did not hy ·:w •.nms e.\µr.-~"-'': 
terminate rleier.rlant', _,t .. L-, J..:l a !Jt::nl·l.-
"I~ P \CIFlC REPORTEK ~d :iERlES 
.t" 
·gn1ficant ~hat ~here 1s no 1ndica-
,1,ir1 ~.1t the pro::--:cutor made any at-
,empl 0 u::ie lhat :.:..ct :o ca.st any infer-
ence ,f guilt on the defendant. nor to 
per;U<.1<1e the jury to du so. 
[4. 51 . .\s a matter of protecting the pub-
lic 1nlerest, a prosecutor would ignore his 
Juty 1f he did not take issue with a remark 
he did not ::.olicit, that professes innocence. 
!t was the prosecution's duty to clear up 
d1screpanc1es manufactured by the defend-
int, so as to give the JUry full opportunity 
for rleliberat1on without speculation. 
The Jury and verdict are affirmed. 
STEWART, J., dissents. 
Dl'RH..\.;!, J., does not participate herein. 
Timothy Ross LAFFERTY, Plaintiff 
and Responden~ 
v. 
PAYSON CITY, a municipal corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Timnthy Ro'3 LAFFERTY, Plaintiff 
am.I .\ppt>ll:rnt, 
PA YSO~ CITY, a municipal corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Nos. 17534, 17536. 
Supreme Court of Utah 
Feb 17, 19B2. 
Cit:. residl'nt brought suit for leclan-
t1on thJ.t municipal impact and connection 
fPt:-, ,\1(.h re::;pt>f't to ne....,ly rieveloped prop-
CrlJl's ·,i,·~_·re t:l.'<b that 1.\ere 1lleg3.I ,rnd dis-
Sllt~H·nn, fr1r 1njunct1on ctgainst :.ie1r ,:;f)-
forCt' ~. 'lt .. ind ~·ur restitution nf t""t-=_.., lit 
had ~1d1d The Fourth District Cvurt. L't;..1.h 
Coun':. r::;eorge E Ballif, .J, entered Jt..:dg-
ment :n fa•1or of resident, as to 1mpac1 :"ee 
and cit! appealed, resident's motion for 
summci.r; judgment as to illegality of con· 
nect10n fees was decided and re::l1dent ap--
pealed The Supreme Court, Oaks, J ., held 
that. 11) building permit "impact fee" of 
$1,000 per family dwelling, rleposite<l in 
city's general revenues, which ordinance 
stated was necessary because of emergency 
situation created by property development 
within city limits, i.e., city needed additional 
revenue to offset costs of necessary increas-
es in municipal sertices, was illegal tax, and 
(2) measure employed in calculating in· 
creases in connection fees for water and 
sewer sertices, i.e., expert evidence on unit 
cost of water and sewer services based on 
1979 cost of constructing expansioA facili· 
ties needed in such areas, and measure em· 
ployed in calculating increases in connection 
fees for newly devdoped properties with 
respect to electrical services, i.e., expert evi. 
dcnce on unit cost of electrical services 
based on replacement cost in 1979 of munic-
ipality'!; existinei;; electrical system, did not 
achieve equitable allocation to newly <level· 
oped properties of capital costs in relation 
to benefits conferred. 
Affirmed in part; vacated and re-
manded in part. 
1. )funicipa.I Corporations <:=>625 
P.e.\::o.,.1hl~ charc-r f·)r a ::pf!cific 3ervice 
1s t-iermt::-.,tti!c ,L.:. f,u111.(111'<:. µerr1111. ~·~r wht:":-0-
as general fee that amounts to revenue 
measure 1s not. 
2. Municipal Corporations ~601.3 
Building permit "impact fee" of $1,000 
per family dwelling, deposited in city'::; gen· 
eral revenues, which ordinance stated was 
necessary because of emergency .:5ituation 
created by property development within 
city limits, i.e., city needed additional reve-
nue to offset costs of neces!;ary increases in 
municipal services, was 11l~ga! tax. 
.".PPENDIX "F" 
LAFFERTY v. P \ Y~tl'\ CITY 
3. '.\lunicipal Corporations ~= rJ.-)6(1) 
V;;ilid1~y of fee .mµl)x' I to augment 
general re\ enues is Uctcrmu~ed by 11:$ legal 
status J.t time it is o::xacted, ,\ ithout regard 
to how funds are lo.ter al\ucated or spent. 
4. Judgment e= 186 
Denial of motion for summary Judg· 
ment on alleged facial invalidity of various 
connection fees and putting city resident to 
trial on reasonab!ene~.s of such fees was 
correct procedure. 
5. Municipal Corporations ~458 
Factors to be considered in deterrr.ining 
relative burden a!ready borne and yet to be 
borne by newly developed properties and 
other properties to assure that municipal 
fees pertaining to newly developed proper· 
ties do not require them to bear more than 
their equitable share of capital costs in rela· 
lion to benefits conferred are cost of exist-
ing capital facilities, means by whii;;h such 
facilities have been financed, extent to 
which properties being charged new fees 
have already contributed to cost of existing 
facilities, extent to which they will contrib-
ute to cost of existing capital facilities in 
future, t:xtcnt to which they should he cred-
ited for proviJing common facilities that 
municipality has provided without charge to 
other properties in its service area, extra0r-
dinary costs, if any, in serving new proper-
ty, and time-price differential inherent in 
fa,ir comparisons of a.mounts paid at differ-
ent times. 
6. :\tunicipal Corporations e=>712 
\V..tc~r.;;. and \Vater Cours .. s :.:=>'._'.()~ft)) 
:1.Lun1c1µ<.u1~y h;i.s !;urden of J1:,(.'.1u .. 1ng 
basis of its calculations to whoever chal-
lenges reasonableness of connection fees, 
and its allocations need not achieve precise 
mathematical equality. 
7. Municipal Corporations <e=712 
Waters and \Vater Courses c=203(6) 
Measure employed in calculatmg in-
creases in conne<:tion fees for water ,rnd 
sewer services for newly developed proper-
ties i.e., expert cviJence on unit cost of 
water and sewer services based on 197~ rnst 
of constructing cxpan::i1on fJ.cil1t1es net'.dcd 
tft"'3.S. ,lid :iut .U..:t1lt 
.Jil·"'-' ''l ill c:q.i1L..ti cu:...b in rPIJ~,,,n · 
er':~0 ,u11;-crrea .\nere ,l :1..;ed \-nl, ,_, , .. 
·· ..:.C:JJtlt>:S •)n r.ewl;. ,Je\ eloped ;..rr>~'e:-1" .n 
,\·1lh1JU~ .1..Ssuranct' that :.uch cosb xr·re <.'l-
u1tahle 1n relation to benefits confi::rrt·d J.nd 
in comparison with costs imposed 'Jn it n1::r 
property owners in municipality 
8. Electricity = 11.2(3) 
).lea~ure employed :n calculat111g in-
creases in connection fees for newly •ie\ei-
oped properties with respect to ele<:tncal 
services, i.e., expert evidence on unit cost of 
electrical services based on replacement cost 
in 1979 of municipality's existing electncal 
system, was incomplete Wlthout inquiry into 
factors such as how existing system was 
financed, J.nd thus did not achieve equitable 
allocation to newly developed properties of 
capital costs in relation to benefits con-
ferred. 
Dave McMullin, Payson, for defendant 
and appellant. 
Ray M. Harding, American Fork, for 
plaintiff and respondent. 
OAKS, Justice: 
This appeal concerns the legality of two 
fees a municipality imposed on the con-
struction of new homes. 
In 1977, Payson City enacted an ordi-
nance requiring the payment of an "impact 
fee" of $1,000 per family dwelling prior: to 
the lS:"uance 0f :my hutldin2 permit The 
rJrd~nJ.r,1_e ~ ~JCC·I · h.t~ · :,.~ ', ..... , ,,.,, n,_.r' 
becau;;;e of J.n emergency ~1tuat10n creatt:'.il 
by property Jevelopment w1th1n the cit; 
limits; the City needed a.<l<l1t1ondl revenue 
to oifset the costs vf the necessary increas-
es in municipal services. This fee was in 
addition to at\ other municipal fees. 
In 1979, the City enacted other 1ffdt-
nances increasing the fee:3 the City ch,trged 
for connecting resiiiencl'S to "ariuu:> c1l\' 
serYices. The revised amounts included 
$1.000 for :Se'.\er: :$-.J.50 for water ( 1:~-1n\·h 
hookup), $250 for electnc1ty 1 100 1mp ~L·r~ 
\·1ce~ Pl:i1ntiff La(fLr'./. J. ··it:. rL"·,11k!1t 
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· hn ,q'I ,ir•·r1' 1 .... s1rerl ',u ('Onstruct J. ~111-
~le t:-irn11\' 11.g·, p .. 11d the impact :t:c 
J.nrl ~he ,~1lnnec:irln fees under prote:.:;t J.r•1 
then brought th1:- ,u1t for :l declaration :.~ . ..:.t 
these fet:;, were taxes that were illei;al lnd 
discriminatory under the ;;;tate and fetter.'.ll 
Constituuons, for an mJunct1on against 
their enforcement, and for restitution •Jf 
the >Z. 725 he haJ paid. 
L THE IMP ACT FEE 
As to the impact fee, the district court 
granted plaintiff's motion for summary 
Judgment, holding that the fee was discrim-
inatory in its. imposit10n on new homeown-
ers and not on existing ones, and lllegal as a 
tax not authorized by law. In No, 17534, 
the City appeals from that decree. 
The d1str1ct court relied on Weber Basin 
Home Builders Association v. Roy City. 26 
Utah 2d 215, 487 P.2d 866 (1971), where this 
Court invalidated an increase in a building 
permit fee on the basis that it was an illegal 
tax. The opinion notes that the purpose of 
the increase was to obtain additional money 
for the _City's general fund, into which the 
proceeds were deposited. As in this case, 
the defendant city contended that the addi-
tional funds were needed to finance im-
pro\'ements in the city's water and sewer 
systems necessitated by new home construc-
tion. 
[1-3] Subsequent decisions have ap-
provc'd connection fees or subdivision fees, 
subject to the reasonableness limitations 
discussed hereafter Banberry Develop-
ment r'orp ~·. ,C:outh Jnrrlan Citv, Utab, 631 
P :..;,1 , :1 1 !'J~iJ. C•ll ('."ty ,:i- \V.,st .l•)'"-
Jan, Utah, tiOti P.~d 217 (1979); Home 
Bu1i<Iers Association of Greater Salt Lake L 
Pro< o City, 28 Utah 2d 402, 503 P.2d .!51 
t 1972) But in each of these cases, the fees 
wen:' imposed to finance a specific munici-
pal service or capital expenditure. The 
It appears from the C:ity's answers to inter-
rogatories an-:1 requests for admissions thot the 
C .t > has collected $98.000 by its impact fee. 
1\h1ch sum the CJty has allocated for capita! 
1mprn\ ements 1n the following areas electri-
c.JI ~Oo;>, :.ewage treatment plJ.nt expansion. 
fi00--0 .. HHJ water. 20 010 But these alloc..it1ons 
1>urnc> now expended and some" not) do nae 
T :12r Basin Home B~, , · :-.-., case w;;i.s dis-
• :~141-.J 1shed nn the bet51::. tr.it J. reasonable 
'•1irge for a specif11.. ~.:1~.'11..•: ;.., permissible, 
'hPrea.s a general fee ~'.\, 1.t amounts to a 
re~·enue measure 1s ;iot Home Builders 
...\.ssoc1ation of Greater >.~it Lake, 28 Utah 
2d at -104, .503 P.2d at -1.5~ We reaffirm 
that distinction, and agrl:e with the district 
court's conclusion that the impact fee de-
posited in the City's general revenues 1n 
this case is an illegal t.ax. 1 Weber Ba.sin 
Home Butlders Associati'on v. Roy City, SU· 
pro The partial summary judgment the 
City has challenged by its app€al in :-lo. 
17534 is therefore affirmeJ. 
II CONNECTION FEES 
[4] The district court denied plointiff's 
motion for summary Judgment on the al-
leged facial invalidity of the various connec-
tion fees, and· put plaintiff to trial on the 
reasonableness of those fees. ~hat was the 
correct procedure. Banberry Development 
Corp. v_ South Jordan City, supra; Home 
Builders Associat1on of Greater Salt Lake v. 
Provo City, supra. 
Al the conclusion of tnal, the court made 
findings on the per-unit cost of the three 
services. In each case, the per-unit costs 
were substantially in excess of the amount 
of the connection fees. The court therefore 
concluded that the connection fees were 
valid because they were ''reasonable and 
represent the cost of creating, maintaining 
and using the aforesaid utilities." In No. 
17S36, plaintiff appeals from that decree_ 
Six T!'lonths after the ~is~~ct cn1!rt's rlc-
!'r I'~• t \.3.::,ih·'d JtS I ;ot."\j(\'' ;• .-:,, 
berrj Development Corp. i-. South Jorrl:w 
City, supra, which involved water connec-
tion fees and park improvement fees. In 
that case, we outlined ''the constitutional 
standards of reasonableness," 631 P.2d .1t 
903, that govern the validity of connection 
Jller our conclusion The validity of a fee im-
posed to augment generu! re\'enues is derer-
rruned by its legal st;ltus at the time 1t is exact· 
ed. without regard to how the funds are later 
allocated or spent. This 1s not a case !1ke those 
invoh:ing conne<:t1on fees. where the ordi-
nances imposing the fees d1:>s1gnated the col\ec· 
oons for specific uses 
LAFFERTY v. PA 1 '' 1-.; < • 1TY 
Cite- as, Ulllh. 64:! P 20 ~71; 
fees charged by mun;21oa:ities. Plaintiff [71 T''~·-· 1' 
contends that this Jec:-ee mlbt be vaco.te<l that ·i-:e 
and the case remandi::d for reconsideration 
tn light of Banberry becau<>e the district 
court's decision that the t.hr~e conn~tion 
fees were reasonable -.va.s based on only 
part of the factors this Court subsequently 
outlined in Banberry. We agree. 
[5] The Hanberry opinion identifies sev-
en important factors that should be con-
sidered "in determining the relative burden 
already borne and yet to be borne by newly 
developed properties and other properties 
" 631 P.2d at 903-4. In brief, those 
factors are (1) the cost of existing capital 
facilities; (2) the rnea:is by which those 
facilities have been financed; (3) the extent 
to which the properties being charged the 
new fees have already contributed to the 
cost of the existing facilities; (4) the ext~nt 
to which they will contribute to the cost of 
existing capital facilities in the future; (5) 
the extent to which they should be creditcrl 
for providing common facilities that the 
municipality has provided without charge to 
other properties in its service area; (6) ex-
traordinary costs, if any, in serving the new 
property; and (7) the time-price rlifferentia\ 
inherent in fair comparisons of amounts 
paid at different limes. 631 P.2<l at 904. 
[6] The objective of the complicated 
comparison in Banberry is to J.Ssure that 
municipal fees pertaining to newly devel-
oped properties do not require them to bear 
more than their equitablt. share of the capi-
t:.1 M"t::: rin COr""'.f'1.ris0ri wit~ 0t\.ie:- pro;i.::~-
'"''l...:.~·d'1 "··' :._tGi:::f: .. .:. ":.t;!n·,-.. j 1_. 
proµerly applied, tho:::.e seven factors should 
put the new homeowner on essentially the 
same basis as the average exi:1ting home-
owner with respect to costs borne in the 
past and to be borne in the future, in com-
parison with benefits already received and 
yet to be received. The mumcipa!itv has 
the burden of disclosing the hasis ~f its 
calculations to whoever challenge::: the rea-
sonahleness of the fees, and its allocations 
need not achieve precise mathematical 
equality. Banbcrry, 631 P.2d at 904 
construc~1 ·n ''1 ·he ~en1C':' arf':J.S ·1 
Thu:.,, ~he t>-.:pert e':1dence •)n the J'"',· 
of WcJ.ter a:-:d sewer service~ was ~11-'-"·1 n 
the ;979 cost .J[ -:onstructin~ the ~\pan,1,1n 
facilities r.eeded in those areas. Th.ic :'1t: '.s-
ure Joes not .1ch1eve the equitable ail' c.:it1on 
sought 1n B.lnberry, since 1t fixes the :1t1re 
cost of new facilities on ne'.vly de\ t."•'t"-'l 
properties without assurance that these 
costs are equ:t.J.ble in re!ation to benefits 
conferred and in compan::.on with costs il""1-
posed on other property owners in the mu-
nicipality. For example, if the costs .:,f 
maintenance and repayment of bonded in-
debtedness for construction of the existing 
system are being financed by general tax 
revenues, service fees, or other payments 
collected from the entire municipality-in-
cluding the newly constructed homes-the 
new homes will be burdened witb all of the 
capital costs of expanding the service capac-
ity plus a portion of the costs of the exist-
ing one. In an effort to avoid this kind of 
unfairness, the seven factors in Hanberry 
require a different approach than imposing-
atl costs of expansion of capacity on the 
newly developed properties 
(8) The exµert evidence 0:1 the unit cost 
of electrical services w~ ha.sed on the re-
placement cost in 1979 of the mumcipa!ity's 
ex1stlng e!ectncal system. If apµropnale!y 
discounted for the age a.nrl condition uf the 
existing system, that measure would satisfy 
one of the factors in B:inberry, but woulJ 
\'>':' ::"\("1)~.:•lf->'·· ·vitfinq~ :nnu·:· .,.,, '.~'>' n•;-.. 
\\ a.s financed. This I:'.) necessary, for ex.:i.m-
ple, to assure that a property owner in-
volved in a new home dc\·e!oµment 1s not 
r~quired to buy lnto the capital \a.Jue ,;f 
existing mumc1pal sen·1ces and then pay '.or 
some portion of the same c:ip1t3.l \'alue a 
second time by future tax paymrnts ag:t1n;,t 
the bonded indebtedness usL·rl t\' L·nn::.truc~ 
them ongrn:.dly 
Since nnt J.11 uf the f:tctn1·::. ~ct "Ut 'n ·~h 
Cuurt's intervl'.ning np1n1nn .n H.1.';/•(·;;_1 lle-
velupment C.irp :·;;011rh I()rri:ll' 
I 
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"'.~,.,,_, mun1Llj>J.I iet.S. 
-1':' . r,:1:.: ·:::i.c::i.te '.h~ decree it' 
·ne •1.::.Cr'\' .i,r' :n •.:.a.se \"u 17.536 ,1n,J 
remanr1 !',,r .r';~~r ;)r0Cet'd1n~ i1ncluu111<; 
·he taking i:· ... 1,J1t:<Jnal evidence, 1f neces-
,aryJ con::-1~~t:'lt .~·1th Banberry and N1th 
this opinion 
So 0rr/t:r("'J .Each party to bear own 
cvsts 
HALL, C .J. anJ STEWART. HOWE and 
DCRHA:I!, JJ, concur. 
~lichael David DOWLAND. Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
LDIAN PRODUCTS FOR SHOOTERS. a 
cor-poration, Euroarms, The Uisure 
Group, Inc.. and ABC corporations 1 
through 10, Defendants and Respon-
dents. 
No. 17323. 
Supreme Court of C'tah. 
Feb. 23. 1982. 
Products liahdity ~ction was brou!!ht 
. ..., ,1~,t c1 nri._. ~1 '.:1 .... :..:.L·tcirc.. rJ!::- ~1.~ 
,·hd.-,er. The I nint D1stnct Crnrt, Sa1t l...J.he 
County, Peter F Lear:, J, entered judg-
ment for the manufacturer, and purchaser 
appealed The Supreme Court, Ha!l, C J, 
helrl that error, if any, in tnal court's ad-
m1ss11)n of expert testimony concerning 
chemical analysis of gun barrel residue was 
nut preJ udu..:1-<I .,,.. here e\ idence from other 
witnc:,ses concerning purchaser's use of gun 
p<,1.,..der ,if type ~wt recommended fur rifle 
'>Uppnrt<>d JUd){mPnt ior manuf..icturer. 
Affirmed 
In J.Jrnducts liabtl1t:r at.:t.•• 
··'<Pi·Jo11n~ rifle. error, :f :.n, .1 
.ng 
,1dm1::i.-,1on uf expert ·.l ~·_1n1·· "• 0::'1:1ng 
•''lt:~ll(';jj J.nalysis of s·~:--. 1 1 r.-,1 --<:~111 ,f: ·'•as 
not pn~Jud1..::1al where -=:·: clE:r.,e trom •Jther 
·,v1tne~es concerning purc"·'-~o:::r s use of gun 
powder (Jf type not recommenJed fur rifle 
;;uµported judgment for m~111_.,{J.cturer 
.\'1. David Eckersley, Sait Lc1.ke City, for 
plaintiff ::inrl appellant. 
Craig S. Cook, Max D. \Vhee!er. J Anther 
ny E)Te, Sa1t Lake City, for defendants and 
respondents. 
HALL. Chief J ust1ce· 
Plaintiff brought this action against Ly-
man Products for Shooters, a fireann dis-
tnbu ting company, and its parent company, 
The Leisure Group, Inc., on a strict product 
1iab1ltty theory. Following' a Spei:1al jury 
verdict in favor of defendants, the trial 
court rendered a Judgment of no cause of 
action Plaintiff appeab on the ground of 
improper admiss1un of expert ·e::;t1mony by 
the tnaJ court.. 
Plaintiff purchased a rifle distributed by 
Lyman Products in the summer of 1916 and 
fired 1t approximately 50 to 75 times with-
out incident. On September 15, 1976, as 
plarntiff fire<l the rifle. it exploded in the 
area of the breech, injuring his wrist and 
hand. Plaintiff claims that the explo::>ion 
was caused by a defect ln the de~ign or the 
rifle .vhich. hv 1ncorp0ratmg- a "dovetail" 
.u:, l ·~, b.,r;c 1 n_r.rl.-·r·~d ~l \\O:~\!( 
~o .~'iLll.:.land clle µrt.s::.u.re of t.:xµluJtn~ ;.,nJ11 
powrler Plaintiff testified that he hJ.d al-
ways loaded the weapon with blat:k powder, 
as recommended by the manufacturer, and 
that he had followed prorer procedures in 
handling and firing it. 
Defendants claim that plaintiff's rifle 
was Jesigned safely and that it could not 
have exploded under the pressure created 
b~ black powder. Defendants introrlucerl 
evidence to show that plaintiff had actually 
!oJ.ded the rifle with :)mokeless powder, 
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Wayne )!. PATTERSON, Plai"r;ff 
and Respondent, 
ALPINE CITY.- a :'llunicipal Cor~oration, 
Defendant and Appellant_ 
No. 18114. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 21, 1983. 
City app€aled from summary judgment 
rendered by the Fourth D1stnct Court, 
Utah County, J. P.obert Bullock, J., declar-
ing sewer connection fee invalid. The Su· 
preme Court, Howe, J., held that: (1) sewer 
connection fee a3.3essed by city was not 
established as required by law and was, 
therefore, invalid where city had not by 
resolut10n or ordinance in writing estab-
lisherl the sewer connection fee, and (2) if 
sewer connection fee was to be used to 
retire bonded indebtedness, all users in the 
system had to be treated equally, and late-
comers could not be subjected to arbitrary 
increase whereby fee of $100 in first month 
was increased to $1,000 in second month 
an<l $1,500 in third month, which was not 
required to cover increased costs,' but was 
done to induce e·arly purchase of required 
540 connections to raise sum required to be 
deposited before funding was approved by 
appropriate federal agencies. 
A!firT'1eri 
l. ~lunicipal Corporations ""'106(1) 
Langu..ige of statute requiring that all 
resolut:un3 of municipal governments shall 
be in writing is mandatory. U.C .. -1._1953, 
10-J-506. 
2. ~unicipal Corporations ~i12 
se .. i,,·er connectwn fee a.ssessed hy city 
\VJ..j n•)t e;,t.tbJ15hed J..S re-qu1reJ hy )aw and 
was, therefore. 1nvaiiJ where city had not 
bv re':!olution or ordinan<.'e in wnting estab-
1i~hed t_hi= si=·Ner conne<:t10n fee UC A 
195:J, 10-;J-,j06, ll'-.1-717 
1. Municipal Corp .. rations J=>712 
~1umc1pa!itit:s r.12.J' mJ.ke a reasonable 
charge for the use of a ~ewer 3ystem in 
order that 1t be :i~il-su:>t.a1mng, but no 
greater charge is ou'.1ior1ze<L U.C.A.1953, 
10-8-J8. 
4. Municipal Corporations =-712 
If sewer connectiun fee was to be used 
to rellre bonded ;ndebtedness, all user.s in 
the system had to be treated equally, and 
latecomers could not be subjected to arbi-
trary increase whereby fee of $700 in fint 
month was increased to $1,000, in second 
month and $1,500 in third month, which was 
not required to cover increased costs, but 
was done to induce early purchase of re-
q uirL-d 540 connections to raise sum re-
quired -to be dep<>sited before funding was 
approved by appropnate federal agencies. 
U.C.A.1953, 10-8--38. 
John C. Backlund, Provo, for defendant 
and appellant. 
Ray M. Harding, Pleasant Grove, for 
plaintiff and resp<>ndenL 
HOWE, Justice: 
Defendant Alpine City appeals from a 
summary judgment in favor of plaintiff 
declaring a sewer connection fee invalid. 
In 1976 Alpine City joined with American 
Fork, Lehi and Pleasant Grov• in establish-
!:115 :he :· modnOl(O~ Sprl:al Scrvit.:~ Distrct 
to aea~ a "'.l.:lte ·.va~er ~rt!atmenc. fac1ltty 
sernng the named cities. rn 1977, after 
obtaining various loans and grants, Alpine 
City had to deposit the sum of $375,000 
before funding wa.s approved by the appro-
priate federal agencies. Alpine City esti-
mated that with a projected hookup of 540 
9ewer connections, the initial price per con· 
nection would be $700 
In 1978 A!p1r:e City enacted an ordinance 
which provuJed that a fee for con~ection to 
the city sewer system could be fixe<l from 
time to time by resolut10n of the city coun· 
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cil. Thereafter, without ·.vr1tten resolution, 
Alpine City established a pl-'1n to sell ;:.~wer 
connection permits for the 1rnt1al ~nee of 
$700. To induce early purchase of the re-
quired number (540) of sewer connections to 
raise the $375,000, Alpine advised the public 
that the fee would be increased after one 
month to $1,000, and after two months to 
$1,500. Anyone could purchase the permits 
at $700 for subsequent resale to potential 
builders or homeowners. 
In December. of 1979 plaintiif purchased 
his sewer connection permit under protest 
for the price of .$1,500 and brought this 
action to ·have that fee declared void and 
unenforceable, and to permanently enjoin 
Alpine City -from assessing the fee. On 
motion for summary judgment brought by 
the plaintiff, the court below entered a 
partial summary judgment in favor of 
plaintiff ruling (l) that the fee was illegally 
assessed against the plaintiff because no 
written resolution had been adopted by the 
city council before December of 1979, and 
(2) that the plan was ultra vires under 
Alpines statutory authority. The court left 
for triaf the issue of whether plaintiff was 
entitled to a refund of the full amount of 
$1,500. Pursuant to stipulation of the par-
ties, the remaining issue was dismi55ed and 
an order making the partial summary judg-
ment final was entered. 
Alpine City appeals, contending that sum-
mary judgment was not proper and that the 
sewer connection fee plan adopted by it was 
a valid e'<:ercise of its general police powers. 
(1, 2) We now addreSd the two points of 
law on which the lower- court found for 
plaintiff in order to determine whether 
summary judgment was proper. Under 
U.C.A., 1953, § 11}-3-717, (Supp.1981) as 
enacted in 1977, all municipal governments 
"may exercise all administrative powers by 
resolution including, but not limited to: (1) 
Establishing water and sewer rates; · " 
Section ll}-3-506, enacted the same year, 
provides as follows: 
A roll call vote shall be taken and record-
ed for all ordinances, resolutions, and any 
action which would create a liability 
against the municipality and in any other 
case at the req ...... :-.: 
governing r.!Jd} u: .J. ·::es" )f 1 "no" •;nte 
and shail be :H<,,.~ed Every resolution 
or ordinance o;ha!I ',e in wnting before 
the vote 1s taken. 
Alpine City admitted in its response to 
plaintiff's req·Jest for production of docu-
ment:; that "[p]rior to December 1979. de-
fendant had not by resolution or ordinance 
in writing established a sewer connection 
fee for connection to the Alpine system." 
The language of the above statute requir-
ing that all resolutions shall be in writing is 
mandatory. The trial court thus did not err 
in concluding that the sewer connection fee 
was not established as required by law and 
therefore invalid. 
Cities and towns are empowered to 
charge for the use of their sewer systems 
by § 10--8-38. That· statute provide• in 
pertinent part: 
Any city or town may, for the purpose of 
defraying the cost of construction, recon-
struction, maintenance or operation of 
any sewer system or sewage treatment 
plant, proVide for mandatory hookup 
where the sewer is available and· within 
300 feet of any property line with any 
building used for human occupancy and 
make a reasonable charge for the use 
thereof. [Emphasis added.] · 
(3] The scope of power granted by the 
Legislature under this statute is clear. ~fu­
nicipahties may make a reasonable charge · 
for the use of a sewer system in order tha.~-~""';~ 1 
it be ;.,>lf-':lu.:::.ta1ning Hume 3uiirlers .-:Ll.s'n_ .:-:-
v. Pr''"' City, 2:l Ct:ih 2d .\U:!. 503 P.2d:.i<iL·.':. 
(1972); Banberry Dev. Cof'J" v. South Jar- · 
dan. Utah, 631 P.2d 899 (1981). Lafferty v. 
Payson City, Utah, 642 P.2d 376 (1982). ~o 
greater charge is authorized_ We do not 
purport to know whether $700, $1,000 or 
$1,500, or none of those amounts, 1s in fact 
a reasonable charge to con::itruct, maintain 
and operate Alpine's ~ystem. But a!\ three 
amounts obviously cannot be rea.'«Jnab!e 
within a two month penod. 
(4] Alpine City cites Rupp v. Crants-
v1/le, Ctah, 610 P 2<l 338 (19~01 '" ouprxirt of 
its contention· that the rate incre:J..::ie was 
proper. That case is readily d1st1ngui::)ha· 
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t)I~ Th,...,. 0 1n originJ.! charge rd ~2:SO ior 
t!dC.'; r•:-,,,j':'r,,,e connected to the S! S~Cm W<i.'.) 
rabed- :.v '",!;() when it was founrl ~nat the 
citv had :·dtled to include the µrice for 18.-
006 :inear :·eet of necessary se•,>,.tr laterals. 
The affected users re<;etved letkr'S explain-
ing the mistake, advertisements \vere run, 
and a public meeting was held. F•illowmg 
open di3cussion, the increase was voted 
upon and approved. Alpine City, on the 
other hand, does not contend that its subse· 
quent increases in the connection fee were 
required to cover increased costs, but con· 
cedes that they were made to induce early 
purchase of the required 540 connections. 
In so doing, Alpine did not uniformly treat · 
all users. 
11 E. McQuillin. The Law of Municipal 
Corporations § 3L30a (3d ed. 1982) states 
that "[t]he charges imposed for using oc for 
making connection with municipal sewers 
mu.5t be reasonable, not arbitrary, and uni-
form, not discriminatory." See also 3 Yok-
ley. Municipal Corporations § 503 (1958), 
stating that "[t]he rates for municipally 
owned utilities, such as a sanitary sewer 
system, must be uniformly applied, or the 
entire rate structure will be set aside." 
Alpine maintains that the "increases were 
required to enable the city to repay its 
bonded indebtedness on the project and its 
share of the bonded indebtedn""5 of the 
Timpanogos SP'>Cial Service District, the re-
gional agency providing sewer treatment 
facilities." If the connection fee is indeed 
to be used to retire bonded indebtedness, 
then all L!Sers On the system must be treat-
v...'. equally and iare-comen cannot be ::rnl">-
Jt:<.:led to .in arbitrary inaea.se of over lUOO',,. 
in a period of two months. See Weber 
Basin Home Builders' A.ss'n. v. Roy City, 26 
l'lah 2d 215, 487 P2ct 866 (1971). 
The ,ummary judgment granted below is 
affirmed basts to respondenL 
HALL, C.J . and STEW ART, OAKS and 
DURHA:I[. JJ .. concur. 
Elizabeth A. DEoiCHLER. Plaintiff 
and He!:!pondent. 
FIRDIAN'S FUND AMERICAN LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a corpora-
tion, Defendant and Appe!lanL· 
No. 18035. 
Supreme Court oi Utah. 
April '27, !983. 
Action was brought to recover benefits 
under accidental death-policy. The Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, G. Hal 
Taylor, J., rendered summary judgment for 
beneficiary, and insurer appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Durham, J., held that water-
ski kite was a "device for-aerial navigation" 
within meaning of exclusionary clause. 
Reversed. 
Howe, J., filed dissenting opinion in 
which Stewart, J .. joined. 
Insurance "=438.l 
Considering aerodynam_ic principles 
which affect ability to become and remain 
airborne and limited degree of operator 
control over direction, speed, and timing 
and place of landing, a waterski kite is a 
"device for aeria.I navigation" within mean· 
ing ()f exclusion c!au~ of life policy 
St:"e publication '.Vcrds Jnd Phrases 
for other jud.JciaJ construcuom and 
definitions. 
Elliott J. Williams, Bruce H. Jensen, Salt 
Lake City, for defendant and appellant. 
Henry S. Nygaard, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and respondent 
DURHAM, Justice: 
The respondent filed suit below to r""ov-
er insurance benefit.9 under an accidental 
ROBE~T J. :lEBR't " ASsc,:I/\TES 
Attorney !or ?laintl ! f 
1965 East "800 Sout.I) t2 
Sal':. LaJc.a City, Utah 341~7 
1Telepnone1 (90ll 262-39LS 
, .... 
:"".'HE DISTRIC"." COURT OF THE ~111no JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN A.ND e'OR $,\[. T l.."\KE COUNTY, 5TATE OF UTAH 
,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
'JCH~ :ALL and CLARK ~LNK!NS 
i\ ,"{ E' ~ 0 ~ 0 
0 i~ D E: R ?l.:i.intJ.t fs, 
·:s. ~i.vi.l ~lo. C-78-829 
C !TY OF WES':' JORDAN. 'J"i: .. 1, 
Oe fend.ant. 
?tal.;"ltlffs' rtl..·ncwt.::<l !'1otio11 :or S.inctions (July 29, 1982) 
...,as heard on i\uc;ust G. 1992. Pl.Ji.ntit'fs were repres~nted by 
1
Robert J. OeSrJ. Def, •1dunt was rcpres~nted by Stephen Homer. 
'After c~nslderJ.ng the ~rguments of counsel, it is hereby ordered ,, 
1
1 that: 
l. The trial is hereby bifurcated int.o two phases. 
2. Ae the first phaae, defendant shall have t.he burden 
ot ?reducing evidence on the followi.nq i.ssuesi 
~. Defendant to provide an accountinq of the truat fWld~ 
pald to defendant in the form of a 7\ 9ubdivid.er'a fee. Th• 
accounting 9hould, ~ ~. sµcci fy how defend&nt has 1pent 
the 7\ subdivis.Lon fL.:cs paid by i-:iL1lnt1ffs. The accountinq ahall 
also compare how de fend.int has spent the 7\ fees received from tho. 
other subdivisions 1.1.st.cJ. in Ocfcnd.1nt's Response to Oi1covery 
'dated May 26, 1982, CJll v. Clty _u1 '...-est Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 220 
I Ut. 19 79 I . 
!3. DcfendJ.nt to JLsclosc Lil...: calculations upon which it ,, 
rel.1.cs ':O .J.ssurc Lh.1t Lh·· 7\ fc~s .ire "'l.thin the stand.J.rd of 
.reasonableness. Th.Ls sh.111, ~ ~. include the data upon 
wh.1.c.'i defendant rclLcs to sho.., that 7\ (as opposed to 10\ or 90Dle 
other amount) lS a rc-.1sonable amount. Thia •hall further 1.nc:.~1148 
':.he -:Jta upon which l! ... ~ ... ndant rel.io.,;os tci shov that the newly 
. \..PPE1!DIX "H" 
I . 
\_ 
:!: 
;developed proper':_e3 ~!~r :he1= 
lrel.~t:..on t.o beneh.':.9 ~~, ~<:!r:-ed. ::1~'-"c_·_0---_:cceo...v_~'"-"--'---=-Sc'-u'-•"-'.'1 
! 
Jordan :1':'1, SJl ? .:.:! 30.j, rn~ . l ~ : 
a reasonable ~!iarqe :~·r -1 spcc1: ,"-lr:-:cse, or o1het!"'.er :t ·,.as !.n 
1
pract.:.ce used as a -1C'11.:r..lL ::ee ~" _,,;ounts ':O a :evenue :neasur1t. 
'taffer~v v. Pavson C:~\·, 642 P.ZJ 
I 
l 78 I Ut. : 98 21 . 
J. llhether Scct..un 9-..:-a 1: ..Jc st :ordan C.:. ty Jrdi."'lance 
I 
JJ wa.s prepa.red by :l"lc ?lann1:i.9 dn::! ::~nl.'19 :omnass1on, and '-'hether 
a pubL1c hea.r1n9 w.J.s n..::ld pr-1or t.o 'Jrur.ulgat.lnq the or:d!.na.nce. 
Call •.t. :::ty of ·~est :or::!an, 606 P 2J .:11, 219 (Ut. :..979). 
J. Plaint1ffs may reserve ..ll~ :ross-exa.minat.:.on Jn the 
11
torcqoing 1ssues unt1l the second :ih.Jse of the tr1a.l. 
~. After defendant ha3 l~'.troduced it.! evidence, :he t:hl 
1
1
sha.11 ::i~ recessed for a period convenient to the- Court, but no 
!'1ess than thirty (30) days.. After the Court resumes session, 
11 
.plaintiffs may conduct their cross-cx.Jm1nation of defendant'• ,, 
, witnesses. 
5. After plalnt.o.f!s have conJ.uctcd their c=oss-exa.minat!Or 1 
11 
and after allowi:iq !'or .Jppropri.ate re-direct and re-crosa. e.xam.ina-
t:.ion~ ?lal.nt:l..ffs sh.J.11 ,:.:iroceed to :mt on their case-1n-chie~. 
6. This second phclse of the trial shall include the 
th~orie:s. listed !:lt!lO ..... i"l.llntl.f:s sn:ill have the burden of proo.: 
1
w1th respect to each ~~ttcr listc<l below: 
A. Whether the '1<t fee rcqu1:-cd of plaintiffs had any 
:-easonable- rel.Jt.;.onsh.1.p co the nccUs for flood control, parke, lfi' 
racrcation facilitH~S :rc3ted by t~c1::- subd.lvi.sion. Call v. Citv 
of west: .Jordan, 6l4 ?.:J. 1157, :259 1 Ut. 1979); Banberry O.v. 
' ' Corp. 'I. South Jard.Jr. :.:.cv, 631 P :J B99, 90) (Ut. 1981). 
9. Whether the 7\ fee h.Js required the newly dev•l~ed 
proper~ ... e9 to bear more than the1r equitable share of capital c:o• 
i.'"1 re~dt1on to t.".c ::icncf:..ta con!crccJ. aa~berry Dev. Corp. v. 
South Jordan C.:.t·1, OJl P :!d 903 -(Ut i98ll. 
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I 
'<'lhet."cr :!c ~t.::ndd.nt. !hould ;.-i.iy attorney fees a• a 1anction 
: ~or :al:.'J.re o:o .Tlaltc :!J..scovery an::! ..... ~ so, 1.n vhat amount. 
D. All ~ther t~coc1es r~1sc~ oy :he pleadings. 
I 
?lai:it.dts nJ.ve ...,aivc:d thci:.- demand !or a Jury trial. 
;21aint;,.!!s ~ur':.:-:cr .:ontcnd that J. ;ur'f :rlal 1.a not quar&nteed by 
. t.he- const.i..tution (Utan or Un1tcd StJ.tcsl for issues ru.sed in 
t.his ':r1al. Defendant Jcmands ,1 Jury trial. Request for jury 
trial 1s den1ed for- ~he reason thJ.t the principal issue to be 
d.atttr:ni:ied J.n thl.S C.lsc is ~hethcr Section 9-C·ll (2) of trleat J'orda.tt 
City OrdinanCll!' JJ i.s constitut1onally valid. Thia .:.nvolv•• a law 
detarm1nat1on pr1mar1ly. 
DATED thu ___ d~y of August, l98l. 
DY TH!! COURT: 
Honorable Kanne eh R!qtrup 
r hereby cert1fy chat t h~nd delivered L true and correct 
!icopy of t.h9' foreqoinq 1\M£N0£0 ORDl!R to: 
STU!IEN HOMER 
l8Sll West 7800 South 
West Jordan CLty, Utah 84084 
on this __ day of ,\ugust, l98l. 
POPERT J. DEBRY - A0849 
RCBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATFS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
9G5 East 4800 South, Suite 2 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN CALL and CLARK JENKINS, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
CITY OF WEST JORDAN, 
Defendants and Respondents.) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-) 
MOTION TO FILE ADDENDUM 
TO BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
No. 19186 
This case was briefed under the old appellate 
rules. The new appellate rules require relevant documents 
to be reproduced in an addendum (Rule 24f). 
Although the addendum was not required at the time 
briefs were filed in this case, an addendum may be of 
assistance to the Court. Furthermore, an addendum may save 
the Court a substantial amount of time in researching the 
record. 
The proposed Addendum (attached hereto) relates to 
Appellant's Reply Brief, page 5, footnote 1. Specifically, 
the addendum constitutes the Master Plan of West Jordan. R 
6~3, et seq.) 
West Jordan claims that the public hearing which 
approved the Master Plan, also approved t.L ,~ft. .~:J·~h .r·. b.,. _ ~1 ·· 
subdividers. (Ordinance No. 33.) JUL 31985 
···c.: 
West ,;c,rdan '."las not presented any agenda or 
1llin11t-es of the meet2-ng. Thus the only evidence of the 
content of the meeting is the Master Plan itself. 
DATED this I day of -~--~-·~1 ..,.... ____ , 19 8 5. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
), 
By: /(_ t~ ,_/ ), 
ROBERT J~RY 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
hereb:: rcrtify that a true and correct copy of the 
<'oregoing MOTION TO FILE ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
(Call & Jer.kins v. City of West Jordan, No. 19186), was 
mailed, U.S., Mail, postage prepaid, ry1m,eo the following: 
Stephen G. Homer 
West Jordan City Attorney 
1850 West 7800 south 
west Jordan, Utah 84084 
3 
this :P___day of 
